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Abstract 
 
 
A number of studies have examined the risk management practices within non-financial 
companies. This research is a comparative study of derivative usage among UK and Italian non-
financial listed SMEs over the time period 2005-2012. The aspects it refers concern the 
management of financial risks which to date (in Italy) has been little studied from the point of view 
of literature because of the paucity of data. The aim of this research is to provide evidence for UK 
and Italian non-financial listed SMEs on the determinants of hedging and on the types of financial 
derivatives used as hedging instruments. 
 
 
--- 
 
 
Numerosi studi hanno esaminato le pratiche di risk management da parte delle imprese non 
finanziarie. Questa ricerca confronta l’utilizzo dei derivati da parte delle Piccole e Medie Imprese 
non finanziarie quotate del Regno Unito ed Italiane nell’arco temporale 2005-2012. Gli aspetti che 
vengono analizzati riguardano la gestione dei rischi finanziari che, a causa della scarsità dei dati, 
ad oggi in Italia sono stati poco approfonditi. Il presente lavoro intende dimostrare empiricamente 
quali sono i fattori che influiscono sulle scelte delle PMI Inglesi ed Italiane ad adottare gli strumenti 
derivati ai fini di copertura per proteggersi contro i rischi finanziari. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The last decades, compared to the previous decades, have been 
characterized by a greater volatility in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, 
commodity prices and securities’ markets prices. To reduce the significant 
negative effects that can be produced by those fluctuations on the firms’ wealth, 
were made available to companies a numbers of risk management instruments 
such as financial derivatives that allowed them to transfer financial price risks to 
other parties. 
The aim of this research is to provide evidence for United Kingdom and Italian 
non-financial listed Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) on the determinant of 
hedging and on the types of financial derivatives used as hedging instruments. It is 
a comparative study between United Kingdom and Italian SMEs that intends to 
evaluate whether differences exist between these two countries. 
The limited research on the use of derivatives by non-financial SMEs in the 
United Kingdom and in Italy provides the motivation for this study. 
The majority of these studies investigated about the use of derivative by U.S. 
non-financial companies such as Nance et al. (1993), Dodle (1993), Bodnar et al. 
(1995), Mian (1996), Geczy et al. (1997), Gay and Nam (1998), Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001), Graham and Rodgers (2002), Guay and Kothary (2003) and Kedia 
and Mozumdar (2003). 
Also, there have been some studies on the use of financial derivatives by 
European companies such as Berkman and Bradbury (1996) about New Zeland 
non-financial firms, Hakkarainen et al. (1997) and Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) 
related to Finland firms, Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) about Germany firms, 
Alkeback and Hagelin (1999) about Swedish companies, Loderer and Pichler 
(2000) about Switzerland companies, De Ceuster et al. (2000) about Belgium 
firms. 
Meanwhile there is little literature about the use of financial derivatives in the 
United Kingdom and fewer in Italy. Grant and Marshall (1997), Mallin et al. (2001), 
El-Masry (2006) and Judge (2006) have conducted surveys to investigate the use 
of derivatives by UK non-financial firms. Fewer studies have been done to 
investigate this subject in Italy, Bison, Pelizzon and Sartore (2002) and Bodnar et 
al. (2013). Both of these UK and Italian empirical studies focus on large firms. 
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Therefore this research based on previous literature, proposed a series of 
hypotheses that have been tested with econometric techniques to check whether 
these hypotheses drawn from financial theories are met in UK and Italian non-
financial listed companies or not. The econometric methods used have been 
univariate and multivariate logit tests. They have been used to analyse the data of 
a sample of 166 UK non-financial listed SMEs and a sample of and of 66 Italian 
non-financial listed SMEs, which have been handily collected. 
The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
the existing literature on the use of derivatives. Chapter two discuss the financial 
risks. Chapter three describes the data used and how the data for United Kingdom 
and Italian non-financial listed SMEs have been collected, further describes the 
methods implemented for testing the hypotheses. Chapter four further extend the 
theoretical aspects of the determinants of hedging into hypotheses, describes the 
effects in different variables used to measure the effects of hedging, and it 
explains the dependent and independent variables. Chapter five contains the 
descriptive analyses with an overview of the hedging data, quotes from annual 
reports, univariate and multivariate regression. The last section includes 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE 
 
1.1: Introduction. 
In the real world the financial market is imperfect and hedging can directly 
affect the firms’ cash flow. 
Risk management can be understood taking into account that the modern 
financial theory is based on three major paradigms the rational wealth 
maximization, the risk/return tradeoff and the no-arbitrage principle. At the same 
time each of these paradigms can be extended to three major areas of finance the 
corporate finance, the financial intermediation and the investments.  
To understand why risk should be managed have been developed two 
different hypotheses. The first is the Value Maximizing Theory of Risk 
Management that is based on the fact that a company will engage in risk 
management policies if they enhance the firm’s value and its shareholders’ value. 
This value can arise from the minimization of costs of financial distress, from the 
minimization of the taxes and from the minimization of the possibility that the firm 
may be forced to forego positive net present value projects because it lacks the 
internally generated funds to do so. The second hypothesis is the Managerial 
Theory of Risk Management that is based on an agency argument. It considers 
the risk aversion of managers associated with their own forms of remuneration, the 
problems of information asymmetry and agency costs. 
 
1.2: Risks faced by firms. 
Generally firms face mainly three types of risks, business risk, strategic risk 
and financial risk. 
Business risk is related to the firm’s operation; in fact it can be identified as 
operating risk, technological risk, informational risk or distributional risk. These 
types of risk are assumed by a firm when it wants to profit by a competitive 
situation in the aforementioned fields. This kind of risk can be managed by 
management’s internal operating decisions. Fatemi and Luft (2002) state that if 
firms are unable to mitigate their operating risk on advantageous terms may 
ultimately fail, and Montgomery Ward1 is an excellent example of this type of 
failure. Business risk is influenced by numerous factors such as sales volume, per-
                                                             
1
 It was an American retail giant enterprise. For more details see: "Montgomery Ward Goes Under": National Post Dec.29, 
2000, "Montgomery Ward Closes Its Doors," Leslie Kaufman with Claudia H. Deutsch, The New York Times, Dec.29, 2000.  
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unit price, input costs, competition, overall economic climate and government 
regulations. A firm that has a higher business risk should choose a capital 
structure that has a lower debt ratio to ensure that it can meet its financial 
obligations at all times. 
Strategic risk is those factors that can affect the firm and the value of its 
shareholders. It can be generated by economic, political, domestic or international 
factors. This type of risk has the characteristic to have a long duration and so can 
produce negative effect on the firm’s value for long period of time. It can arise from 
making poor business decisions, from the substandard execution of decisions, 
from inadequate resource allocation and from failure to respond well to changes in 
the business environment. 
Financial risk can be seen as an umbrella term that includes different types of 
risk that are associated with financing, including a financial transaction that 
includes the risk of default of a company. This type of risk is going to be discussed 
in deep in the next chapter. 
 
1.3: Shareholders Maximizing Theory. 
The first invocation to risk management occurs with Markowitz (1952) who 
introduced a crucial element: the risk. He considered the risk not as a general idea 
or as an emotion but as a number. With his model risk-return postulates the 
investors risk aversion and identifies the variables involved in investments 
decisions that are expected return and equity standard deviation. This model does 
not provide any information concerning the relationship between the performance 
and the risk of an equity/security. In fact, it explains the performance and the risk 
as input data. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the most well-known equilibrium 
model in the financial market. It was proposed by Sharpe (1964) and adjusted by 
Lintner (1965) and by Mossin (1966). It assumes the concept of informational 
efficiency, the absence of transaction costs, the homogeneity of expectations, and 
the presence of risk free rate and suggests the trade-off between risk and 
performance. It has three main variables: the risk free rate, the coefficient of 
systematic risk (beta) and the risk premium. The CAPM identifies a linear 
relationship between the yield of a security and its degree of risk, the latter is 
measured by a factor (beta), and this factor is proportional to the covariance 
between the bond yield and the market yield. Therefore, the CAPM identifies those 
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factors that affect the financial assets’ profitability and identifies the investor’ 
required return for each level of risk. 
Each model point out that, the performance depends only on the contribution 
that the individual investor has on the market or on the systematic risk of the 
portfolio. Therefore the shareholders will not be willing to remunerate risk 
management interventions designed to cover specific risks that, for definition, can 
be diversified within their own investment portfolio. 
Another important front of financial theory relevant to the study of the 
investment choices of the industrial and financial companies has further developed 
the debate on companies risk management. On one side the Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) theory shows that changes in the firm’s financial policy do not affect its 
value if shareholders can replicate or reverse these decisions at zero costs. Since 
hedging policies are equivalent to general changes in the firm’s financial structure, 
they also fail to enhance firm value as long as basic assumptions of Modigliani and 
Miller are met. In presence of market imperfections, reducing the firm’s 
performance volatility can increase the net cash flows accruing to shareholders 
either directly and indirectly. Directly, by generating tax or transaction cost 
savings, or in the other hand by improving the contractual relations with company 
stakeholders. Corporate hedging can also help to reduce the firm’s cost of capital 
which raises the present value of future net cash flow streams for corporate 
hedging; to make sense, it must however further hold that it is the least costly way 
of obtaining these value increases. Modigliani and Miller (M&M) as a theory has 
formalized the contribution of risk management in conditions of perfect markets. 
Later models recognized market imperfections, releasing the restrictive 
assumptions and ascribing to risk management a key role in the creation of value. 
Since the mid-80s emerged a new vision of funding policies that gives the risk 
management a different role. The key concept of M&M, that the value is created 
through good investments, is not rejected but the financial risk management is 
considered a key element to enable companies to make good investments. It is 
evident how the M&M assumptions are, and therefore the perfect world considered 
by them does not exist. In a real context characterized by market imperfections, 
companies are exposed to economic and financial risks that if do not be hedged 
could generate costs for the companies. 
The first front of research studies how risk management allows to reduce the 
destruction of value generated by the taxation asymmetry. 
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The tax-asymmetry topic has to be analysed with reference to two different 
situations: the progressive evolution of taxation and the different tax treatment of 
the two financing sources (risk capital and debt capital). 
About the first point, the progressive evolution of taxation, it means that a company 
is required to pay a tax that increases with the value of the company before tax 
(pre-tax value). In a scenario like this, the best solution for a company is to present 
profits in the lowest tax rates in different accounting periods, rather than having 
negative profits for a year and profits, in the following years, that are positioned in 
the highest area. Therefore, through the risk manager you can achieve a reduction 
in the overall tax burden due to the leveling of the economic results obtained in the 
various exercises. 
In the mid-80s appeared the first models that made a valuable quantitative 
support for the analysis of hedging on firm value. Clifford, Smith and Stulz (1985) 
in their research they develop a positive theory of hedging by value-maximizing 
corporations in which hedging is part of overall financing policy. They demonstrate 
how hedging, in special circumstances, can increase firm value. The researchers 
study how the M&M hypothesis can be related with hedging policies. For the first 
time they show that, if the firm’s fiscal rates are a convex function, hedging can 
reduce taxes. Furthermore, more convex is the fiscal rate function higher the tax 
benefits can be. Thus, can be stated that the progressivity of taxation is the key 
element that makes the function that describes the rate convex. Other factors can 
contribute to generate a convex tax rate, as: operating losses fiscally deductible, 
fiscal credits investment and foreign fiscal credits. Much higher are these preferred 
items, the greater the tax benefits for a company that hedges. 
With regard to the issue of tax asymmetries, a firm, thanks to increased 
exploitation of the tax shield, which increases its optimal leverage level could 
increase its "after-tax expected cash flow”. Risk management increases the 
possibility to attract more debt capital because it reduces the gains volatility and 
therefore reduce the overall company risk, without reducing the net present value 
of the investments. With a lower level of risk a company can sustain a higher 
debt/equity ratio which means the ability to make greater use of the tax shelter. 
Leland (1998) in his article demonstrates that through hedging policies firms 
could achieve a higher debt capacity. The primary benefit of financing with debt 
capital resides in the deductibility of interest. The study shows that hedging allows 
firms to increase their debt capacity and thus the firm value. 
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Graham, Clifford and Smith (1999) in their analysis, use a simulation method 
to test more than 80,000 Comupustat firm-year observations and find that 
approximately 50 percent of corporations face convex tax functions. Among these 
50 percent, roughly one-quarter of these firms have potential tax savings from 
hedging that appear material, in extreme cases firms can save expected tax 
liability exceed 40 percent. While 25 percent have concave tax functions. Can be 
stated that firms facing convexity tax-function, hedging lowers expected tax 
liabilities, thereby providing an incentive to hedge. This paper reports the same 
results of Smith and Stutz (1985). The study of Graham and Rogers (2002) starts 
from these two assumptions: that hedging can increase the debt capacity and 
increase the tax deduction, and hedging can reduce expected tax liability when tax 
function is convex. They find that tax is a factor for firms to hedge. This because 
hedging can lead to larger debt capacity and tax deduction, and this research was 
the first evidence that suggested that hedging can increase debt capacity and firm 
value. They find no evidence support about the relationship between hedging and 
tax convexity. Graham and Rogers (2002) point out that there is a positive 
relationship between hedging and debt capacity. In fact they demonstrate that 
hedging can increase debt capacity but higher leverage can increase the incentive 
to hedge. Their findings show that firms facing high expected distress costs would 
hedge more with derivatives. Another research done by Carter, Rogers and 
Simkins (2003) demonstrate that the value increase from hedging increases with 
capital investment. The results show that in the airline industry investor value 
hedging more because they expect hedging can protect the ability for firms to 
invest in wicked times. 
The second front of research is related to the reduction of financial distress 
costs. Risk management strategies allow reducing the total risk exposure of a firm, 
making the financial distress less likely to happen or reducing the costs. 
Smith and Stutz (1985) show, by a quantitative model, that hedging reduces the 
probability of a firm to incur in a financial distress situation and thus reduce its 
expected costs. Financial distress costs and crisis costs have a negative impact 
on the shareholder wealth. In fact hedging becomes more profitable with the 
increment of long term debt because the probability that the firm is going to face 
these costs is directly related to the amount of these debt respects to the asset 
value. Therefore, is possible to conclude stating that a proper analysis of financial 
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distress’ costs should take into account both, the probability of encountering these 
problems and also any related costs. 
An important aspect of hedging is that if it increases the firm value, at the 
same time it shifts this wealth from shareholders to bondholders, and this makes 
shareholders poorest. At least there are two ways in which the market creates 
pressure implementation of hedging policies. The first is because hedging allows 
firms to reduce their debt cost. But if the probability of failure would be relevant, 
the gain resulting from the non-hedging policy would be sufficient to overcome the 
costs associated with the loss of reputation, because the firms’ reputation is 
important only if allow it to not fail. On the other hand, hedging provides a means 
through which it is possible to reduce the costs of distress imposed by bond 
covenants. That because, hedging, reducing the content of the overall risk of the 
company, could make the debts more safe and secure and then ensure that the 
contracts do not become binding. 
 
1.4: Underinvestment problems. 
About the relationship between hedging and investment opportunities has to 
be taken in to account that firms often rise capital through internal capital and/or 
external capital. But a capital increase by internal funds is less costly than one 
done using external funds. That explain why firms to raise their capital use internal 
funds firstly. So, the third front of the research is the one related to 
underinvestment problem. This phenomenon arise when the firm’s internal cash 
generation is not enough to fund growth opportunities and the funding from 
external sources is so expensive that lead the company to cut the investment level 
under the optimal level. Myers (1977) in his paper stated that investment 
opportunities must be assessed in relation to the possible conflict of interest 
between shareholders (holders of residual rights) and holders of debt (holders of 
fixed charges). Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) with their research show that 
when external funds are more costly for firms than internally generated funds, 
there will be a benefit to hedging. Thus can be stated that hedging helps the firm 
to reduce the volatility/variability of internal funds assuring that it has enough 
internal funds that can be used for investment opportunities and reduce the 
possibility of underinvestment. The findings of this research have been extended 
by Gay and Nam (1998). These researchers examined the relationship between 
the use of derivatives and underinvestment hypothesis. Their study analyses the 
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interaction effects among a firm’s investment opportunities, cash stocks, and 
internally generated funds to distinguish clearly the role of the underinvestment 
hypothesis. The study starts from the underinvestment problem as a determinant 
of corporate hedging policy. Have been found that there is a positive relationship 
between firm’s derivative use and its growth opportunities. The research 
demonstrate that firms with enhanced investment opportunities use more 
derivative instruments when they have relatively low cash stocks. At the same time 
firms with a positive correlation between investment expenditures and internal 
cash flows, tend to have a smaller derivative exposure, and this suggests that they 
could use natural hedgers. 
 
1.5: Positive role of hedging. 
The firsts authors whose investigate the positive role of hedging are Allayannis 
and Weston (2001). They analyse if the use of foreign currency derivative (FCDs) 
is related with higher firm market value captured by Tobin’s Q. The sample is 
composed by 720 large US non-financial firms over the time period 1990-1995. 
The results show that, in a sample of firms with foreign sales, there is a positive 
relation between the use of FCDs and firm value, and the hedging premium is 
around 4.78% of firm value. Therefore the results show that in those years which 
the dollar has appreciated, the hedging premium is much larger. The results from 
the analysis made by Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003) are consistent with the 
ones of Allayannis and Weston (2001), because they show that the jet fuel 
hedging is positive related to airlines firm value, and the hedging premium is in 
range of 12-16%. 
 
1.6: Managerial Theory of Risk Management. 
Through information asymmetry managers have more information than 
outsiders. Thus can be stated that the decision concerning the use of hedging 
instruments, the types and the dimension depends on a manager’s utility function, 
on a manager’s views about the market and on the visibility of the firm’s 
accounting information. About the manager’s utility function, have to be taken in to 
account the theory of Williamson (1964). This theory assumes that the utility 
maximization is a manager’s solo objective. It is only in a corporate form of 
business organization that a self-interest seeking manager can maximize his own 
utility, since there exists a separation of ownership and control. So, manager can 
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use their discretion to frame and execute policies which would maximize their own 
utilities rather than maximizing the shareholder’s utilities. This represents the 
principal-agent problem2. Smith and Stutz (1985) with their research show that 
managers’ risk aversion can lead them to hedge but they do not necessarily do so. 
They point out that the hedging decisions for managers can be influenced by a 
linear or convex compensation function. If the firm’s compensation function is 
convex the less the firm is expected to hedge, in the other hand when managers 
have significant fraction of the firm, is expect the firm to hedge more (linear 
function). De Marzo and Duffie (1995) stated that the optimal hedging policy 
adopted by managers depends on the type of accounting information available to 
shareholders. Therefore hedging could help outside investors to observe 
manager’s ability. Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) in their research examine the 
importance of manager reputation. The key idea is that managers with greater 
skills in relation to the management of certain types of risks want to be sure to be 
able to communicate effectively in the market such superior ability. Therefore, their 
aim is to minimize the uncertainty about its performance. To do this, managers will 
tend to cover only the risks that they cannot control properly and with respect to 
which they do not have any special skills management. The authors argue that 
hedging reducing the volatility entails costs in terms of decrease in the value of the 
equity. Managers, therefore, undertake hedging policies only if they believe they 
have skills that are superior to other managers in the industry to offset these costs. 
The managers “less able” instead generally choose not to cover, either because 
their costs will be higher, and groped for the lot. Tufano (1996), analyzing the 
North American gold mining industry he tests whether cross-sectional differences 
in risk management activity can be explained by academic theory, such as those 
firms which more likely face financial distress would have more extensive risk 
management, otherwise risk management would be linked to risk aversion of 
managers. His findings suggests that firms whose managers hold greater equity 
stakes manage more gold price risks and those whose managers hold options 
may manage less gold price risks. His results are consistent with those of Smith 
and Stulz (1985). 
There are other firm characteristic that can be related to hedging. 
                                                             
2
 The Principal-Agent problem is part of the agency theory, because it develops when a principal creates an environment in 
which the agent has incentives to align its interests with those of the principal, typically through incentives. Therefore, the 
principal crates incentives for the agent to act as the principal wants, because the principal faces information asymmetry 
and risk with regards to whether the agent has effectively completed a contract. (Michael Jensen and William H. Meckling).  
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The agency cost is a phenomenon that affects the opportunistic behavior that 
management can implement for their own exclusive benefit or for the benefit of its 
shareholders and to the detriment of third party lenders. Tufano (1998)  recognizes 
and documents that the practice of risk management can be designed to protect 
investment with a negative net present value for the shareholders and are able to 
increase personal wealth managers. 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) with their research tested the hypothesis that 
hedging increases firm’s value by reducing expected taxes, expected costs of 
financial distress or other agency costs. This test has been done using survey data 
related to the use of forwards, futures, swaps and options by firms combined with 
data on firms characteristics collected by Compustat. The analysis shows that 
firms using hedge instruments are larger, have higher research and development 
expenditure, have more growth opportunities and have higher dividends. Mian 
(1996), his paper provides empirical evidence on the corporate hedging decision. 
Finding show that larger firms are more likely to hedge and this supports the 
hypothesis that there are economies of scale in hedging and that hedging activities 
are more influenced by information and transaction consideration than by the cost 
of rising capital. 
 
1.7: Empirical Evidence. 
Empirically, the use of derivatives by firms appears to be widespread. A large 
number of studies have documented the extent and nature of derivatives use by 
non-financial firms. Some of these studies are based on survey data and other are 
based on disclosed data. The 90s were marked by a series of investigations 
whose purpose is to demonstrate and quantify from an empirical point of view the 
link between firm value and hedging risks. In this framework there are researches 
of various authors who have set themselves the goal of verifying whether the firms 
use those instruments with the same goals supported by theory. 
The most quoted empirical investigation is the one of Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993). In their research they identify several motivations to explain why 
hedging increase the firm value. They define the hedging instruments such as the 
use of "off-balance sheet" instruments as opposed to the techniques of reducing 
the volatility of the results of "on-balance sheet" such as the creation of special 
funds or the conclusion of insurance contracts. The study wants to provide 
empirical evidence of the theoretical hypotheses about the utility of hedging 
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proposed in the literature, not only related with taxation, but also with regard to the 
costs of financial distress, to the underinvestment problem and the agency costs. 
For the purpose of research, the authors have collected by a survey addressed to 
the Chief Executive Officer of the companies belonging to the Fortune 500 and 
S&P 400. The analysis provides a first evidence of the hypothesis that states that 
firms which have a convex tax rates function hedge more, whilst there is no 
empirical evidence about the correlation between hedging and the possibility of 
incurring in a financial distress situation. Finally, the authors found evidence of a 
positive correlation between R&D expenditure and the use of derivative 
instruments. Block and Gallagher (1986) and Booth, Smith and Stulz (1984), in 
their researches, they argued that hedging programs exhibit informational scale 
economies and that larger firms are more likely to employ managers with the 
specialized information to manage a hedging program employing these 
instruments. This arguments imply that large firms are more likely to hedge. 
Dolde (1993) with his research has been the first to confirm the hypothesis 
about the probability to incur in financial distress stated by Smith and Stulz (1985). 
He examined Fortune 500 companies by survey. His research shows that there is 
a positive relationship between leverage and financial distress expected costs, 
therefore firms with high level of leverage decide to hedge against financial risks 
that can occur. Also this study show the positive relationship between R&D costs 
and hedging, as the theory states. 
Bodnar et al. (1995) have done the first surveys assessing the use of 
derivative instruments.3 Their surveys attempts to sample the entire U.S. non-
financial corporate (listed) population. They find that usage is not widespread and 
is more common among large firms. They also try to understand the reasons that 
justify this utilization. Their focus on the prevalence of derivative usage, reason for 
use or non-use and preference among different instruments, including concerns 
about risk management programs and internal control issues. 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996) they studied the financial accounts of 166 firms 
listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange that had to report the fair value and 
notional value of all their off-and on-balance sheet financial instruments. Their 
results show that derivative usage increases with certain financial features such as 
leverage, tax losses, size, the proportion of shares held by directors and the 
dividend payout ratio. Firms whit high interest coverage and high liquidity hedge 
                                                             
3
 Called the Wharton Surveys. 
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less. Also is shown that the use of derivative is not related with short-term asset 
growth, and this instrument might be used by firms that experienced difficulties in 
varying their operating activities in response to changes in economic variables. 
Furthermore the analysis demonstrates that hedging can be used to exploit 
economies of scale associated with transaction costs and firms with sophisticated 
financial management are more likely to hedge. Companies that use derivatives 
tend to be more highly geared and have higher dividend payout ratios than their 
non-user counterparts. The authors concluded that companies use derivatives to 
reduce the cost of financial distress and to increase the present value of tax 
losses, and they suggested that when firms are attempting lower agency costs, 
and in the meanwhile have low dividend payout ratio and a high proportion of 
liquid assets, are less likely to hedge  
Detailed data on derivative use is available only for few industries, such as the 
one investigated by Tufano (1996). His study represents the most historically 
important contribution associated to the Managerial Theory of Risk Management. 
In this research have been used a sample of firms belonging to a single industry, 
the gold extraction. This sector is characterized by some special features that 
make it ideal for a survey on risk management. First of all, this type of business 
face a common exposure and the substantial fluctuations in the price of gold that 
financial markets are able to cope with a wide range of financial instruments. In 
addition, companies in this sector have adopted a rich variety of policies aimed at 
managing the risks involved in such volatility and finally the data related to the 
implementation of these policies are public. In accordance with the assumptions 
made by Smith and Stulz (1985), Tufano focuses on risk aversion of the manager 
as a cause of Financial Risk Management. As demonstrated by Smith and Stulz 
(1985), firms whose managers hold more stock options and therefore have a more 
convex payoff structure tend to hedge less the volatility of gold price. In addition, 
firms whose managers have greater wealth invested in shares of the company, are 
more likely to hedge against commodity risk. 
The Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) research is an investigation based on 
corporate derivative information collected directly by annual reposts. This study 
examines the use of currency derivatives with a sample of 372 non-financial firms 
in the U.S.. They identify firm characteristics that have not been considered in 
earlier studies and address issues of endogeneity. Also, they extended the market 
imperfections theories by considering how the costs of using hedging can affect 
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firms’ decision to use currency derivatives. Their findings show that firms with the 
greatest economies of scale in implementing and maintaining a risk management 
program are more likely to use currency derivative4. 
Grant and Marshall (1997) they have surveyed the treasurers of large UK firms 
about their use of derivatives instruments. Their results shows a widespread use 
of derivatives instruments as swaps, forwards and options. The mainly instrument 
used to hedge themselves against risk exposure are interest rate and currency 
risks instruments, but at the same time they shows that is increasing the use of 
derivatives instruments to manage commodity and equity risks. 
There is another study by Hakkarainen et al. (1997) on European firms that is 
independent of the Wharton surveys. This research reports results of a survey 
made in 1994 about the management of interest rate risk by the top 1000 largest 
Finnish non-financial companies. 
Gay and Nam (1998) focused on the underinvestment problem and the aim of 
their research is to find empirical evidence to what stated by the literature about 
underinvestment problem. As discussed in the previous paragraph, the study 
analyses the interaction effects among a firm’s investment opportunities, cash 
stocks, and internally generated funds to distinguish clearly the role of the 
underinvestment hypothesis. The study starts from the underinvestment problem 
as a determinant of corporate hedging policy. Have been found that there is a 
positive relationship between firm’s derivative use and its growth opportunities. 
The research demonstrate that firms with enhanced investment opportunities use 
more derivative instruments when they have relatively low cash stocks. At the 
same time firms with a positive correlation between investment expenditures and 
internal cash flows, tend to have a smaller derivative exposure, and this suggests 
that they could use natural hedgers. 
Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) completed two direct application of the Wharton 
surveys for Germany and show that German firms are more likely to use derivative 
contracts than U.S. firms. There is another research, done by Alkeback and 
Hagelin (1999) who provides evidence about the use of derivatives instruments 
among Swedish non-financial companies. This study compared its results with 
those presented in Bodnar et al. (1995) without taking in to account the differences 
in size and industry classification. The survey results show that between Swedish 
firms there is a marked lack of knowledge about derivatives instruments. 
                                                             
4
 Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997). 
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There are other researches that indicated that non-financial firms were not 
using derivatives for speculative purposes.5 One is the anonymous survey done by 
Graham, Clifford and Smith (1999) published a second investigation liked with the 
one done by Nance, Smith and Smithson published in 1993. In this research, 
Smith and Graham used different method. They collected 80.000 firm-year 
observations using Compustat and they find that approximately 50 percent of 
corporation face convex tax functions. Among these 50 percent, roughly one-
quarter of these firms have potential tax savings from hedging that appear 
material, in extreme cases firms can save expected tax liability exceed 40 percent. 
While 25 percent have concave tax functions. Can be stated that firms facing 
convexity tax-function, hedging lowers expected tax liabilities, thereby providing an 
incentive to hedge. The Graham and Rogers research appeared in the Journal of 
Finance in April 2002. The study analyses data from the Electronic Data Gathering 
and Retrieval of the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission). The authors 
concluded their analysis stating that companies hedge to increase the borrowing 
capacity in order to increase the value of the company due to the increased 
exploitation of the tax shield but do not engage in hedging policies when there is a 
convex tax function. 
Jalivand, Switzer and Tang (2000) their research show that there is similarities 
and differences between Canadian, American and European risk managers. The 
results suggest that the use of derivatives is more widespread in Canada than in 
the USA and continental Europe. 
Loderer and Pichler (2000) they surveyed 165 Swiss listed firms in 1996 and 
get 96 responses. Their sample contain more large Swiss listed firms, and those 
have an higher exposure to currency risk. they want to investigate risk 
management policies of Swiss industrial firms. The results show that less than 
40% of the sample can quantify its exposure to currency risk, even though most of 
the sample reports using derivatives. 
Fatemi and Glaum (2000) have done a study of risk management practices in 
large non-financial German firms. The research suggests as the scope of risk 
management expands, firms are likely to cover a larger number of areas of an 
organization’s activities as well as the variety of risks including financial, 
environmental, industry and operational. 
                                                             
5
 Francis and Stephan (1993), Berkman and Bradbury (1996) and Graham and Rogers (2002). 
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De Ceuster et al (2000) analysed the use of derivatives by large Belgium non-
financial firms. They have surveyed 344 non-financial firms but got response from 
74 companies. Data show that 65.8% of the companies used derivatives 
instruments. Bigger companies are more likely to use derivatives respect to small 
companies. The propensity to use derivatives depends also to the industry sector, 
in fact chemical companies are more likely to hedge. The interest rate and 
commodity risk are the mainly risks whose are hedged. 
Mallin et al. (2001) surveyed the use of derivatives instruments among non-
financial listed firms in the UK and compared their findings to the results in Bodnar 
et al. (1995). They found derivative usage among larger UK companies, but in 
earnings as the primary objective for using derivatives. 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) with their paper examines the use of foreign 
currency derivative and the impact on exchange rate risk by S&P 500 non-financial 
firms in the time period 1992-1993. They show that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of foreign debt and the ratio of foreign sales over total sales. 
Moreover the study finds that the use of foreign currency derivatives significantly 
reduces the exchange rate risk that companies face. Furthermore, firms also use 
foreign debt as an alternative or in conjunction with foreign currency derivatives. 
Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) analyzed 44 non-financial listed companies 
during 1985-1991. The results show that the export-to-net-sales is positive and 
highly significant, that companies raise FX debt to hedge their foreign currency 
exposures, that larger firms are more likely to borrow foreign currencies and that is 
shown by a positive and highly significant log total book assets variable, that there 
is a significant and positive interest differential, furthermore the industrial 
concentration variable, dividend yield and the return on book assets are not 
significant but have the expected sign. 
Guay and Kothari (2003) find that despite the widespread corporate use of 
interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives, the dollar impact of these contracts 
on earnings and cash flow appears to be rather modest. They also point out that is 
quite plausible that firms that hedge using derivatives also engage in other risk 
management activities, and that combined effect of these risk management 
strategies significantly raises the value of the firm. 
Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) they examine the use of foreign currency 
denominated debt as a hedging instruments by large U.S. firms. They found strong 
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evidence that firms issue foreign currency debt in order to hedge exchange rate 
exposures.  
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) showed that some firms do not disclose in 
their annual reports the derivative instruments as speculative instruments and in 
some cases contradict their annual reports statements where they disclose the 
use of derivatives for hedging purposes only. 
Faulkender (2005), his paper explores why managers are timing the interest 
rate market. His analysis is based on a very large, hand-collected dataset of swap 
activity. The results shows that swap usage and the choice of interest rate 
exposure are primarily driven by a desire to meet consensus earnings forecasts 
and to raise managerial pay. 
El-Masry (2006) investigates the reasons for using or not derivatives 
instruments by 401 UK non-financial firms. This paper investigates the extent to 
which the derivatives have used and how they are used. The results suggest that 
larger firms are more likely to use derivatives than medium and smaller firms, at 
the same time public companies are more likely to use derivatives than private 
firms, and derivatives usage is greatest among international firms. The companies 
that do not use derivatives is because their exposure is not significant and another 
important reason that lead companies to not use derivatives is about disclosures 
of derivatives that is activity required under FASB rules, and costs of establishing 
and maintaining derivatives programmes exceed the expected benefits. UK 
companies use derivatives because want to hedge foreign exchange risk and 
interest rate risk, and another important reason for using hedging with derivatives 
is managing the volatility in cash flows 
Judge (2006b) examining the academic debate identified the five main 
theoretical explanation for corporate hedging in the minimization of corporate tax 
liabilities, in the reduction of the expected costs of financial distress, in the 
mitigation of the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders, in the 
improving of the coordination between financing and investment policy and in the 
maximization of the value of the manager’s wealth. Further his study  supports the 
economies of scale arguments and provides further evidence for the expected 
costs of financial distress being an important factor for the decision to hedge 
foreign currency risk by using an alternative definition of hedging. Previous studies 
define hedgers as a firm that use derivatives. However these instruments also can 
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be used for speculative purposes and about that Judge6 states that if the motives 
for optimal hedging and speculation are correlated empirically results might not 
distinguish between these two activities. 
Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) with their approach measured the effects 
of hedging on a firm’s exposure to risk. They used this method on a large sample 
of companies operating in 47 countries, and their results show that the use of 
derivatives is related with lower cash flow volatility, idiosyncratic and systematic 
risk. 
Bodnar, Consolandi, Gabbi e Jaiswal-Dale (2013) they have done a web-
based survey, on Italian non-financial firms, about risk management practices and 
the use of derivatives instruments to manage risk, time period September 2007 
January 2008. The results show that the most common risk faced by Italian non-
financial firms is the foreign currency risk. Foreign currency options and swaps. 
are positively related to the level of managerial education and the involvement with 
international trade. At the same time the use of interest rate derivative depends on 
the firm size, location, firm rating and on the manager background. 
  
                                                             
6
 Judge (2006a). 
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CHAPTER 2: RISKS 
 
2.1: Risk evolution. 
Until now literature has not provided a global definition of the concept of risk. 
There are many definitions of risk but most of these tend to highlight its downside 
The Oxford Dictionary defines it as a “situation involving exposure to danger”, 
while the Italian Zanichelli-Zingarelli Dictionary gives the following definition 
“possibilità di conseguenze dannose o negative a seguito di circostanze non 
sempre prevedibili”7. 
During the Renaissance the concept of risk began to assume importance. 
Pellicelli (2004) e Chiappori (2008) state that the origin of  the concept of risk can 
be linked to the Hammurabi Code. This code bears some traces of a type of risk-
sharing contract that contains both credit and insurance elements. Bernstein 
(1998) analysed the etymology of the word risk. It derives from the old Italian word 
“risicàre” that is “osare”8, thus, the word risk can be understood as a choice rather 
than expectation of an uncertain fate. Pascal and Fermat in the late 1964 kept up 
a written correspondence about bets and from this emerged an essay about 
probability. For the first time a mathematical basis related to the theory of 
probability was formulated, and this established the basis for future developments 
of instruments that can be used to measure risk, those instruments are still in use 
today. 
The economist Frank H. Knight in 1921 formulated the first definition of risk. 
He began with the distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk must be 
understood as “randomness with knowable probabilities”, while uncertainty must 
be understood as “randomness with unknowable probabilities”. Some Italian 
authors have studied the relationship between risk and uncertainty. One of whom 
is Sassi (1940). With his research he showed that uncertainty, in its broadest 
sense, is a generic state that prevents a complete understanding, and that it 
always forms the basis of risk. Demaria (1950) proposed a tripartite division 
between uncertainty, risk and temporary uncertainty. Finally, Bertini (1987) in his 
study states that risk is generally connected to situations of cognitive impediment 
mainly of the subjective type, while uncertainty is associated with objective 
circumstances which are external to the cognitive capacity of the individual. 
                                                             
7
 “Possibility of harmful or negative consequences due to circumstances not always foreseeable”. 
8
 “Osare” in English can be translated as “to dare”. 
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With the research of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), economic 
theories have accepted and shared Knight’s (1921 definition of risk). These two 
authors were the first proponents of the Expected utility Theory. This states that 
under conditions of uncertainty, individuals should always choose, according to a 
rational model, the alternatives that offer them the highest utility. About thirty years 
later Kaheman e Tversky (1979) developed the Prospect Theory, which is based 
on a subjective reference point in managerial choices as well as investment 
choices. This affirms a vision of risk concerned with quantitative-statistical 
methods of measurement, and at the same time a vision related to a subjective 
perception of reality. 
Taking into account what is stated above a conclusion can be drawn on the 
concept of risk and it can be qualified as a relative concept that depends on both 
the expectations and the capacity of the subject affected. 
By the early nineties a general standard of acceptance for the identification 
and classification of risk was established, especially with regard to the dimensions 
of organizational performance and joint business - COSO Framework 19929. The 
Combined Code (1999)10 was the first organic compendium of corporate 
governance rules in which risk management was considered among the 
components of a good qualifying business management system, while the Turnbull 
Report (1999)11 emphasized the relationship between systematic risk 
management and value creation. During the same year, 1999, the “Codice di 
Autodisciplina” (Code of Conduct)12 was drawn up in Italy in which the 
responsibility for the identification and management of business risks was explicitly 
attributed to government bodies. In 2002 in the United States the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was enacted the purpose of which was to make internal systems control and 
the audit systems more effective and independent and to empower government 
bodies on risk management and on the correct disclosure information conveyed to 
the market. 
The role played by national and international regulations regarding the 
disclosure of business risks is also important. On the one hand, these are 
designed to provide comprehensive and transparent information to stakeholders, 
                                                             
9
 CoSo Framework 1992: The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations od the Treadway Commission 1992. In 2004 it gave 
the following definition of risk: “risk is the possibility that an event will occur and adversely affect the achievement of 
objectives”. 
10
 Combined Code: London Stock Exchange (1999). 
11
 Turnbull Report (1999): Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (1999). 
12
 Codice di Autodisciplina: Borsa Italiana (1999). 
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on the other hand, to encourage companies to adopt instruments aimed at risk 
management. 
 
2.2: Risks classification. 
Several risk classifications are set out in literature, each one highlights certain 
properties and characteristics. 
Initially attention will be paid to a classification that is not very common in 
literature but which is essential from the point of view of the management of 
medium size business13. This classification makes a macro division between 
business risks and associated risks14. Candiotto (1996) defines the first type of risk 
as the risk that stems from the choices related to the primary activities of the value 
chain and is measured by the resulting effects on company and stakeholders. 
Prandi (2008) on the other hand, defines associated risks as those that relate to 
ball side management components which are influenced by numerous external 
variables. Their technical-operational nature requires specific attention and 
measurement with the aim of reducing the potential impact through a preventive 
safeguard action or through the use of transfer instruments. The latter can be 
subdivided into two types: traditional risks, in which are included assets risks, 
product risks and human resources risks; and the other type is called new risks; 
these regard environmental risks, administrative offense risks and compliance risk. 
This macro division shows a methodology for the analysis and the management of 
the business dynamics. 
What kind of impact can risks have in the business system? 
The impact is direct when the consequences generated by the event directly 
affect the company's resources, otherwise the impact can be indirect when the 
effects indirectly affect the assets of the company. These two types of impacts 
described above have specific forms of prevention and insurance coverage. 
Finally, the impacts can be consequential as the consequence of direct and 
indirect impacts affect the image of the company and its reputation, furthermore 
they can increase the losses of market share. There are no forms of insurance 
which cover reputation. 
                                                             
13
 It was decided to refer to this classification because the empirical analysis, which will be explained in the following 
chapters, relates to the use of derivatives by the UK and Italian non-financial listed Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). 
14
 Prandi P. (2010), Il risk management. Teoria e pratica nel rispetto della normativa, Economia & Management, Franco 
Angeli, pp. 57-60. 
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There are principally two classifications of risk events that are closely 
connected with risk management. The first classification distinguishes between 
pure risks and speculative risks. Pure risks are those risks that have only an 
unfavorable perspective and therefore are considered insurable. Tarallo (2000), 
Giorgino and Travaglini (2008) defined pure risks as those risks that arise from 
random events. When these events occur, they usually determine outcomes which 
can be observed immediately in the short term and the physical and economic 
consequences of the event can be reduced or contained through the adoption of 
timely measures. Pure risks can be positive and negative. These risks are in turn 
managed by ex-post control and by risk transfer activities. 
At the same time speculative risks are those risks whose occurrence may lead 
to additional costs or profits. Tarallo (2000) in his investigation states that a 
company faces this kind of risk when has to bear an economic risk. The firm 
choose its strategic position because it produces assets or provides services in 
order to meet efficiency or quality parameters that allow it to generates revenues 
and profits. The risks described below can be identified as speculative risks: 
 Strategic risk: this relates to the degree of prosecutions of corporate 
strategies. 
 Operational risk: this includes those risks which are linked with business 
production processes. 
 Financial risk: this concerns all the risks arising from financial structure, 
from the performance of the financial markets and from the transactions made 
with third parties. Within this category are the following risk factors, Giorgino 
and Travaglini (2008) 
• Exchange rate risk,  
• Commodity risk, 
• Interest rate risk, 
• Liquidity Risk, 
• Credit risk. 
According to Floreani (2005) and Guelfi (2009) speculative risks are 
characterized by a gradual realization over time, by a delayed performance and 
examination, by the economic effects that progressively occur and by the lack of 
intervention to reduce the negative economic consequence of the events 
These types of risks are not insurable. The main way to hedge against the 
speculative risks is hedging. 
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2.2.1: Financial Risk 
Financial business risks are those that arise from the routine activity of a 
company and are linked to the price of instruments traded on financial markets. 
There are two types: internal risks which encompass all those risks arising from 
the financial management policy adopted by the company, and  external risks that 
relate to those risks which arise from the market. In this latter category we can 
include foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity risk and credit risk. 
The existence of financial markets in which these are traded determines that 
business flows can be quantitatively estimated and evaluated by techniques widely 
shared among operators and that most of the financial risks incorporate a 
systematic component which can affect their assessment and management. 
Finally, the principal techniques used in managing financial risk are  represented 
by hedging instruments. 
Financial risks can be part of an active and/or passive management. An active 
management of risks exists when market prices do not necessarily reflect the 
value of the traded flows. Those involved will need to be able to make a 
quantitative assessment of risk which goes beyond that indicated by the market 
price. It is possible to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities and sophisticated 
evaluation systems and privileged information are required. Passive management 
is based on the notion that, when this approach is adopted management is not 
able to realise an effective quantitative evaluation of the risks traded beyond than 
that which is expressed by market prices. 
 
2.2.1.1: Exchange Rate Risk. 
The exchange rate risk represents the sensitivity of economic and financial 
flows of the company to exchange rates. The deferral of payments and receipts, 
combined with the volatile nature of currency markets causes uncertainty 
regarding payments and collections, as well as uncertainty related to revenues 
and/or costs. This risk is the most well-known risk. It represents a crucial problem 
because in this era of trade globalization, it plays a central role since even small 
businesses operate in foreign currencies. 
The traditional classification distinguishes four types of exchange rate risk: 
 Settlement risk: Facile (1996) states that the assumption of the existence of 
this risk is based on “a time interval between the definition of the contractual 
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conditions and the conclusion of the financial transaction, during which the risk 
of foreign exchange market is subject to change”. This specific type of risk 
could affect both the importer (or an operator paid in foreign currency) and the 
exporter (or an investor in foreign securities). The former is affected because 
when a payment or refund must be made in a currency other than national 
there is the risk of an appreciation of the level of the foreign currency against 
the domestic currency. With respect to the latter when a payment is received in 
foreign currency, there is the risk of depreciation of the currency against the 
national currency. It is easy to identify this risk and it is linear because each 
unit change in the exchange rate corresponds to a proportional change in the 
business marginal variation. 
 Economic Risk: this refers to the risk that changes in exchange rates 
produce on prices related to those market sectors in which the company 
operates. 
 Competitive Risk: this is the risk which arises from changes in competitive 
relations as a consequence of increases in the foreign exchange market  
different costing systems  and revenue structures with respect to competitors. It 
is hard to identify this risk when the company finds itself in a situation 
characterized by multiple competitors and by production which is located  in 
countries with different currencies. 
 Translation Risk: this relates to the conversion of foreign currency balance 
sheet assets in the national currency at the end of the year. 
These four types of exchange rate risks are interconnected. A firm operating in 
markets with currency other than its national currency is exposed to changes in 
market rates and this could produce negative exchange rate effects on the 
company’s income statement, consequently this could also affect its competitive 
position and could generate further short term and long term effects. This risk can 
be managed through instruments such as buying and selling currency futures and 
options on exchange rates. There is a wide range of options that allow firms to 
manage their exchange rate risks and they are extremely flexible and adaptable to 
any specific requirement. The use of these financial instruments requires specific 
expertise. 
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2.2.1.2: Interest Rate Risk 
The interest rate risk (IRR) is more insidious than the exchange rate risk 
because it usually involves a longer period and represents the sensitivity of the 
business cash flows on interest rates. The fluctuations generated by IRR can 
impact both parts of the company balance sheet, especially the passive side 
because most companies have different types of debt exposure – long, medium 
and short terms debt maturity. Changes in interest rates could represent a 
risk/opportunity to be exploited in order to benefit from the level of interest rates; 
fixing the cost of debt for an extended period of time could allow the company to 
benefit from the optimal cost structure which guarantees  the cost of debt in the 
long term. Any interest paid or received on a fixed basis does not represent a real 
risk, as it has been fixed in advance. 
 
2.2.1.3: Commodity Risk 
The commodity risk refers to the uncertainties of future market values and to 
the size of the future income determined by the fluctuation in commodity prices. 
This topic covers all industrial companies because none of them can operate 
without the use of raw materials. There is a directly proportional link between 
exposure to price risk and production costs, furthermore the higher the risk is, the 
more likely it is that the increase of the commodity price will be reflected on the 
final sale price. For this type of risk it is also possible to make a further 
classification: 
 Settlement Risk: this is typical in those markets where the price of raw 
materials is based on a quotation value and therefore fixed on the day of 
delivery. 
 Economic-Competitive Risk: this risk is supported by those parties 
(producers/users) that have not fixed the price of the commodities, therefore 
they are at a disadvantage compared to those competitors who have 
adequately dealt with such a risk of or who have purchased their good in the 
most favorable period. 
 Replacement Risk: this is the risk in which strong variations in prices lead to 
a shift in demand towards other products. This risk in the long term can 
generate devastating consequences for those companies that are not able to 
convert their structures to adapt to the market changes. 
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2.2.1.4: Credit Risk 
Sironi (2005) states that credit risk can be understood as “the possibility that 
an unexpected change in the creditworthiness of a counterparty could generate a 
corresponding unexpected change in the fair value of the related credit exposure”. 
Thus credit risk can be understood as a default and migration risk, risk as an 
unexpected event and risk as credit exposure. Anolli e Gualtieri (1999) have 
defined credit risk as “the possibility that a debtor fails to comply even in part with 
its obligations: this event is the so-called default” 
It is possible classify this risk as follow: 
 Default Risk & Migration Risk: this is the risk of a deterioration in the 
creditworthiness of a counterparty (downgrade). This downgrade could be due 
by a debtor’s downgrade rating, by an agency or by trust analysts of the 
creditor bank. 
 Recovery Risk: this refers to the possibility that the rate of recovery, related 
to counterparty exposure and consequent insolvency, turns out to be lower 
than the one originally estimated by the bank. 
 Risk Exposure: this is a typical risk of credit lines and has an aleatory value, 
furthermore it refers to the actual amount of the loan at the time of insolvency. 
 Spread Risk: this is the risk wherebye the risk premium (spread) is 
increased due to requirements in capital markets. 
 
2.3: Risk Classification Basel I Basel II and Basel III. 
The revision of the Basel Accord on capital requirements for banks (Basel I 
and II) has prompted companies to enhance resources and instruments for risk 
management. 
With Basel I credit risk was measured for all businesses in the same way. It did 
not take into account the time factor (as the temporal structure of maturities) and 
excluded risk factors such as operational risk. 
Basel II scaled the pattern of minimum capital requirements through a more 
structured and efficient system of weighting, Resti (2008). It sets out, on three 
pillars, the level of capitalization that supervisors require from banks: 
 Pillar I - Minimum Capital Requirements: this pillar contains all the 
regulations on banking capital requirements to cover risks that financial 
institutions assume. In particular, it introduces a new solvency coefficient, 
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which alongside credit risk, considers the market risks together with a new 
concept of risk; operational risk. 
 Pillar II - Supervisory Review Process: this pillar states that taking into 
account business strategies in terms of capitalization and risk-taking, central 
banks will have greater discretion in assessing the banks’ capital adequacy, 
and  imposes higher coverage that could exceed the minimum requirements. 
 Pillar III - Market Discipline: transparency rules are provided to give public 
information on capital levels, on risks and on their management. 
With regard to credit risk, taking into account what is stated above, Basel II 
introduced two important innovations, first it allowed for the use of risk mitigation 
instruments such as traditional forms of collateral and collateral on financial and 
real assets, together with more innovative forms such as financial derivatives. 
Furthermore it recognized internal models for the assessment of credit risk, 
counterparty risk and transaction risk. 
Another important novelty is the opportunity granted to intermediaries which 
allows them to  adopt several alternatives in order to calculate the minimum capital 
requirements against credit risk: 
 Standard Approach: this approach uses assesments established by the 
supervisory authority. The assessment of corporate borrowers (or to be given) 
will be carried out by external rating agencies specifically authorized by the 
Financial Regulator. Depending on the rating assigned,different weighting for 
the calculation of the provision of capital will be used. Depending on the type of 
business the weighting varies: 
 
Tab. 1 – Weighting for the calculations. 
Firm Type Turnover (T) Financing Weighting 
Corporate > € 50 millions > € 1 million Rating based 
SME Corporate € 5 millions < T < € 50 millions > € 1 million Rating based 
Retail T < € 50 millions < € 1 million Fix at 75% 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
 Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB): This model is a calculation system 
based on quantitative input by which the capital requirement (K) is measured. 
Part of this requirement, the expected loss (EL) is represented by the following 
equation: 
EL = EAD x PD x LGD x M 
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Where PD (Probability of Default) indicates the probability that the customer 
shall be in default in a year, the EAD (Exposure at Default) shows what will be 
the exact amount borrowed at the time of insolvency, the LGD (Loss Given 
Default) suggests what percentage of the loan, less recoveries, will be lost if 
the party is in default, and finally M (Maturity) explains how value in the 
medium-long term is reduced if the customer is solvent but worsens its credit 
rating. 
The IRB approach, is divided into:  
• Foundation Approach (IRB Base): in which banks use their own 
valuations to estimate the PD and adopt system valuations for the other 
variables. 
• Advanced Approach (IRB Advanced): in this model banks use their 
own valuations for all variables in the model including maturity (M). 
A common feature of all these approaches is the role played by collaterals (risk 
migrants), which allow discounts to be obtained on the calculation of capital 
requirements. There are two types of collaterals: personal collaterals, when they 
are issued by governments, banks, and trust companies with high credit ratings, 
and collateral such as cash, gold, stocks and qualified bonds or funds (simple 
approach) or other listed stocks (integral approach). 
What were the impacts of Basel II on the relationship bank-firm? 
Under the Basel II agreement, lenders have to set aside capital to cover risks 
connected with their business activities, and the amount of capital to be set aside 
depends on the credit risk related to corporate borrowers. Banks ask companies to 
reduce their financial risk in order to improve their credit rating15 and thus to 
reduce their venture capital constrained in terms of loans issued to borrowers. 
Lower constrained venture capital means that the banks are able to use this 
capital in alternative ways. A reverse scenario is characterized by losses of 
investment opportunities, where costs would necessarily fall on businesses 
through increases in interest rates for those considered to be more risky. 
Basel II implies that the financing costs for a firm are always linked to the 
rating of the borrowers. This means that the reduction of financial costs 
necessarily comes about through an increase in capital and a consequent 
improvement in the corporate credit rating.  
                                                             
15
 Thereby lessening the credit risk. 
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Basel III is a set of new rules on Banking Supervision in response to the recent 
financial crisis. It came into operation in early 2013 and a long transitional period 
was foreseen (up to 1 September 2019). This approach was adopted in order to 
facilitate a gradual adjustment of the operational strategies of banks on economic 
recovery and avoid relapse. Its goals are to prevent excessive risk taking by 
operators, to reinforce the financial system and to establish a level playing field. 
The measures that will be implemented will address the financial 
intermediaries and include: 
 The introduction of minimum standards of liquidity: two rules were 
introduced:  
• Liquidity Coverage Ratio16: this rule requires banks to maintain a 
stock of liquid assets that can overcome a phase of heightened outflow 
of funds for a period of 30 days without having to resort to the market or 
refinancing at the central bank. 
• Net Stable Funding Ratio17: this rule requires that sources of stable 
funding are able to finance less liquid assets, and are needed to 
increase medium and long term funding. 
 The definition of regulatory capital, together with the establishment of higher 
capital requirements: this confirmed the function of heritage as a garrison 
essential for the stability of financial intermediaries. Adequate and increased 
quality levels of capital increase banks’ ability to cope with losses and ensure 
that intermediaries are able to take advantage of growth opportunities and to 
support families and businesses, also in moments of difficulty. Furthermore, 
more stringent requirements in terms of instruments and high-quality assets 
were envisaged, while the total capital requirement at 8% of risk-weighted 
assets remained unchanged.18. 
 Better coverage of market risk and counterparty risk: new rules provided 
that some key parameters for the calculation of requirements, such as value at 
risk and correlations between activities, have to be calculated taking into 
account conditions of stress. 
 The reduction of the level of leverage: a minimum capital requirement (Tier 
1) that banks must hold relative to total assets not risk-weighted (leverage 
                                                             
16
 According to this rule, the ratio between high quality liquid assets and total net cash outflows in 30 days, must be greater 
than or equal to 100%. 
17
 According to this rule, the ratio between the available stable funding (Funds) and the stable funding request (Assets) must 
be greater than or equal to 100% 
18
 Common Equity increased from 2% to 4.5% and Tier1 increased from 4% to 6%. 
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ratio) was established. This was determined in such a way as to capture all 
activities of a bank (and balance sheet) and is neutral with respect to different 
accounting rules. 
 Of the counter-cyclical measures in order to reduce the pro-cyclical 
prudential rules: measures to reduce the pro-cyclicality of prudential rules have 
been planned and consequently banks are required to hold more capital 
resources than the minimum (Buffer). Two sizes: 
• Banks must be equipped with a capital buffer above the regulatory 
minimum (equal to 2.5 % of common equity ratio of assets risk). 
• Introduction of an additional mechanism to ensure that banks build 
up capital resources in the early stages of excessive growth of the 
overall credit. 
What is the philosophy and what are the consequences that lie at the basis of 
Basel III?  
All transactions that a bank performs involve risk and therefore potential 
losses. The stronger the risk, the higher the potential losses are, and therefore the 
greater the amount of money that banks must set aside to protect themselves. 
It must be borne in mind that the new provisions increase the percentage of 
capital that banks must set aside for safety.Thus the banks will have to incur an 
increase in costs and this will eventually be passed on to their customers in terms 
of increased commissions and spreads on bank loans. Company valuations will be 
more careful and specific with respect to at least two decisions: whether to lend 
and how much money to lend, together with decisions relating to the costs and 
conditions to apply. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1: Data Collection 
This research intends to investigates how and why UK and Italian non-financial 
listed Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) used derivatives instruments during 
the time period 2005-2012. It wants to focus only on non-financial firms because 
they should concentrate their efforts on hedging transactions, meanwhile financial 
companies have risk management activities related with hedging and trading 
transactions. Furthermore the decision to focus on SMEs is due because, has 
shown in the table below, seems that no one have done investigation on the use of 
financial derivatives by Italian non-financial listed SMEs. 
 
Tab. 2 – Summary of the most important empirical studies on hedging demands 
Author/s 
Publication 
Year 
Size Firm Type Source Country/s 
Time 
Period 
Aim 
Nance et al. 1993 434 
Non-
Financial 
Survey USA 1986 Derivatives 
Dolde 1993 244 
Fortune 
500 
Companies 
Survey USA NO Info Derivatives 
Bodnar et 
al. 
1995 530 
Non-
Financial 
Compustat 
& 
Survey 
USA 1994 Derivatives 
Berkman 
and 
Bradbury 
1996 244 
Non-
Financial 
Annual 
Reports 
New 
Zeland 
1994 Derivatives 
Mian 1996 169 
Non-
Financial 
Annual 
Reports 
USA 1992 
FX and IR 
Derivatives 
Tufano 1996 48 
Gold 
Mining 
Survey USA 1991-1993 
Commodity 
Price 
Derivatives 
Geczy et al. 1997 372 
Non-
Financial 
Annual 
Reports 
USA 1991 
FX 
Derivatives 
Grant and 
Marshall 
1997 250 
Top 250 
UK 
Companies 
Survey UK 1994,1995 Derivatives 
Hakkarainen 
et al. 
1997 84 
Non-
Financial  
Survey Finland 1994 Derivatives 
Gay and 
Nam 
1998 486 
Non-
Financial 
Swaps 
Monitor 
Database 
USA 1995 
All and IR 
Derivatives 
Bodnar and 1999 126 Non- Survey Germany 1997 Derivatives 
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Gebhardt Financial 
Alkeback 
and Hagelin 
1999 163 
Non-
Financial 
Survey Swedish 1996 Derivatives 
Jalivand, 
Switzer and 
Tang 
2000 154 
Non-
Financial  
Survey & 
Montreal 
Exchange 
Database 
Canada 1996 Derivatives 
Loderer and 
Pichler 
2000 96 
Non-
Financial 
Survey Switzerland 1996 
Currency 
Risk 
De Ceuster 
et al. 
2000 73 
CCs & 
Top200 
Firms 
Survey Belgium 1997 Derivatives 
Allayannis 
and Ofek 
2001 724 
Non-
Financial 
Annual 
Reports 
USA 1992-1993 
FX 
Derivatives 
Keloharju 
and 
Niskanen 
2001 44 
Non-
Financial 
Survey Finland 1985-1991 
Foreign 
Currency 
Debt 
Mallin et al. 2001 231 
Non-
Financial 
Survey UK 1997 Derivatives 
Graham and 
Rodgers 
2002 442 
Non-
Financial 
SEC’s 
EDGAR - 
Compustat 
USA 
1994 or 
1995 
FX and IR 
Derivatives 
Bison, 
Pelizzon 
and Sartore 
2002 150 
Non-
Financial 
Annual 
Reports 
Italy 1994-1999 Derivatives 
Guay and 
Kothary 
2003 234 
Non-
Financial 
Compustat USA 1997 
FX, IR, 
Commodity 
Price 
Derivatives 
Kedia and 
Mozumdar 
2003 523 
Non-
Financial & 
Non-
Utilities 
Compustat 
& Moody’s 
Investor 
Services 
USA 1996 
Foreign 
Curremcy-
Denominated 
Debt 
Geczy, 
Minton and 
Schrand 
2004 372 
US 
Industrial 
Corporation 
Fortune’s 
1991 List & 
Annual 
Reports 
USA 1990 
Currency 
Derivatives 
Faulkender 2005 133 
Chemical 
Industry 
SDC 
Platinum, 
DealScan, 
EDGAR, 
Compustat 
USA 1994-1999 
Interest Rate 
Derivatives 
El-Masry 2006 401 
Non-
Financial 
Survey & 
FAME 
UK 
March-May 
2001 
Derivatives 
Judge 2006 400 
Non-
Financial 
FT500, 
Survey & 
UK 1995 Derivatives 
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Annual 
Reports 
Bartram, 
Brown and 
Conrad 
2011 6,888 
Non-
Financial & 
Non-
Regulated 
Utilities 
Thomson 
Analysis, 
Global 
Reports 
and 
Datastream 
47 
Countries 
2000-2001 Derivatives 
Bodnar et 
al. 
2013 86 
Non-
Financial 
Survey & 
AIDA 
Italy 2007-2008 Derivatives 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
Table 2 briefly summarizes information about previous empirical studies about 
hedging demand. In detail it shows by year: the sample size, the firm type 
analysed, the source where data have been collected, the country/s that compose 
the sample, the time period and the aim of the research. Therefore it suggests that 
at least fourteen of those empirical studies investigate the use of derivatives by 
United States companies, and one of these studies – Bartram, brown and Conrad 
(2011) – covers forty seven countries including United States. Furthermore, four 
empirical researchers analysed the demand for hedging with derivatives 
instrument from United Kingdom and only two papers examined this subject from 
the Italian companies’ point of view. Moreover none of those studies focused on 
SMEs. 
The starting point to build up the two SMEs samples – UK and Italian - has 
been the European Definition of Small and Medium Enterprises – 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC adopted on 1st January 2005 - which is similar to 
the UK definition – Company Act 2006 section 382 and 465 - except that the 
Italian definition includes a category called “micro”. Below are given the definitions 
with the Euro value and the Euro value converted into Sterling at the rate 
applicable when this text was drafted (July 2013)19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19
 Source: ec.europa.eu (infoeruro) - Exchange rate EUR/GBP  € 1 = £ 0.8531. 
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Tab. 3 – EU SMEs Definition.
20
 
Category Headcount Turnover Balance Sh. Total 
Medium < 250 ≤ € 50 million 
≤ £ 43 million 
≤ € 43 million 
≤ £ 37 million 
Small < 50 ≤ € 10 million 
≤ £ 9 million 
≤ € 10 million 
≤ £ 9 million 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 million 
≤ £ 2 million 
≤ € 2 million 
≤ £ 2 million 
Source: author’s elaboration. The Euro value converted into Sterlin have been done using the following exchange rate: 
Exchange rate EUR/GBP  € 1 = £ 0.8531 from ec.europa.eu (infoeruro). 
 
Data have been collected from two different sources Bureaux Van Dijk 
databases (BVD) and Annual Reports (AR). 
Beginning with the definition of SMEs and using Bureaux Van Dijk databases21 
the two sample of UK and Italian non-financial listed SMEs have been created. In 
those samples are included all the companies that in 2005, at least, recorded 
between 10 and 250 number of employees and between 2 million and 50 million 
Euro (£ 2 million and £ 43 million) turnover. Once these two sample have been 
constructed have been collected, from FAME database for the UK companies and 
from AIDA database for the Italian companies, all the necessary variables to 
perform the calculation needed for this research. 
Furthermore, since there are no databases that provide information on the use 
of financial instruments used by companies to cover themselves against risk 
exposure, it was decided to collect these data from the firms’ annual reports 
instead of doing a survey. Because annul reports give a larger quantity and quality 
information than surveys do. Moreover, the Italian database – AIDA – does not 
split the Italian companies turnover into “Italian Turnover” and “Export Turnover” 
as FAME – UK database – does22, so AIDA gives only the macro variable. Thus 
this information, only for the Italian sample, has been collected in the annual 
reports of each firm. To do that have been taken into account what the Italian and 
the European accounting legislations states23. 
Therefore the information about the use of financial derivatives by the UK and 
Italian SMEs, the types of these instruments - Foreign Exchange (FX), Interest 
Rate (IR) and Commodity – and the Italian “Export Turnover” have been handly 
                                                             
20
 All the amounts in Sterling are rounded. 
21
 FAME for UK sample and AIDA for Italian sample. 
22
 FAME provides the macro data “Turnover” and the micro data “UK Turnover” and “Export Turnover”.  
23
 Codice Civile (Civil Law) Article 2427 points 6 and 10 and International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14. 
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collected for all the companies that are in the two samples – 166 firms for UK and 
66 firms for Italy – over the time period of eight years 2005-2012. 
During the process of data collection have been noticed a better quality and 
quantity of the firms’ financial statements in annual reports due to the changes in 
the reporting standards over the time period. And “larger” companies with more 
international dimension presented higher quality information about their strategies. 
Meanwhile, smaller companies disclosed essential information about their hedging 
strategies, and when they used financial derivatives gave limited information about 
the instrument adopted. 
To obtain these data have been implemented two different methods. When the 
format of the annual report does not allowed to use keywords to catch these 
information, that was found looking into those sections where debt and risk 
information were specified throughout the document. Otherwise, when annual 
report presented a new format, the hedging information has been obtained by 
implementing a keywords search approach to find the financial risk management 
section in the notes to the account in annual reports for each year of 2005-2012. 
The data collection process includes the search for annual reports and the search 
for relevant hedging data in the reports. The keywords used have been: financial 
risk, derivative, notional, market risk, foreign exchange, foreign currency, forward 
contract, swap, interest rate. So, when a keyword is found, the surrounding text is 
read and interpreted to decide the value of hedging variable. 
Therefore the UK sample is composed by a list of 166 UK non-financial listed 
companies and the Italian sample includes a list of 66 Italian non-financial listed 
companies. Those samples do not comprise financial firms because these 
companies may have different motivations for using financial derivatives 
instruments instead of hedging purposes. 
 
3.2: Methodology 
The study uses two balanced panel data sets, UK and Italian, as the firm data 
are built over a time period of eight years with multiple cross sections for each 
year. A panel data like this has a larger number of observation points which 
increase the degree of freedom and reduce the collinearity between independent 
variables, resulting in improved efficiency of the econometric estimates (Hsiao 
2003). The validity of the estimation results is also increased as panel data set 
control for omitted variables (Hsiao 2003). 
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Have been used a binary variable to classify whether a firm is using derivatives 
or not. That variable takes the value 1 if the firm uses derivatives and 0 if 
otherwise or there is no information disclosed in the annual report. A derivative 
user can be defined as a firm that provide qualitative information about any 
derivative use in the annual report. 
This study implemented a logit model because the dependent variables are 
binary variables and that requires the use of a model that allow to do the analysis 
of binary outcomes. The analysis is divided in two steps. In the first step, due to a 
large number of explanatory variables with the financial information of the firms in 
the samples, have been needed to reduce them to create the best possible model. 
In this regards has been run the Univariate Logit Regression for all the 
independent variables, to identify the most significant variables. So, each 
significant variable has been selected as candidate for run the multivariate model. 
The Univariate Logit Regression has been run for all the explanatory variables in 
relation with three main dependent variables. The first is “Use” which intend to test 
if firms use derivatives as hedging instrument or otherwise and the results show 
whose explanatory variables are theoretically more influential in the decision of 
hedging. The second and the third dependent binary variables are foreign 
exchange (FX use) and interest rate (IR use) dummies and is tested the 
significance of the different proxies for these specific hedging instruments. 
The second step is the Multivariate Logit Regression whose purpose is to 
capture the correlation of the observation within a firm. It intends to examine the 
determinants of hedging hypotheses using a dependent binary variable that takes 
value 1 when the firm is hedging and 0 otherwise. Have been decided to use a 
logit model because it overcomes the limitations of the linear probability model 
(LPM) because it uses the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to calculate the 
regression coefficients. This model maximizes the probability that unobserved 
dependent and independent variables occur together. The model that is used by 
the Logit regression is written as24: 
 
Li = ln (Pi/(1-Pi)) = β1 + β2Xi + µi 
 
With logit regression can be obtained three information: 
                                                             
24
 Gujarati and Porter (2009), p.555. 
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 Estimated Coefficients: that gives the change in the logit function given a 
change in the independent variable. 
 Odds Ratio: that is the probability of the event happens divided by the 
probability of the event does not happens, in this context the event is the 
probability to hedge or not. 
 Marginal Effect: that measures the actual change in probability. 
 On this way is possible to determine the effect of the explanatory variables 
on the decision of hedging. 
  
 42 
 
CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESES 
 
4.1: Introduction. 
Three different dependent dummy variables have been used to measure the 
hedging activities by UK and Italian non–financial Small and Medium Enterprises. 
The first dependent variable is Hedgers (Use) and tests the firm’ likelihood on 
using derivatives instruments. The second is IR Hedgers (IR Users) which tests 
the probability that a firm hedges by derivatives, and the third variable is FX 
Hedgers (FX Users) whose aims is the same of the one defined above – Hedgers 
and IR Hedgers. 
Based on a comprehensive review of the existent literature have been 
identified six main research hypotheses. 
 
4.1.1: H1 – Financial Distress. 
A financial distress situation can occur when a firm is not able to meet or 
presents difficulty to pay off its financial obligations to its creditors. Hence, a 
company can incur in a situation like this when it has high fixed costs, illiquid 
assets or revenues that are sensible to the economic downturns. Smith and Stulz 
(1985) with their research showed that companies increased their value with 
hedging because this allowed them to smooth taxable income reducing expected 
tax liabilities. At the same time they confirmed that hedging can reduce the costs 
of financial distress. Therefore, companies seems to have a positive relationship 
between the financial distress and the probability to hedge. In fact, higher is the 
probability of a financial distress for a firm higher will be the probability that it is 
going to hedge. 
To test these hypotheses have been used the following proxies:  
 Interest Coverage ratio (IC): this is used to determine how easily a firm can 
pay interest on outstanding debt. The lower is this ratio more higher is the 
probability to incur into a financial distress situation. Thus there is a negative 
relationship between IC ratio and the expected decision to hedge as argued by 
Judge (2006), Bartram et al. (2009) and Geczy et al. (1997). Have to be taken 
in to account that when this ratio is 1.5 or lower it means that the firm’s ability 
to meets interest expenses could be questionable. And a ratio below 1 means 
that the firm is not generating enough revenues to cover interest expenses. 
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 Leverage ratio: it is a financial measure that gives an idea of the ability of a 
firm to meet its financial obligations. So, firms with higher leverage are keener 
to incur in distressed situation therefore are more likely to hedge. Thus, can be 
stated that should be a positive relationship between leverage and the 
probability to hedge. Higher leverage imply that the firms will have a higher 
probability of ending up in a distressed situation and thus are more likely to 
hedge. As stated by Campello, Lin, Ma and Zou (2011), Bartram et al. (2009) 
and Graham and Rogers (2002). 
 Profitability ratio: this ratio shows a firm’s overall efficiency and 
performance. This macro ratio can be divided in two types, the margin ratios 
that represent the firm’s ability to translate sales into profits at various stages of 
measurement, and the returns ratios that show the firm’s ability to measure the 
overall efficiency of the firm in generating returns for its shareholders. Bartram 
et al. (2009) argued that firm’s with higher profitability could have a lower 
probability to incur in a financial distress situation thus are less likely to hedge. 
But Glaum (2002) stated that firm’s with higher profitability will enable 
managers to conduct a more selective hedging strategy to take bets in the 
financial markets, so there should be a positive relationship between hedging 
and profitability. 
 Debt Maturity ratio: this ratio refers to the short term and long term contracts 
between the issuer and the investors. It is measured by long term borrowings 
as a percentage of total debt, Bartram et al. (2009). So, could be stated that 
firms having long debt maturities are more likely to hedge, this because longer 
debt maturities can indicate a potentially higher amount of debt. 
 Z-Score ratio - (Altman 1968): this ratio is used to predict the probability that 
a firm will goes into bankruptcy within two years. It is used to predict corporate 
defaults and it is used as a control measure for the financial distress status of 
firms in academic studies. The Altman Z-score ratio is based on five financial 
ratios that can be calculated from data found on a company's annual report. 
There are several version of this ratio, in this research has been use the one 
for listed companies. Below the z-score formula used: 
z-score = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 0.9E 25 
A= Working Capital/Total Assets 
                                                             
25
 Altman (1968), “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy”, The Journal of 
Finance, vol. 23 pp. 589-609. 
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B = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
C = Earnings Before Interest & Tax/Total Assets 
D = Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities 
E = Sales/Total Assets 
 
Tab. 4 – H1 Financial Distress Proxies. 
Measure Predictions 
IC - 
Leverage + 
Profitability +/- 
Debt maturity + 
Z-Score - 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
4.1.2: H2 – Underinvestment Costs. 
Bessembinder (1991) and Myers (1977) with their research show that when 
leverage is hight the asymmetric information can lead to underinvestment. 
Bessembinder (1991) states that hedging can increase the debt capacity reducing 
the probability of financial distress and thus changes the default states of the firm, 
making the firm able to reduce the costs of underinvestment and accomplish lower 
borrowing costs. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) in their analysis show that 
hedging ensure firms to have enough internal founds to exploit attractive 
investment opportunities an thus increase the shareholders’ value. Furthermore 
they suggest that whereas imperfect capital markets make external financing 
policy, smaller firms and firth higher investment opportunities are more likely to 
hedge. 
To test these hypotheses have been used the following proxies: 
 Capital Expenditure over sales ratio: this ratio measures the level of 
investments that a firm is making into its future. It compares the capital 
expenditure to sales in a given period. This measure has been used by Tufano 
(1996), Geczy et al. (1997), Graham and Rogers (2002) and Judge (2006). 
 Market to Book ratio: this ratio is used to find the value of a company 
comparing its book value with its market value. This ratio has been use by 
Froot et al. (1993). 
It is expected a positive relationship between these ratios and the probability to 
hedge, because theories predict a positive association between investment 
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spending and hedging, indeed suggest that leveraged firms have greatest 
underinvestment problems and so are more likely to hedge. 
 
Tab. 5 – H2 Undeinvestment Costs Proxies. 
Measure Predictions 
Capital expenditure over sales + 
Market to book ratio + 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
4.1.3: H3 – Financial Price Risk as Interest Rate Risk 
Smith and Stulz (1985) investigated that firms with greater variation in cash 
flow or accounting earnings due to financial price exposure are more likely to 
hedge. And can be assumed that companies hedge a bigger amount of their risks. 
Brunzell, Hansson and Liljeblom (2009) stated that enterprises with greater 
leverage, long term debt and lower interest cover ratios are more likely to hedge. 
To test this hypothesis has been use the following proxies: 
 Leverage ratio, 
 Long Term Debt, 
 Interest Coverage ratios. 
Brunzell, Hansson and Liljeblom (2009) showed that when is measured interest 
rate exposure is expected that firms with greater leverage and long term debt and 
a lower interest coverage ratio are more likely to hedge. 
 
Tab. 6 – H3 Underinvestment Costs Proxies. 
Measure Predictions 
Leverage + 
Debt Maturity + 
Interest Coverage - 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
4.1.4: H4 – Firm Growth. 
The firm size has a crucial role to determine if a firm is going to hedge or not. 
Previous researches found opposed results. In fact Smith and Stulz (1985) with 
their outputs stated that there is a negative relationship between firm size and 
bankruptcy costs, so small firms have more incentive to hedge. Froot et al. (1993) 
with their study showed that small firms are more likely to hedge because of 
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greater information asymmetry and because the external financing are more costly 
due to higher transaction costs. 
To test this hypothesis has been use the following proxies: 
 Ln total assets: this proxy has been used also by Graham, and Rodgers 
(2002), Guay and Kothary (2003), Nguyen and Faff (2003), Bartram et al. 
(2004), Judge (2006) and by Campello, Lin, Ma and Zou (2011). 
 Ln total sales. 
 Ln market capitalization. 
 
Tab. 7 – H4 Firm Growth. 
Measure Predictions 
Ln Total Assets + 
Ln Total Sales + 
Ln Market Capitalization + 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
4.1.5: H5 – Overseas Operations and Foreign Exchange Risk. 
Firms that have operation in foreign markets are more exposed to financial 
risks such as exchange rate. Hence these companies should be more likely to 
hedge by derivatives instruments to cover themselves against foreign currency 
exposure. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) with their research found that one of the 
main factors that influences the manager’s decisions to use derivatives or not is 
the level of the overseas operations. Dominguez and Tesar (2001) demonstrated 
that firms that work in an high internationalized industry are more likely to hedge 
their exchange rate exposure. Judge (2006b) showed that companies with greater 
percentage of foreign sales or foreign assets are more likely to hedge. 
To test this hypothesis has been use the foreign sales over total sales proxy. 
And is expected that it has a positive relationship with hedging, especially with 
foreign exchange derivatives use. 
 
Tab. 8 – H5 Overseas Operations. 
Measure Predictions 
Foreign Sales over Total sales + 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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4.1.6: H6 – Hedging Substitutes. 
The use of hedging substitutes help firms to reduce their probability to incur 
into a financial distress situation and support agency problem costs, Nance et al. 
(1993). They also show that imposing dividend restrictions can be lowed the 
probability for a firm to incur in a financial distress situation. Haushalter (2000) 
shows that the relationship between dividend behavior and the decision to hedge 
can be positive and negative. Judge (2006) and Bartram et al. (2009) and Geczy 
et al. (1997) in their researches show that firms investing in more liquid or less 
risky assets will be less likely to hedge. 
 
Tab. 9 – H6 Hedging Substitutes. 
Measure Predictions 
Dividend Yield + 
Liquidity - 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
4.2: Summary of Measures and Predictions  
A brief summary of the six research hypotheses: 
H1: Firms with higher probability of financial distress are more likely to hedge. 
H2: Firms exposed to underinvestment costs (firms with high leverage or with 
more growth opportunities) are more likely to hedge. 
H3: Firms facing interest rate exposure are more likely to hedge a larger portion of 
their exposure. 
H4: Larger firms are more likely to hedge due to benefits of economies of scales 
by engaging risk management activities. 
H5: Companies with high degree of overseas operations are more likely to hedge. 
H6: Firms using hedging substitutes are less likely to hedge. 
 
The table below presents the variables predictions derived from the hedging 
theory and literature. Have to be taken in to account that one measure can proxy 
more than one argument at the same time. 
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Tab. 9 – Measure and Predictions. 
Independent 
Variables 
ID Measures Predictions 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 
Debt/Equity DEBTOEQUITY Leverage + + +    
Debt/Capital DEBTTOCAPITAL Leverage + + +    
LT-Debt/Capital LTDEBTCAPITAL Leverage + + +    
LT-Debt/equity LTDEBTEQ Leverage + + +    
Liabilities/Assets LIABASSETS Leverage + + +    
Gearing Ratio GEARINGRAT Leverage + + +    
Book value 
Leverage 
BVLEV Leverage + + +    
Market Value 
Leverage 
MVLEV Leverage + + +    
EBIT/Int. 
Payments 
EBITINT IC -  -    
EBITDA/Int. 
Payments 
EBITDAINT IC -  -    
Interest Cover 
Ratio 
INTERESTCOVERX IC -  -    
Assets Cover 
Ratio 
ASSETCOBERX IC -  -    
Berryratio BERRYRATIO IC -  -    
Grossmargin GROSSMARGIN IC -  -    
Short Term 
Borrowing 
STDTPCT Debt Maturity -      
Long Term 
Borrowing 
LTDTPCT Debt Maturity +      
Current Ratio CRAT Liquidity -     - 
Quick Ratio QRAT Liquidity -     - 
Liquidity Ratio LIQUIDITYRATIOX Liquidity -     - 
Shareholders 
liquidity ratio 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITYRATIO Liquidity -     - 
Solvency ratio 
asset based 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBASED Liquidity -     - 
ROC ROC Profitability       
ROE ROE Profitability       
Profit Margin PROFITMARGIN Profitability       
Return on 
Shareholders’ 
Funds 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDERSFUNDS Profitability       
Return on Total 
Assest  
ROA Profitability       
EBIT Margin EBITMARGIN Profitability -  +    
EBITDA Margin EBITDAMARGIN Profitability -  +    
Z-Score ZSC Likelihood of 
default 
-      
Capital 
Expenditure/Sales 
CAPEXPSALES Growth 
Opportunities 
 +     
Market to Book 
ratio 
MTB Growth 
Opportunities 
 +     
Ln Market 
Capitalization 
LNMACP Firm Size - -  +   
Ln Total Sales LNTS Firm Size - -  +   
Ln Total Assets LNTA Firm Size - -  +   
Dividend Yield DIVYIELD Dividend 
Behaviour 
-     + 
Foreign Sales % FSPCT Foreign 
Exposure 
  +  +  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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4.3: Dependent Variables  
The dependent variables that have been used in this study are binary variables 
and take the value 1 if a firm in the sample use derivatives and 0 if otherwise. It 
wants to identify specific firm characteristics that might determine a firm’s decision 
to hedge. This method is applied also for the other two dependent variables, FX 
Hedgers and IR Hedgers. In both cases the dummy variable assumes the value 1 
when the firm is using FX derivatives instruments (or IR derivatives instruments) 
and 0 otherwise. Using these as dependent variables allow the research to identify 
which firm’s characteristics determine the firm’s decision to use the specific types 
of derivatives, FX derivatives and IR derivative. 
 
4.4: Independent Variables  
Below is reported a table summarizing all the independent variables that have 
been used to analyse the objectives of this research. 
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Tab. 10 – Definitions and data sources. 
VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE 
Z-SCORE 1.2(working capital/total assets) + 1.4(retained 
earnings/total assets) + 3.3(earnings before 
interest and taxes/total assets) + 0.6(market 
value of equity/total liabilities) + 0.9(sales/total 
assets) 
Bureaux van Dijk 
EBIT/ INT. PAYMENTS EBIT/Int. Payments Bureaux van Dijk 
EBITDA/INT. PAYMNENTS EBITDA/Int. Payments Bureaux van Dijk 
DIVIDEND YIELD Dividend Yield – close Bureaux van Dijk 
DEBT/EQUITY Total debt/Shareholder’s Equity Bureaux van Dijk 
DEBT/ CAPITAL Total debt/ Total capital Bureaux van Dijk 
LT-DEBT/CAPITAL Long term debt/Capital Available Bureaux van Dijk 
LT-DEBT/EQUITY Long term debt/ Shareholder’s Equity Bureaux van Dijk 
LIABILITIES/ASSETS Total liabilities/Total Assets Bureaux van Dijk 
LEVERAGE Geraing ratio 
Gearingratio = - ((Short Term Loans 
&Overdafts+Long Term Liabilities)/Shareholders 
Funds))x100 
Bureaux van Dijk 
BOOK VALUE LEVERAGE Total debt /(Total Equity + Total Debt) Bureaux van Dijk 
MARKET VALUE 
LEVERAGE 
Total debt/(Total assets –Total equity + Market 
capitalization) 
Bureaux van Dijk 
LN MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION 
Ln market capitalization 
Market capitalization (The market value of a 
listed company is calculated by multiplying its 
share price by the number of shares 
outstanding) 
Bureaux van Dijk 
LN TOTAL SALES Turnover Bureaux van Dijk 
LN TOTAL ASSETS Ln Total Assets Bureaux van Dijk  
CURRENT RATIO Current assets/Current Liabilities Bureaux van Dijk 
QUICK RATIO (Current assets-Inventories)/Current liabilities Bureaux van Dijk 
CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURE/SALES 
Capital expenditure/sales Bureaux van Dijk 
MARKET TO BOOK RATIO (Total assets-Total equity + market 
capitalization)/Total assets 
Bureaux van Dijk 
ROC (Net income- Dividends)/Total Capital Bureaux van Dijk 
ROE Net Income/Capital Bureaux van Dijk 
SHORT-TERM 
BORROWING  
Short-Term Borrowing/Total debt Bureaux van Dijk 
LONG-TERM BORROWING Long-Term Borrowing/Total debt Bureaux van Dijk 
FOREIGN SALES Foreign Sales/Total Sales Annual Report 
LIQUIDITY RATIO (Current Assets- Stock & W.I.P.)/Current 
Liabilities 
Bureaux van Dijk 
SHAREHOLDERS 
LIQUIDITY RATIO 
Shareholders’ Funds/ Long term liabilities Bureaux van Dijk 
SOLVENCY RATIO 
(ASSET BASED) (%) 
Shareholders’ Funds/Total Assets Bureaux van Dijk 
ASSET COVER Total Assets/Long Term Debt Bureaux van Dijk 
PROFIT MARGIN (%) Profit(Loss) before tax/Turnover Bureaux van Dijk 
RETURN ON 
SHAREHOLDERS’ FUNDS 
(%) 
(Profit(Loss) before tax/Shareholders ‘Funds)% Bureaux van Dijk 
RETURN ON TOTAL 
ASSETS (%) 
(Profit(Loss) before tax/Total Assets)% Bureaux van Dijk 
INTEREST COVER (%) Profit (Loss) before Interest/ -Interest Paid Bureaux van Dijk 
GROSS MARGIN (%)  Gross Profit/Turnover Bureaux van Dijk 
BARRY RATIO (%) -((Gross Profit+Other Operating Income pre 
OP)/(Administration Expenses + Exceptional 
Items pre OP)) 
Bureaux van Dijk 
EBIT MARGIN (%) Operating Profit/Turnover Bureaux van Dijk 
EBITDA MARGIN (%) EBITDA/Turnover Bureaux van Dijk 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL ANALYISIS 
 
5.1: Methodology 
This study employs a balanced panel data set as the firm-data is constructed 
over a time period of 8 years (2005-2012) with multiple cross sections for each 
year. A panel data set has a larger number of observation points which increase 
the degree of freedom and reduce the collinearity between independent variables, 
resulting in improved efficiency of economic estimates (Hsiao, 2003). The validity 
of the estimation results is also increased as a panel data set control for omitted 
variables (Hsiao, 2003). 
This study employs a method to examine if there are any firm level factors that 
determine a firm’s decision to hedge by using a multivariate logit regression. 
 
5.1.1: Outliers 
Winsorization is used to prevent any disturbance in the estimation outputs 
caused by outliers. As some of the variables may contain extreme values, it could 
create skewness in the samples and this the variables may not be normally 
distributed (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). The winsorization process removes any 
outliers by truncate the extreme values outside a fixed number of standard 
deviations from the mean, so that these extreme values will be equal to the 
highest or lowest number inside the parameter (Hellerstein, 2008). Moreover, the 
natural log has been applied on some variables to mitigate the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. To test for the normality of the variables this study uses the 
Shapiro-Wilk test where the null hypothesis states that the variable is normally 
distributed. As the test shows rejection of the null hypothesis this study takes use 
of robust (heteroscedastic) standard errors to mitigate the problem of 
heterogeneity and lack of normally distributed data. 
 
5.1.2: Multicollinearity 
When two or more explanatory variables in a model are correlated could arise 
the problem of multicollinearity. Therefore to determine which independent 
variables have the highest theoretical relevance to hedging, have been used the 
Wald chi-square statistic. It can be used to determine the statistical significance of 
each explanatory variable, where the null hypothesis is that the coefficient in a 
logit regression model is equal to zero. 
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5.2: Descriptive statistics UK non-financial listed SMEs 
The data sample consists of 1328 firm-year observations. The table below 
shows the activity and the types of derivatives of hedging and the most used 
derivatives and derivative combinations for the firm-year observations in the UK 
sample. Panel A shows that 23.84% of the sample is classified as using 
derivatives to hedge. Panel B shows that 55.21% of the derivative users disclosed 
in their annual reports that they used IR derivatives, 51.74% used FX derivatives 
and 1.74% Commodity derivatives. The most used derivative combination was FX 
and IR derivatives 7.64%. Further, Panel D and E show that the most used FX 
derivative is FX Forwards 83.89%. The most commonly used IR derivative is IR 
Swaps 96.86%. Most used derivative combination is FX Forwards and IR Swaps 
7.64%. The fact that forward contracts and swaps are more commonly used than 
options could be because of the cost required to pay upfront when buying an 
option. Forwards contracts and swaps require no such premium payment upfront 
but are quoted with a bid-ask spread, which means the buyer will always get the 
highest price and the seller the lowest price. 
 
Tab. 11 - Hedging activity and types of derivatives used by UK non-financial SMEs. 
This table presents data on the hedging activity with derivatives disclosed in the annual reports amongst the 
sample of 166 firms from the year 2005-2012. Panel data A shows the number of derivative users and non-
users. Panel B presents data on the type of derivatives used. Panel C presents the combination of derivatives 
used and distinguishes between FX derivatives users, IR derivative users and Commodity users. Panel D and 
E present data on the most commonly used derivatives within the groups of FX and IR derivatives. Panel F 
shows the most common combinations of FX and IR derivatives used. 
Panel A: Derivative Use N % 
Use 288 23.84% 
Do not use 920 76.16% 
Total 1208 100% 
 
Panel B: Types of derivatives used (calculated as a 
percentage of 288 derivative users – Panel A) 
N % 
IR 159 55.21% 
FX 149 51.74% 
Commodity 5 1.74% 
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Panel C: Combination of derivative used N % 
FX only 125 43.40% 
IR only 136 47.22% 
Commodity only 2 0.69% 
FX & IR only 22 7.64% 
FX & Commodity only 2 0.69% 
IR & Commodity only 1 0.35% 
Total 288 100.00% 
 
Panel D: Most used FX derivatives (calculated as a 
percentage of 149 derivative users – Panel B) 
N % 
FX Forwards 125 83.89% 
FX Swaps 1 0.67% 
FX Options 5 3.36% 
FX Futures 2 1.34% 
 
Panel E: Most used IR derivatives (calculated as a 
percentage of 159 derivative users – Panel B) 
N % 
IR Forwards 0 0.00% 
IR Swaps 154 96.86% 
IR Options 5 3.14% 
IR Futures 0 0.00% 
 
Panel F: Combination of FX and IR derivative used 
(calculated as a percentage of 288 derivative users – 
Panel A) 
N % 
FX Forwards only 101 35.07% 
FX Options only 4 1.39% 
FX Futures only 2 0.69% 
IR Swaps only 132 45.83% 
IR Options only 5 1.74% 
FX Forwards + FX Swaps only 1 0.35% 
FX Forwards + FX Options only 1 0.35% 
FX Forwards + IR Swaps only 22 7.64% 
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Source: author’s elaboration of data handily collected from annual reports of UK non-financial listed SMEs. 
 
The table below (Table 12) examines the differences in firm characteristics 
between hedgers and non-hedgers through the mean difference test and the 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. Looking into the financial distress measures can be seen 
that those are significantly higher for users than non-users derivatives. In more 
detail, about the leverage proxies first of all have been stated that four out of eight 
variables are significant and three out of four significant proxies are higher for the 
hedgers. And those are debt equity ratio, long term debt equity and market value. 
This shows what has been assumed by the literature that firms with higher 
leverage are more likely to hedge because are more keener to incur in financial 
distress situations. 
Have been tested eight profitability measures and five of these are significant 
variables such as profit margin, return on shareholders’ funds, return on total 
assets, EBIT margin and EBITDA margin. The results show what has been stated 
by Glaum (2002) that hedgers are those firms with higher profitability. 
Five proxies have been use to test the relationship between interest coverage 
ratio and hedgers. These ratios show how easily a firm can pays interests on 
outstanding debt. Three of these are significant variables and two of these show 
that derivative users have higher interest coverage ratios. That is inconsistent with 
what the literature says because it states that there is a negative relationship 
between this ratio and the probability to hedge. So hedgers should have lower 
ratio because this would mean that they are more likely to go in a distressed 
situation. Asset coverage ratio is the only significant variable that shows the 
negative relationship. 
About the debt maturity ratios both of them are significant and are consistent 
with the literature because the long term borrowing variable is significant for the 
hedgers and that shows that firms with long term debt maturity are more likely to 
hedge to cover themselves against expected future risk fluctuations. 
The two proxies used to test the growth opportunities are both significant but 
only capital expenditure reflects what stated by the literature that companies 
hedge because investment. 
To measure the financial price risk have been use mainly three proxies the 
foreign sales, leverage ratio and the interest coverage ratio. Foreign sales and 
leverage ratios show that there is a positive relationship between hedging and 
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financial price exposure. The interest coverage ratios show that firms that have a 
higher financial exposure are more likely to hedge and that is in contrast with what 
is stated by the literature because should exist a negative relationship. The foreign 
sales variable has been used also to test the relationship between hedging and 
overseas operations and as shown firms facing higher operations in foreign 
markets have been used hedging instruments to protect themselves against this 
risk. 
All the variables measuring firm size are significantly higher for hedgers and 
that is consistent with the fact that higher firms enjoy information and transaction 
costs scale economies by engaging in risk management activities. 
Finally to test the relationship between hedging and the use of other 
instruments to hedge have been used five liquidity proxies and three of them are 
significant such as current ratio, shareholder’s liquidity ratio and solvency ratio 
asset based. Only the shareholder’s liquidity ratio shows the right relationship 
stated by the literature such as more liquid is a firm less likely to hedge it is. 
 
Tab. 12 - Mean difference test of hedgers vs non-hedgers. 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between derivatives users versus non-users, where ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variable 
Hedgers 
Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum test 
N Mean N Mean Diff T-stat Sig. H&NH Z Sign. 
ZSC 234 1,13 563 0,99 -0,14 -1,48 0,14 H=NH -0,67 0,50 
DIVYIELD 152 3,42 242 3,66 0,24 0,89 0,40 H=NH 0,64 0,52 
LEVERAGE           
DEBTEQUITY 172 40,64 455 15,69 -24,96 -2,52 
0,01 
*** 
H>NH -3,63 0,00 
DEBTCAPITAL 172 0,27 455 0,31 0,05 0,60 0,55 H=NH -1,51 0,13 
LTDEBTCAPITAL 187 0,20 515 0,19 -0,01 -0,41 0,68 H=NH -2,98 0,00 
LTDEBTEQUITY 187 0,40 515 0,26 -0,14 -2,34 
0,02 
** 
H>NH -4,18 0,00 
LIABASSETS 259 0,44 729 0,50 0,06  3,14 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 2,24 0,03 
GEARINGRAT 268 53,43 752 54,66 1,23 0,22 0,83 H=NH -2,16 0,03 
BV 172 0,31 455 0,31 0,00 0,02 0,99 H=NH -1,71 0,09 
MKTV 156 0,42 347 0,35 -0,07 -3,29 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -3,16 0,00 
LIQUIDITY           
CRAT 286 2,37 911 2,11 -0,26 -1,87 
0,06 
* 
H>NH -1,62 0,11 
QRAT 187 1,71 534 1,60 -0,11 -1,01 0,31 H=NH -1,40 0,16 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 286 1,78 911 1,80 0,01 0,11 0,91 H=NH 0,48 0,63 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITY
RATIOX 
266 25,03 731 36,30 11,27 1,70 
0,09 
* 
H<NH 1,58 0,11 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBA
SED 
285 56,99 902 51,30 -5,69  -3,36 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -2,19 0,03 
PROFITABILITY           
ROC 112 0,02 172 0,03 0,02 1,27 0,21 H=NH 0,65 0,52 
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ROE 277 -0,01 868 -0,12 -0,10 -1,48 0,14 H=NH -0,86 0,39 
PROFITMARGIN 260 6,18 847 -0,94 -7,12 -4,46 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,01 0,00 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDER
SFUNDS 
282 1,96 849 -7,54 -9,50 -2,41 
0,02 
** 
H>NH -1,67 0,10 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 286 2,45 910 -4,52 -6,97  -3,82 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -2,73 0,01 
EBITMARGIN 280 6,32 888 -7,51 -13,83  -4,07 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,55 0,00 
EBITDAMARGIN 280 14,62 886 2,61 -12,01 -4,24 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,65 0,00 
GROSSMARGIN 241 45,83 770 48,33 2,49 1,44 0,15 H=NH 1,17 0,24 
IC           
EBITINP 248 30,13 696 -17,55 -47,67  -2,98 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,37 0,00 
EBITDAINP 248 63,30 696 12,79 -50,51 -2,57 
0,01
*** 
H>NH -3,75 0,00 
INTERESTCOVERX 252 23,89 673 16,14 -7,75 -1,44 0,15 H=NH -2,61 0,01 
ASSETCOVERX 187 41,97 503 73,06 31,09  2,50 
0,01 
*** 
H<NH 3,95 0,00 
BERRYRATIO 241 1,20 767 1,12 -0,07 -1,22 0,22 H=NH -4,20 0,00 
GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITY 
          
CAPEXPSALES 32 0,00 261 -0,04 -0,05  -1,98 
0,05 
** 
H>NH -0,52 0,60 
MKTTBRAT 253 0,44 681 0,49 0,05 2,64 
0,01 
*** 
H<NH 1,79 0,07 
DEBT MATURITY           
STBORROW 172 0,37 455 0,47 0,11 3,92 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 4,18 0,00 
LTBORROW 172 0,63 455 0,53 -0,11  -3,92 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,18 0,00 
FIRM SIZE           
LNMKTCAP 254 3,11 680 2,48 -0,63  -5,94 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,35 0,00 
LNTOTSALES 272 10,00 858 9,32 
-0,68  
 
-10,11 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH 
-
10,13 
0,00 
LNTOTASSETS 277 10,47 869 9,52 
-0,94  
 
-10,74 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH 
-
11,08 
0,00 
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE 
          
FOREIGNSALES 272 0,32 858 0,25 
-0,07  
 
-2,78 
0,01 
*** 
H>NH -1,76 0,08 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
 
The tables below provide differences in means between FX derivative users 
versus non-FX derivative users and IR derivative users versus non-IR derivative 
users with and without bias. 
First of all must be done a comparison of the results from the next two tables – 
table 13 and table 14 - that gives an overview of which characteristics are 
important in case of hedging with FX derivative no bias and IR derivatives no bias. 
Those tables show that FX derivative users no bias have three out of eight non-
significant leverage variables that are debt equity, debt capital and long term debt 
equity. It could be explained by the fact that the non-FX derivative users no bias 
should be IR derivative users no bias. In fact if look to the table 14 (IR hedgers 
non bias) the debt equity and the long term debt equity are both significant and 
show that higher leveraged firms are more likely to hedge. The fact that IR 
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derivative users have higher variables form the non-users could be explain 
because higher leveraged firms (firms with more debt, thus higher level of IR 
exposure) would be more concerned about interest changes on loans than lower 
leveraged firms, they are more likely to use IR derivatives than FX derivatives. 
As expected FX hedgers no bias has a higher foreign sales variable that can 
be explain by the fact that companies with higher foreign exposure are more likely 
to hedge. And at the same time for the IR hedgers no bias the long term borrow 
variable is significant for those firms who have a long term debt exposure and that 
can be justified by the fact that those firms want to cover themselves against any 
fluctuation in interest rates risk. Furthermore IR derivative users no bias have one 
out of five higher significant variables of IC for hedgers. 
 
Tab. 13 - Mean difference test of FX hedgers vs non-FX hedgers (no bias). 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between FX derivatives users versus non-FX derivative users 
no bias, where ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variable 
Hedgers 
Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum test 
N Mean N Mean Diff T-stat 
Sig
n. 
H&NH Z Sign. 
ZSC 121 1,60 563 0,99 -0,61 -4,98 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,13 0,00 
DIVYIELD 76 3,28 242 3,66 0,39 1,05 0,29 H=NH 1,02 0,31 
LEVERAGE           
DEBTEQUITY 65 19,19 456 17,52 -1,67 -0,13 0,89 H=NH -0,19 0,85 
DEBTCAPITAL 65 0,24 456 0,31 0,08 0,69 0,49 H=NH 1,93 0,05 
LTDEBTCAPITAL 67 0,12 515 0,19 0,07 1,69 
0,09 
* 
H<NH 2,25 0,02 
LTDEBTEQUITY 67 0,21 515 0,26 0,04 0,44 0,66 H=NH 1,49 0,14 
LIABASSETS 127 0,38 729 0,50 0,12 4,90 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 4,97 0,00 
GEARINGRAT 136 25,99 752 54,81 28,82 3,92 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 3,99 0,00 
BV 65 0,20 456 0,31 0,11 2,57 
0,01 
*** 
H<NH 2,45 0,01 
MKTV 62 0,26 348 0,35 0,09 2,89 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 2,72 0,01 
LIQUIDITY           
CRAT 148 2,66 911 2,11 -0,56 -3,19 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,24 0,00 
QRAT 105 2,02 534 1,60 -0,42 -3,10 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,12 0,00 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 148 2,20 911 1,80 -0,40 -2,76 
0,01 
*** 
H>NH -3,72 0,00 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITY
RATIOX 
132 42,34 731 36,29 -6,05 -0,65 0,51 H=NH -4,13 0,00 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBA
SED 
148 62,54 902 51,26 -11,28 -4,99 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,93 0,00 
PROFITABILITY           
ROC 148 7,36 903 -3,81 -11,17 -2,20 
0,03 
** 
H>NH -3,38 0,00 
ROE 142 0,01 868 -0,11 -0,12 -1,29 9,20 H=NH -2,00 0,05 
PROFITMARGIN 145 6,23 847 -0,86 -7,09 -3,57 0,00 H>NH -3,67 0,00 
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*** 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDER
SFUNDS 
147 8,44 849 -7,43 -15,87 -3,04 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -3,19 0,00 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 148 5,61 910 -4,45 -10,07 -4,08 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,34 0,00 
EBITMARGIN 147 4,17 888 -7,42 -11,59 -2,79 
0,01 
*** 
H>NH -3,54 0,00 
EBITDAMARGIN 147 10,47 886 2,71 -7,77 -2,32 
0,02 
** 
H>NH -3,08 0,00 
GROSSMARGIN 131 46,20 771 48,37 2,17 0,98 0,33 H=NH 0,86 0,39 
IC           
EBITINP 120 64,45 697 -17,52 -81,98 -3,59 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,79 0,00 
EBITDAINP 120 
121,0
8 
697 12,78 -108,31 -3,86 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,19 0,00 
INTERESTCOVERX 122 45,85 674 16,12 -29,72 -3,91 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,95 0,00 
ASSETCOVERX 65 89,51 503 73,31 -16,20 -0,78 0,44 H=NH -2,67 0,01 
BERRYRATIO 131 1,21 768 1,12 -0,09 -1,26 0,21 H=NH -4,55 0,00 
GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITY 
          
CAPEXPSALES 17 -0,03 261 -0,04 -0,02 -0,58 0,56 H=NH -0,58 0,56 
MKTTBRAT 135 0,37 681 0,49 0,12 4,52 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 4,54 0,00 
DEBT MATURITY           
STBORROW 65 0,47 456 0,47 0,00 0,00 1,00 H=NH 0,10 0,92 
LTBORROW 65 0,53 456 0,53 0,00 0,00 1,00 H=NH -0,10 0,92 
FIRM SIZE           
LNMKTCAP 135 3,07 680 2,48 -0,59 -4,35 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,54 0,00 
LNTOTSALES 142 10,14 858 9,32 -0,82 -9,20 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -9,74 0,00 
LNTOTASSETS 142 10,13 869 9,53 -0,60 -5,34 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,88 0,00 
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE 
          
FOREIGNSALES 142 0,44 858 0,25 -0,19 -6,13 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,23 0,00 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
 
Tab. 14 - Mean difference test of IR hedgers vs non-IR hedgers (no bias). 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between IR derivatives users versus non-IR derivative users no 
bias, where ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variable 
Hedgers 
Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum test 
N Mean N Mean Diff T-stat 
Sig
n. 
H&NH Z Sign. 
ZSC 132 0,73 563 0,99 0,26 2,26 
0,02 
** 
H<NH 4,01 0,00 
DIVYIELD 90 3,37 242 3,66 0,30 0,87 0,38 H=NH 0,60 0,55 
LEVERAGE           
DEBTEQUITY 122 40,18 456 17,52 -22,66 -1,96 
0,05 
** 
H>NH -4,36 0,00 
DEBTCAPITAL 122 0,28 456 0,31 0,03 0,37 0,71 H=NH -3,23 0,00 
LTDEBTCAPITAL 135 0,25 515 0,19 -0,05 -1,68 
0,09 
* 
H>NH -5,69 0,00 
LTDEBTEQUITY 135 0,48 515 0,26 -0,22 -3,19 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,75 0,00 
LIABASSETS 151 0,49 729 0,50 0,01 0,34 0,74 H=NH -0,99 0,32 
GEARINGRAT 152 75,00 752 54,81 -20,19 -2,74 
0,01 
*** 
H>NH -6,70 0,00 
BV 122 0,36 456 0,31 -0,05 -1,52 0,13 H=NH -3,86 0,00 
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MKTV 109 0,50 348 0,35 -0,15 -6,34 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,00 0,00 
LIQUIDITY           
CRAT 158 1,96 911 2,11 0,15 0,83 0,40 H=NH 3,71 0,00 
QRAT 90 1,36 534 1,60 0,24 1,74 
0,08 
* 
H<NH 2,00 0,05 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 158 1,31 911 1,80 0,49 3,56 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 5,14 0,00 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITY
RATIOX 
154 8,64 731 36,29 27,65 3,45 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 5,91 0,00 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBA
SED 
157 51,92 902 51,26 -0,66 -0,30 9,76 H=NH 1,36 0,18 
PROFITABILITY           
ROC 158 1,13 903 -3,81 -4,94 -1,00 0,32 H=NH 0,09 0,93 
ROE 154 -0,01 868 -0,11 -0,11 -1,23 0,22 H=NH 0,29 0,77 
PROFITMARGIN 137 5,87 847 -0,86 -6,73 -3,15 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -2,67 0,01 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDER
SFUNDS 
155 -1,03 849 -7,43 -6,40 -1,24 0,22 H=NH 0,18 0,86 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 158 0,90 910 -4,45 -5,36 -2,25 
0,02 
** 
H>NH -0,36 0,72 
EBITMARGIN 153 11,41 888 -7,42 -18,83 -4,25 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,44 0,00 
EBITDAMARGIN 153 19,70 886 2,71 -16,99 -4,55 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,04 0,00 
GROSSMARGIN 123 46,95 771 48,37 1,42 0,62 0,54 H=NH 0,12 0,91 
IC           
EBITINP 147 9,92 697 -17,52 -27,45 -1,37 0,17 H=NH -1,68 0,09 
EBITDAINP 147 21,50 697 12,78 -8,72 -0,37 0,71 H=NH -0,45 0,66 
INTERESTCOVERX 150 11,63 674 16,12 4,50 0,73 0,47 H=NH 0,11 0,91 
ASSETCOVERX 138 16,90 503 73,31 56,41 4,23 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 6,98 0,00 
BERRYRATIO 123 1,22 768 1,12 -0,10 -1,14 0,25 H=NH -2,34 0,02 
GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITY 
          
CAPEXPSALES 14 0,00 261 -0,04 -0,05 -1,36 0,18 H=NH 0,28 0,78 
MKTTBRAT 137 0,49 681 0,49 0,00 -0,09 0,93 H=NH -1,59 0,11 
DEBT MATURITY           
STBORROW 122 0,30 456 0,47 0,17 5,80 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 5,93 0,00 
LTBORROW 122 0,70 456 0,53 -0,17 -5,80 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,93 0,00 
FIRM SIZE           
LNMKTCAP 138 3,21 680 2,48 -0,74 -5,52 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,09 0,00 
LNTOTSALES 149 9,92 858 9,32 -0,60 -6,95 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,82 0,00 
LNTOTASSETS 154 10,80 869 9,53 -1,27 -11,34 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH 
-
10,68 
0,00 
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE 
          
FOREIGNSALES 149 0,21 858 0,25 0,04 1,33 0,18 H=NH 1,47 0,14 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
 
The next two tables show the differences in means between FX hedgers and 
IR hedgers. They show that also in this scenario is verified what stated for FX and 
IR hedgers no bias about the leverage and the Interest coverage proxies. So that 
debt equity, debt capital and long term debt equity are the only three leverage 
variables that are no significant – see table 15 that shows the results about FX 
hedgers. And the firsts two of these variables are significant in the table 16 
showing the results for the IR hedgers. Furthermore the significant variables as 
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interest coverage proxies still the same for IR and FX hedgers. That strengthens 
what have been said before. 
 
Tab. 15 - Mean difference test of FX hedgers vs non-FX hedgers (bias). 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between FX derivatives users versus non-FX derivative users, 
where ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VARIABLE 
Hedgers 
Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum test 
N Mean N Mean Diff T-stat 
Sig
n. 
H&NH Z Sign. 
ZSC 121 1,60 676 0,93 -0,68 -5,72 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,04 0,00 
DIVYIELD 76 3,28 318 3,64 0,36 1,03 0,30 H=NH 1,04 0,30 
LEVERAGE           
DEBTEQUITY 65 19,19 562 22,93 3,73 0,26 0,80 H=NH 0,57 0,57 
DEBTCAPITAL 65 0,24 562 0,31 0,07 0,62 0,53 H=NH 2,63 0,01 
LTDEBTCAPITAL 67 0,12 635 0,20 0,08 2,02 
0,04 
** 
H<NH 3,23 0,00 
LTDEBTEQUITY 67 0,21 635 0,30 0,09 0,96 0,34 H=NH 2,60 0,01 
LIABASSETS 127 0,38 861 0,50 0,12 5,10 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 5,38 0,00 
GEARINGRAT 136 25,99 884 58,70 32,71 4,47 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 5,23 0,00 
BV 65 0,20 562 0,32 0,13 2,94 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 3,25 0,00 
MKTV 62 0,26 441 0,38 0,12 4,04 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 3,92 0,00 
LIQUIDITY           
CRAT 148 2,66 
104
9 
2,10 -0,56 -3,12 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,56 0,00 
QRAT 105 2,02 616 1,56 -0,46 -3,48 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,50 0,00 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 148 2,20 
104
9 
1,74 -0,46 -3,25 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,31 0,00 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITY
RATIOX 
132 42,34 865 31,91 -10,43 -1,21 0,23 H=NH -5,37 0,00 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBA
SED 
148 62,54 
103
9 
51,26 -11,28 -5,18 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,34 0,00 
PROFITABILITY           
ROC 148 7,36 
104
1 
-3,58 -10,94 -2,25 
0,02 
** 
H>NH -3,69 0,00 
ROE 142 0,01 
100
3 
-0,10 -0,11 -1,25 0,21 H>NH -2,22 0,03 
PROFITMARGIN 145 6,23 962 -0,09 -6,32 -3,14 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -3,37 0,00 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDER
SFUNDS 
147 8,44 984 -7,20 -15,64 -3,09 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -3,45 0,00 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 148 5,61 
104
8 
-4,05 -9,66 -4,09 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -4,56 0,00 
EBITMARGIN 147 4,17 
102
1 
-5,40 -9,57 -2,18 
0,03 
** 
H>NH -2,81 0,01 
EBITDAMARGIN 147 10,47 
101
9 
4,78 -5,70 -1,55 0,12 H=NH -2,26 0,02 
GROSSMARGIN 131 46,20 880 47,96 1,76 0,80 0,42 H=NH 0,73 0,47 
IC           
EBITINP 120 64,45 824 -15,14 -79,60 -3,78 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,93 0,00 
EBITDAINP 120 
121,0
8 
824 12,23 -108,86 -4,21 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,56 0,00 
INTERESTCOVERX 122 45,85 803 14,06 -31,78 -4,54 0,00 H>NH -5,35 0,00 
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*** 
ASSETCOVERX 65 89,51 625 62,04 -27,46 -1,44 0,15 H=NH -3,79 0,00 
BERRYRATIO 131 1,21 877 1,13 -0,08 -1,10 0,27 H=NH -4,25 0,00 
GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITY 
          
CAPEXPSALES 17 -0,03 276 -0,04 -0,01 -0,42 0,67 H=NH -0,58 0,56 
MKTTBRAT 135 0,37 799 0,49 0,12 4,74 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 5,03 0,00 
DEBT MATURITY           
STBORROW 65 0,47 562 0,44 -0,03 -0,85 0,40 H=NH -0,76 0,45 
LTBORROW 65 0,53 562 0,56 0,03 0,85 0,40 H=NH 0,76 0,45 
FIRM SIZE           
LNMKTCAP 135 3,07 799 2,58 -0,49 -3,62 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -3,72 0,00 
LNTOTSALES 142 10,14 988 9,39 -0,75 -8,56 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -9,31 0,00 
LNTOTASSETS 142 10,13 
100
4 
9,70 -0,43 -3,62 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,37 0,00 
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE 
          
FOREIGNSALES 142 0,44 988 0,24 -0,20 -6,59 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,63 0,00 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
 
Tab. 16 - Mean difference test of IR hedgers vs non-IR hedgers (bias). 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between IR derivatives users versus non-IR derivative users, 
where ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%respectively. 
Variable 
Hedgers 
Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum test 
N Mean N Mean Diff T-stat 
Sig
n. 
H&NH Z Sign. 
ZSC 132 0,73 665 1,09 0,36 3,12 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 5,14 0,00 
DIVYIELD 90 3,37 304 3,63 0,26 0,80 0,43 H=NH 0,55 0,58 
LEVERAGE           
DEBTEQUITY 122 40,18 505 18,28 -21,90 -1,96 
0,05 
** 
H>NH -4,43 0,00 
DEBTCAPITAL 122 0,28 505 0,30 0,02 0,28 0,78 H=NH -3,74 0,00 
LTDEBTCAPITAL 135 0,25 567 0,18 -0,06 -2,03 
0,04 
** 
H>NH -6,29 0,00 
LTDEBTEQUITY 135 0,48 567 0,25 -0,23 -3,34 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -7,27 0,00 
LIABASSETS 151 0,49 837 0,48 -0,01 -0,41 0,68 H=NH -1,94 0,05 
GEARINGRAT 152 75,00 868 50,72 -24,28 -3,46 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -7,55 0,00 
BV 122 0,36 505 0,30 -0,06 -1,97 
0,05 
** 
H>NH -4,46 0,00 
MKTV 109 0,50 394 0,33 -0,17 -7,06 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,67 0,00 
LIQUIDITY           
CRAT 158 1,96 
103
9 
2,20 0,24 1,39 0,17 H<NH 4,51 0,00 
QRAT 90 1,36 631 1,67 0,31 2,19 
0,03 
** 
H<NH 2,60 0,01 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 158 1,31 
103
9 
1,87 0,56 4,04 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 5,82 0,00 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITY
RATIOX 
154 8,64 843 37,80 29,16 3,62 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 6,81 0,00 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBA
SED 
157 51,92 
103
0 
52,78 0,86 0,40 0,69 H=NH 2,24 0,03 
PROFITABILITY           
ROC 158 1,13 
103
1 
-2,73 -3,86 -0,82 0,41 H=NH 0,66 0,51 
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ROE 154 -0,01 991 -0,10 -0,10 -1,15 0,25 H=NH 0,61 0,54 
PROFITMARGIN 137 5.87 970 0.01 -5.86 -2.84 
0.00 
*** 
H>NH -2.32 0.02 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDER
SFUNDS 
155 -1,03 976 -5,82 -4,79 -0,96 0,34 H=NH 0,67 0,50 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 158 0,90 
103
8 
-3,43 -4,33 -1,88 
0,06 
* 
H<NH 0,29 0,77 
EBITMARGIN 153 11,41 
101
5 
-6,55 -17,96 -4,18 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,27 0,00 
EBITDAMARGIN 153 19,70 
101
3 
3,35 -16,35 -4,57 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,95 0,00 
GROSSMARGIN 123 46,95 888 47,84 0,89 0,39 0,70 H=NH -0,15 0,88 
IC           
EBITINP 147 9,92 797 -7,78 -17,70 -0,91 0,36 H=NH -0,69 0,49 
EBITDAINP 147 21,50 797 26,91 5,41 0,23 0,82 H=NH 0,65 0,51 
INTERESTCOVERX 150 11,63 775 19,54 7,91 1,22 0,22 H=NH 1,02 0,31 
ASSETCOVERX 138 16,90 552 76,56 59,66 4,35 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 7,56 0,00 
BERRYRATIO 123 1,22 885 1,13 -0,09 -1,11 0,26 H=NH -1,91 0,01 
GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITY 
          
CAPEXPSALES 14 0,00 279 -0,04 -0,04 -1,27 0,20 H=NH 0,35 0,73 
MKTTBRAT 137 0,49 797 0,47 -0,02 -0,83 0,41 H=NH -2,53 0,01 
DEBT MATURITY           
STBORROW 122 0,30 505 0,48 0,18 5,98 
0,00 
*** 
H<NH 6,11 0,00 
LTBORROW 122 0,70 505 0,52 -0,18 -5,98 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -6,11 0,00 
FIRM SIZE           
LNMKTCAP 138 3,21 796 2,55 -0,67 -4,98 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,67 0,00 
LNTOTSALES 149 9,92 981 9,41 -0,51 -5,81 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH -5,58 0,00 
LNTOTASSETS 154 10,80 992 9,59 -1,21 -11,02 
0,00 
*** 
H>NH 
-
10,25 
0,00 
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE 
          
FOREIGNSALES 149 0,21 981 0,27 0,06 2,06 
0,04 
** 
H<NH 2,05 0,04 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
 
Summary Mean difference test and Wilcoxon rank sum test 
What can be concluded is that companies using derivatives are those with an 
higher level of leverage and that can be explained by the fact that higher 
leveraged firms – enterprises with more debt and thus higher level of interest rate 
exposure – would be more concerned about the interest changes on loans than 
lower leveraged firms. And that is shown in table 12 by the fact that three out of 
four significant leverage variables are higher for hedgers and in table 14 and 16 
where all the five significant variables are higher for IR hedgers. And the debt 
maturity proxies in the same tables shows that firms facing long term borrowing 
are more likely to use hedge instruments as derivatives. But at the same time the 
use of FX derivative can be justified by the fact that in tables 12, 13 and 15 the 
foreign sales variable is significant and higher for hedgers. 
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5.2.1: Univariate logit regression: UK non-financial listed SMEs 
With the mean difference test and the rank sum test have been examined the 
different features between hedgers and non-hedgers. In this paragraph are going 
to be presented the results of univariate logit tests run with all the variables 
examined in the previous part. By doing this is get an estimated idea of the effect 
of every individual variable in the decision of hedging, so can choose with more 
confidence the most significant variables to run multivariate logit regression and 
construct the best model to explain the determinants of hedging. The same test 
has been run to check the effect of every variable on users of derivatives, users of 
FX derivatives and users of IR derivatives without bias. 
The leverage measure for hedgers and IR hedgers is market value leverage 
because it is significant and it has a positive coefficient. The FX hedgers has 
liability assets as most significant variable but have to be taken into account that it 
has a negative coefficient. These results are consistent with the one shown in 
tables 12, 13 and 14 where those proxies are higher for hedgers and IR hedgers. 
Liquidity variables present different results for different groups. For users and 
FX derivative users the significant liquidity ratio is solvency ratio asset based, but it 
has a positive coefficient that is in contrast with what the literature says. That it is 
also shown in tables 12 and 13. For the IR derivative users the liquidity ratio is 
significant and have a negative coefficient so a negative influence in the hedging 
decision and it agrees with what stated in table 14. 
Profitability variable for FX derivative users is ROA, for IR derivative users is 
EBITDA Margin and for Users is Profit Margin. All of these variables have a 
positive coefficient as stated by the literature. Furthermore this positive 
relationship is verified also by the mean difference test tables 12, 13 and 14. 
Interest coverage the most significant variable for Users is EBIT interest 
payment but it has a wrong coefficient, thus at the same time as IC measure with a 
negative coefficient there is Asset coverage ratio. About the FX derivatives users, 
Interest coverage ratio represents the most significant variable but with a negative 
coefficient. IR Users as significant variable Asset coverage ratio that has a 
negative coefficient as expected. In fact also in the previous tests have been 
shown that what the literature says is not verified by our data. 
About the firm growth in the group of derivative users and FX derivative users 
the variable with more relevance is mark to book ratio and has negative coefficient 
as not predicted. But for IR derivative users there is no firm growth significant 
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variables. Also through the mean difference test there is a negative relationship 
between growth opportunity and hedging that could be explained by the fact that 
the sample is composed by SMEs and could be that those companies do not 
intends to use derivatives to hedge growth opportunity, could be that they use 
other tools. 
Debt maturity variable for users and IR derivative users is the long term debt 
(ltborrow) and it is the most significant debt maturity variable and as the literature 
says and the previous test shown there is a positive relationship. For FX derivative 
users there is no debt maturity significant variables. That agrees with what have 
been shown in the mean difference test. 
To capture the effect of the firm size the natural log of total sales is the variable 
with more relevance for users and FX derivative user. IR derivative users have 
natural log of total assets as significant variable to be explain that. In all of these 
cases the previous results confirms what have been just stated. 
To measure the risk of default and dividend yield we have used the z-score 
and dividend yield respectively because they are the only variables available in 
their respective categories, although dividend yield is not significant when it is 
anlaysed in all of the groups and the z-score is statistically significant in the group 
of IR and FX users but in the FX users its coefficient is positive instead of 
negative. 
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Tab. 17 - Univariate Logit of hedgers. 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms use 
derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust standard 
errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables N Coeff  
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
 Zsc 797 0,097  0,062 1,58 0,11 2,50 
 Divyield 394 -0,033  0,038 -0,85 0,39 0,73 
LEVERAGE 
debtequity 627 -1,018 ** 0,001 2,26 0,02 5,12 
debtcapital 627 -0,061  0,088 -0,69 0,49 0,47 
ltdebtcapital 702 0,109  0,236 0,46 0,64 0,21 
ltdebtequity 702 0,266 *** 0,105 2,54 0,01 6,43 
liabassets 988 -0,970 *** 0,284 -3,41 0,00 11,62 
gearingrat 1020 0,000  0,001 -0,23 0,81 0,06 
Bv 627 -0,005  0,243 -0,02 0,98 0,00 
Mktv 503 1,378 *** 0,424 3,25 0,00 10,57 
LIQUIDITY 
Crat 1197 0,057 * 0,303 1,87 0,06 3,50 
Qrat 721 0,067  0,065 1,03 0,30 1,06 
liquidityratiox 1197 -0,005  0,042 -0,11 0,91 0,01 
shareholdersliqui
dityratiox 
997 -0,002 * 0,001 -1,64 0,10 2,69 
solvencyratioass
etbased 
1187 0,010 *** 0,003 3,83 0,00 14,68 
PROFITABILITY 
Roc 1189 0,002 ** 0,001 2,37 0,02 5,63 
Roe 1145 0,117 * 0,064 1,83 0,07 3,34 
profitmargin 1107 0,153 *** 0,003 4,39 0,00 19,30 
returnonsharehol
dersfunds 
1131 0,003 *** 0,001 2,55 0,01 6,49 
Returnontotalass
ets 
1196 0,133 *** 0,003 4,10 0,00 16,78 
ebitmargin 1168 0,008 *** 0,002 2,74 0,01 7,51 
ebitdamargin 1166 0,008 *** 0,003 3,25 0,00 10,57 
grossmargin 1011 -0,005  0,003 -1,48 0,14 2,19 
IC 
Ebitinp 944 0,001 *** 0,000 3,30 0,00 10,90 
ebitdainp 944 0,001 *** 0,000 2,65 0,01 7,02 
interestcoverx 925 0,001  0,009 1,47 0,14 2,17 
assetcoverx 690 -0,002 ** 0,001 -2,04 0,04 4,16 
berryratio 1008 0,102  0,084 1,21 0,23 1,47 
GROWTH OP. capexpsales 293 3,281 ** 1,477 2,22 0,03 4,93 
mkttbrat 934 -0,828 *** 0,282 -2,93 0,00 8,60 
DEBT MATURITY stborrow 627 -1,199 *** 0,328 -3,66 0,00 13,38 
ltborrow 627 1,198 *** 0,328 3,66 0,00 13,37 
FIRM SIZE 
lnmktcap 934 0,303 *** 0,055 5,47 0,00 29,90 
lntotsales 1130 0,799 *** 0,084 9,54 0,00 91,01 
lntotassets 1146 0,557 *** 0,059 9,51 0,00 90,42 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 1130 0,550 *** 0,202 2,72 0,01 7,42 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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Tab. 18 - Univariate Logit of IR (bias). 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms hedge 
with IR derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust 
standard errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables N Coeff  
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
 Zsc 797 -0,222 *** 0,060 -3,68 0,00 13,52 
 Divyield 394 -0,037   0,045 -0,82 0,41 0,67 
LEVERAGE 
debtequity 627 0,001 * 0,001 1,84 0,07 3,40 
debtcapital 627 -0,032   0,110 -0,29 0,77 0,08 
ltdebtcapital 702 0,589 ** 0,288 2,05 0,04 4,19 
ltdebtequity 702 0,402 *** 0,114 3,52 0,00 12,41 
liabassets 988 0,139   0,274 0,51 0,61 0,26 
gearingrat 1020 0,003 *** 0,001 3,90 0,00 15,19 
Bv 627 0,532 ** 0,232 2,29 0,02 5,25 
Mktv 503 3,301 *** 0,465 7,10 0,00 50,37 
LIQUIDITY 
Crat 1197 -0,067   0,070 -0,96 0,34 0,92 
Qrat 721 -0,243 ** 0,120 -2,03 0,04 4,13 
liquidityratiox 1197 -0,344 *** 0,116 -2,97 0,00 8,80 
shareholdersliqui
dityratiox 
997 -0,019   0,013 -1,49 0,14 2,23 
solvencyratioass
etbased 
1187 -0,001   0,003 -0,52 0,60 0,28 
PROFITABILITY 
Roc 1189 0,001   0,001 1,22 0,22 1,49 
Roe 1145 0,119 * 0,064 1,86 0,06 3,47 
profitmargin 1107 0,012 *** 0,005 2,52 0,01 6,34 
returnonsharehol
dersfunds 
1131 0,002   0,001 1,17 0,24 1,37 
returnontotalass
ets 
1196 0,007 *** 0,003 2,70 0,01 7,28 
ebitmargin 1168 0,012 *** 0,005 2,60 0,01 6,77 
ebitdamargin 1166 0,012 *** 0,004 3,19 0,00 10,19 
grossmargin 1011 -0,002   0,004 -0,41 0,68 0,17 
IC 
Ebitinp 944 0,000   0,000 1,50 0,14 2,24 
ebitdainp 944 0,000   0,000 -0,41 0,68 0,17 
interestcoverx 925 -0,002   0,002 -1,21 0,23 1,46 
assetcoverx 690 -0,011 ** 0,005 -2,27 0,02 5,15 
berryratio 1008 0,115   0,120 0,96 0,34 0,92 
GROWTH OP. capexpsales 293 3,916   2,153 1,35 0,18 1,83 
mkttbrat 934 0,270   0,266 1,02 0,31 1,03 
DEBT MATURITY stborrow 627 -2,226 *** 0,418 -5,33 0,00 28,40 
ltborrow 627 2,226 *** 0,418 5,33 0,00 28,40 
FIRM SIZE 
lnmktcap 934 0,316 *** 0,067 4,74 0,00 22,46 
lntotsales 1130 0,557 *** 0,081 6,88 0,00 47,40 
lntotassets 1146 0,695 *** 0,070 9,94 0,00 98,71 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 1130 -0,583 ** 0,271 -2,15 0,03 4,62 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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Tab. 19 - Univariate Logit of FX (bias). 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms hedge 
with FX derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust 
standard errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables N Coeff  
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
 Zsc 797 0,586 *** 0,098 5,93 0,00 35,15 
 Divyield 394 0,052   0,052 -0,99 0,32 0,98 
LEVERAGE 
debtequity 627 0,000   0,001 -0,40 0,69 0,16 
debtcapital 627 -0,085   0,065 -1,32 0,19 1,75 
ltdebtcapital 702 -0,805 *** 0,271 -2,97 0,00 8,83 
ltdebtequity 702 -0,183   0,158 -1,16 0,25 1,33 
liabassets 988 -2,542 *** 0,462 -5,50 0,00 30,24 
gearingrat 1020 -0,012 *** 0,004 -3,49 0,00 12,15 
Bv 627 -2,067 *** 0,656 -3,15 0,00 9,91 
Mktv 503 -2,677 *** 0,614 -4,36 0,00 19,03 
LIQUIDITY 
Crat 1197 0,105 *** 0,029 3,59 0,00 12,89 
Qrat 721 0,247 *** 0,067 3,67 0,00 13,48 
liquidityratiox 1197 0,141 *** 0,040 3,49 0,00 12,17 
shareholdersliqui
dityratiox 
997 0,001   0,001 1,33 0,18 1,76 
solvencyratioass
etbased 
1187 0,024 *** 0,004 5,77 0,00 33,28 
PROFITABILITY 
Roc 1189 0,004 *** 0,001 3,45 0,00 11,92 
Roe 1145 0,137   0,093 1,48 0,14 2,19 
profitmargin 1107 0,014 *** 0,003 3,86 0,00 14,93 
returnonsharehol
dersfunds 
1131 0,008 *** 0,002 3,81 0,00 14,50 
returnontotalass
ets 
1196 0,025 *** 0,006 4,21 0,00 17,73 
ebitmargin 1168 0,005 *** 0,002 3,15 0,00 9,92 
ebitdamargin 1166 0,004 *** 0,001 2,75 0,01 7,55 
grossmargin 1011 -0,003   0,004 -0,88 0,38 0,77 
IC 
Ebitinp 944 0,002 *** 0,000 4,03 0,00 16,28 
ebitdainp 944 0,001 *** 0,000 3,90 0,00 15,17 
interestcoverx 925 0,004 *** 0,001 4,13 0,00 17,07 
assetcoverx 690 0,001   0,001 1,49 0,14 2,23 
berryratio 1008 0,111 * 0,061 1,82 0,07 3,32 
GROWTH OP. capexpsales 293 0,888   0,832 1,07 0,29 1,14 
mkttbrat 934 -2,314 *** 0,442 -5,24 0,00 27,42 
DEBT MATURITY stborrow 627 0,359   0,437 0,82 0,41 0,67 
ltborrow 627 -0,359   0,437 -0,82 0,41 0,67 
FIRM SIZE 
lnmktcap 934 0,231 *** 0,065 3,57 0,00 12,75 
lntotsales 1130 0,884 *** 0,107 8,25 0,00 68,14 
lntotassets 1146 0,237 *** 0,053 4,50 0,00 20,24 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 1130 1,514 *** 0,242 6,27 0,00 39,28 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
 
In the table below have been summarized in order by significance, all the 
significant independent variables for each dependent binary variable. To build up 
the multivariate regression for each proxy have been taken into account the 
independent variables that the dependent variables have in common and at the 
same time whose who have the high number of observations.26 
 
 
 
                                                             
26
 The data sample consists of 1328 firm-year observations. 
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Tab. 20 - Summary independent variables for multivariate model. 
HEDGERS No. Obs. IR No. Obs. FX No. Obs. 
  Z-Score 797 Z-Score 797 
Leverage 
Liability Assets 988 Market Value 503 Liability Assets 988 
Market Value 503 Gearing Ratio 1020 Market Value 503 
Long Term Debt 
Equity 
702 Long Term Debt 
Equity 
702 Gearing Ratio 1020 
Debt Equity 627 Book Value 
Leverage 
627 Book Value 
Leverage 
627 
  Long Term Debt 
Capital 
702 Long Term Debt 
Capital 
702 
      
Liquidity 
Solvency Ratio 
Asset Based 
1187 Debt Equity 627 Solvency Ratio 
Asset Based 
1187 
Currency Ratio 1197 Liquidity Ratio 1197 Quick Ratio 721 
Shareholders 
Liquidity Ratio 
997 Quick Ratio 721 Currency Ratio 1197 
    Liquidity Ratio  
Profitability 
Profit Margin 1107 EBITDA Margin 1166 ROA 1196 
ROA 1196 ROA 1196 Profit Margin 1107 
EBITDA Margin  1166 EBIT Margin 1168 Return on 
Shareholders 
Funds 
1131 
EBIT Margin 1168 Profit Margin 1107 ROC 1189 
Return on 
Shareholders’ 
Funds 
1131 ROE 1145   
ROC 1189     
ROE 1145     
Interest Coverage 
EBIT Interest 
Payment 
944 Asset Coverage 690 Interest Cover 925 
EBITDA Interest 
Payment 
944   EBIT Interest 
Payment 
944 
Asset Coverage 
Ratio 
690   EBITDA Interest 
Payment 
944 
    Berry Ratio 1008 
Growth Opportunities 
Market To Book 
Ratio 
934   Market To Book 
Ratio 
934 
Capital 
Expenditure 
293     
Debt Maturity 
Long Term Borrow 627 Long Term Borrow 627   
Short Term Borrow 627 Short Term Borrow 627   
Firm Size 
Ln Total Sales 1130 Ln Total Assets 1146 Ln Total Sales 1130 
Ln Total Assets 1146 Ln Total Sales 1130 Ln Total Assets 1146 
Ln Market 
Capitalization 
934 Ln Market 
Capitalization 
934 Ln Market 
Capitalization 
934 
Foreign Exposure 
Foreign Sales 1130 Foreign Sales 1130 Foreign Sales 1130 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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5.2.2: Multivariate logit regression: UK non-financial listed SMEs 
To run the Multivariate logit regression have been used the following 
independent variables: 
 
Tab. 21 - Summary independent variables and relative literature. 
 
Independent Variables Literature 
Z-SCORE Altman (1968) 
Leverage  
Market Value Stulz (1996) 
Leland (1998) 
Liquidity  
Solvency Ratio Asset Based Froot (1993) 
Currency Ratio 
Quick Ratio 
Profitability  
Profit Margin Glaum (2002) 
Bartram et al. (2009) 
ROA 
Return on Shareholders’ Funds 
ROC 
ROE 
Interest Coverage  
EBIT Interest Payment Geczy (1997) 
Judge (2006) 
Bartrmam et al. (2009) 
 
Asset Coverage 
Growth Opportunities  
Market To Book Ratio Myers (1977) 
Bressembinder (1991) 
Froot et al. (1993) 
Debt Maturity  
Long Term Borrow Stulz (1996) 
Leland (1998) 
Short Term Borrow 
Firm Size  
Ln Total Sales Graham and Rodgers (2002) 
Judge (2006) 
Campello et al. (2011) Ln Total Assets 
Foreign Exposure  
Foreign Sales Smith and Stulz (1985) 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Univariate tests have given an indication of the relationship between 
hedging and the different firm characteristics. However, these tests tend to be 
weak since the interaction between different independent variables is not taken 
into account. The table below presents the results from a cluster-specific logit 
regression between the probability of hedging and several independent variables. 
The results in model 1-7 suggest that firm size and hedging substitute ratios are 
the most significant variables to determine the probability of hedging. The first 
showing a positive relationship between the use of derivatives and the firm’s 
dimension. In the other hand, hedging substitute measure highlight that small and 
medium enterprises which use hedging substitute are less likely to hedge by 
derivatives instruments. 
Foreign sale has been used as a proxy for foreign exposure. It has a 
positive coefficient in six out of seven of the models studied but at the same time 
in four out of seven is not significant. The positive coefficients support what have 
been said by Smith and Stulz (1985). Their idea was that firms with more foreign 
exposure are more likely to hedge. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) with their findings 
suggested that the foreign sales is the most significant factor in explaining the use 
of derivatives. 
Leverage and debt maturity. The variables that have been used (market 
value leverage and long term borrow) show that there is a positive relationship 
with the probability of hedging. That is consistent with what Stulz (1996) and 
Leland (1998) demonstrated, that is the existence of a strong relation between 
debt and hedging. They showed how companies hedging reduce the likelihood of 
bankruptcy and therefore are able to increase their level of debt. In fact market 
value of leverage has the greatest elasticity and odds value. In model 3 an 
increase of 1% in leverage would argument the probability of hedging by 23.44% 
and the odds of using derivative for companies with greater leverage is 3.18 times 
higher than for companies with low leverage ratios. 
Solvency ratio assets based has been used as liquidity variable and as 
predicted has a negative impact in hedging probability and that is consistent with 
Froot et al. (1993). They predicted a negative association between liquidity and 
hedging. 
The Interest Coverage proxies used have been EBIT Interest Payments and 
Asset coverage ratio, these variables are all significant but EBIT Interest Payment 
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has a positive coefficient instead of negative as the theories of Froot et al. (1993) 
say. For them the volatility seems to have opposite effects. They affirmed that 
hedging reduces cash flow volatility leading to better rates for financing, therefore 
those companies with higher rates of volatility are more likely to use derivatives in 
order to reduce the financial risk and get an easier and better conditions access 
for funding. 
The profitability variables that have been employed to measure the 
relationship with the probability of hedging are profit margin and the return on total 
assets. These two variables have a positive coefficient and are significant. Bartram 
et al. (2009) argue that firms having a lower probability of financial distress are 
less likely to hedge. Glaum (2002) argues that firms with high profitability will 
enable managers to conduct a more selective hedging strategy to take bets in the 
financial markets, thus there should be a positive relationship between hedging 
and profitability. 
After analyzing all variables can be concluded that the decision of using 
derivatives as hedging instruments is closely related to factors determining the 
liquidity costs, the firm size and the overseas operations, the variables of these 
proxies are significant in almost all the models. 
The market to book ratio has been used as a proxy of underinvestment 
costs. It is significant in all the seven models but at the same time it has a negative 
coefficient instead of positive. The literature says that is expected that companies 
with more growth opportunities are more likely to hedge in order to protect 
investments and get a constant flow of financing avoiding unexpected 
disturbances, Froot et al. (1993). 
The last two tables show the results for models having as dependent 
variable the probability of using FX and IR derivative respectively. 
The Table 25 shows the relationship between the probability that a firm 
hedges with IR derivatives and proxies for incentives to hedge. The market value 
leverage and short and long term borrow are important factor in determining 
whether to hedge with IR derivatives. The most important factor as financial 
distress proxies is leverage, and also it is the one who is ranked as the most 
important variable when comparing the marginal effect across models, which gives 
strong support to the notion that firms’ with more exposure to interest rate changes 
are more likely to hedge. According to Bessembinder (1991) and Myers (1977), 
the significantly positive effect of leverage on the likelihood of hedging is 
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consistent with the notion that asymmetric information can lead to 
underinvestment when leverage is high, resulting in increased agency costs which 
creates incentives for firms to hedge. 
Scale economies also create benefits for small and medium firms to hedge, 
which is indicated by the positive relationship between firm size and IR hedging. 
The last table suggests that FX exposure resulting from foreign operating 
revenues is an important factor in determining whether firm hedges FX risks. This 
support the argument that firms with more volatile income resulting from changes 
in the exchange rate are more likely to hedge with FX derivatives, which is 
supported by the findings in the multivariate logit regression. As for the hedgers, 
there is a positive link between firm size and probability of hedging and that 
supports scale economies hypothesis. The liquidity ratios are negative related to 
hedge with FX derivatives, which is consistent with the notion that firms can invest 
in more liquid and less risky assets and thus reduce the probability of financial 
distress. 
With the multivariate analysis have been tried to identify a model with all the 
most significant variables. Hence, have been started creating the model with the 
most significant variables and then based on trial and error method adding other 
variables have been tried to find those that are meaningful to create the model 
with the largest number of explanatory variables which reflects the best possible 
decision of hedging. At the end have been obtained a model composed of six 
independent variables statistically significant: ROA, market to book ratio, foreign 
sales, natural log of total assets and solvency ratio asset based – Model 5. 
As might be expected when this model has been applied to specific cases 
as the probability of using foreign exchange derivatives or interest rate derivatives 
have been found that some variables are no longer significant. For IR Hedgers 
those variables are: ROA and market to book ratio. Whilst for FX Hedgers all these 
variables are significant. 
Looking into the summary statistics of each table is possible to demonstrate 
why model 5 has been choose as the best model. Taking into account the 
summary table related to the probability of hedging (Use) model 5 has the highest 
number of observation (914) and correctly predicted the 75.00% of the derivatives 
users and the 59.76% of the no derivatives users. Thus the 36.11 % of the sample 
are misclassified cases. But the same model at the same time when predicts the 
probability of hedging by IR its correctly predicted only the 35.90% would use 
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derivatives and the 89.49% would not use those instruments. So the 18.48% of the 
sample are misclassified cases. For the probability of hedging instruments by FX 
the 18.87% of the sample are misclassified cases so the 45.45% would use 
derivatives and 87.54% would not use derivatives. In both the probability tables of 
Use and FX Hedgers the chi square is high, respectively 102.33% for Use and 
98.82% for FX Hedgers but for IR hedgers the chi square is 55.05%. 
Is interesting focusing on the numbers of users and non-users displayed in 
table 25 and 26. The table 25 shows the probability of hedging by IR derivative 
and the data show that over 78 observation as users only 28 are classified as 
users IR derivatives and at the same time there are 50 misclassified non 
derivatives users, so that could be explained in two ways the first is that the 47 
misclassified IR users could be FX users or otherwise they should not be users. In 
all the seven model the sensitivity is very lower for IR derivative users compared 
with the one in table of the FX hedging. But at the same time the sensitivity is 
higher in table 24. About the misclassification for the Probability of hedging by FX 
derivatives presents a similar situation with the one presented by the IR 
derivatives users so could justify the misclassification. 
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Tab. 24 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (Use). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge as proxies for incentives to hedge (Panel A). the dependent variable 
equals 1 if a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), marginal 
effects (ME), odds ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the independent 
variable. The marginal effect (elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent variable. The 
higher the elasticity’ value more important is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-values are 
calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
EBIT INT 
PAYMENT 
0.002 
(0.003) 
*** 
0.000 
(0.002) 
*** 
1.002 
(0.003) 
*** 
                  
ASSETCOV
ERX 
   
- 
0.001 
(0.292) 
 
- 
0.000 
(0.291) 
 
 
0.999 
(0.292) 
 
               
MKTV       
1.156 
(0.017) 
** 
0.234 
(0.017) 
** 
3.176 
(0.017) 
** 
            
PROFIT 
MARGIN 
         
0.008 
(0.069) 
* 
0.001 
(0.068) 
* 
1.008 
(0.069) 
* 
         
ROA             
0.010 
(0.057) 
* 
0.002 
(0.053) 
* 
0.010 
(0.057) 
* 
      
ST 
BORROW 
               
- 
0.996 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
0.201 
(0.006) 
*** 
 
0.370 
(0.007) 
*** 
   
LT 
BORROW 
                  
0.995 
(0.007) 
*** 
0.201 
(0.006) 
*** 
2.706 
(0.007) 
*** 
MKTTBRAT 
- 
73.587 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
14.136 
(0.005) 
*** 
 
0.000 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
77.580 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
15.841 
(0.016) 
** 
 
0.000 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
75.952 
(0.025) 
** 
- 
15.407 
(0.023) 
** 
 
0.000 
(0.025) 
** 
-
80.844(
0.002) 
*** 
- 
14.106 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
0.000 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
67.703 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
12.138 
(0.005) 
*** 
- 
67.703 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
78.911 
(0.019) 
** 
- 
15.970 
(0.018) 
** 
 
0.000 
(0.019) 
** 
- 
 78.916 
(0.019) 
** 
- 
15.971 
(0.018) 
** 
 
0.000 
(0.019) 
** 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
 
0.251 
(0.299) 
* 
 
0.048 
(0.299) 
* 
 
1.285 
(0.299) 
* 
 
0.014 
(0.962) 
* 
 
0.003 
(0.962) 
* 
 
1.014 
(0.962) 
* 
- 
0.101 
(0.737) 
 
- 
0.020 
(0.737) 
 
0.904 
(0.737) 
0.278 
(0.237) 
0.048 
(0.237) 
1.320 
(0.237) 
 
0.469 
(0.034) 
** 
 
0.084 
(0.034) 
** 
 
0.469 
(0.034) 
** 
0.020 
(0.948) 
0.004 
(0.948) 
1.020 
(0.948) 
0.020 
(0.948) 
0.004 
(0.948) 
1.020 
(0.948) 
LN SALES       
0.679 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.138 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.971 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.730 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.127 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.075 
(0.000) 
*** 
   
0.649 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.131 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.913 
(0.000) 
*** 
-0.786 
(0.020) 
** 
-0.159 
(0.018) 
** 
0.456 
(0.020) 
** 
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LN ASSETS 
0.462 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.089 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.589 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.464 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.095 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.590 
(0.000) 
*** 
      
0.515 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.092 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.515 
(0.000) 
*** 
      
Q-RATIO                      
SOLVENCY 
RATIO 
- 
0.727 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.139 
(0.006) 
*** 
 
0,483 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.774 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
0.158 
(0.016) 
** 
 
0.461 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
0.752 
(0.026) 
** 
- 
0.153 
(0.025) 
** 
 
0.471 
(0.026) 
** 
- 
0.795 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
0.139 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
0.451 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
0.672 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
0.121 
(0.006) 
*** 
 
0.672 
(0.015) 
** 
- 
0.786 
(0.020) 
** 
- 
0.159 
(0.018) 
** 
 
0.456 
(0.020) 
** 
- 
0.786 
(0.020) 
** 
- 
0.159 
(0.018) 
** 
 
0.456 
(0.020) 
** 
Z-SCORE                      
_cons 
67.568 
(0.013) 
** 
 
2,2e+2
9 
(0.013) 
** 
72.003 
(0.026) 
** 
 
1,9e+3
1 
(0.026) 
** 
67.800 
(0.045) 
** 
 
2.8e+2
9 
(0.045) 
** 
71.933 
(0.006) 
*** 
 
1.7e+3
1 
(0.006) 
*** 
61.180 
(0.015) 
** 
 
61.180 
(0.015) 
** 
72.063 
(0.033) 
** 
 
2e+31 
(0.033) 
** 
71.020 
(0.035) 
** 
 
7.4e+30 
(0.035) 
** 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
N. 752 532 498 860 914 498 498 
No. of Users 224 163 153 229 248 153 153 
Classified as Users 182 132 127 173 186 122 122 
Classified as Non-
Users 
42 31 26 56 62 31 31 
Sensitivity 81.25% 80.98% 83.01% 75.55% 75.00% 79.74% 79.74% 
No. of Non-Users 528 369 345 631 666 345 345 
Classified as users 264 186 181 247 268 184 184 
Classified as Non-
Users 
264 183 164 384 398 161 161 
Specificity 50.00% 49.59% 47.54% 60.86% 59.76% 46.67% 46.67% 
Correctly Specified 59.31% 59.21% 58.43% 64.77% 63.89% 56.83% 56.83% 
Chi-Square 85.54% 54.53% 52.04% 99.22% 102.33% 53.92% 53.91% 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-Square 0.0934 0.0832 0.0847 0.0995 0.0958 0.0878 0.0877 
Log pseudo likelihood -415.23412 -300.546 -281.1772 -448.7783 -483.1410 -280.2411 -280.2424 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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Tab. 25 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (IR). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge with IR derivatives as proxies for incentives to hedge. The dependent 
variable equals 1 if a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), 
marginal effects (ME), odds ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the 
independent variable. The marginal effect (elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent 
variable. The higher the elasticity’ value more important is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-
values are calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
EBIT INT 
PAYMENT 
- 
0.000 
(0.989) 
- 
0.000 
(0.989) 
 
0.999 
(0.989) 
                  
ASSETCOV
ERX 
   
- 
0.012 
(0.034) 
** 
- 
0.001 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
0.988 
(0.008) 
*** 
               
MKTV       
3.037 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.352 
(0.000) 
*** 
20.835 
(0.000) 
*** 
            
PROFIT 
MARGIN 
         
0.012 
(0.085) 
* 
0.001 
(0.084) 
* 
1.012 
(0.085) 
* 
         
ROA             
0.001 
(0.930) 
0.000 
(0.930) 
1.001 
(0.930) 
      
ST 
BORROW 
               
- 
1.644 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.197 
(0.005) 
*** 
 
0.193 
(0.008) 
*** 
   
LT 
BORROW 
                  
1.644 
(0.008) 
*** 
0.197 
(0.005) 
*** 
5.177 
(0.008) 
*** 
MKTTBRAT 
- 
0.327 
(0.656) 
 
-  
0.037 
(0.655) 
 
 
0.721 
(0.656) 
 
- 
1.916 
(0.053) 
* 
- 
0.190 
(0.044) 
** 
 
0.147 
(0.053) 
* 
- 
2.927 
(0.011) 
** 
- 
0.339 
(0.007) 
*** 
 
0.053 
(0.011) 
** 
- 
1.186 
(0.123) 
 
- 
0.123 
(0.117) 
 
0.305 
(0.123) 
- 
0.186 
(0.800) 
 
- 
0.019 
(0.800) 
 
0.830 
(0.800) 
- 
1.854 
(0.059) 
* 
- 
0.222 
(0.052) 
* 
 
0.156 
(0.059) 
* 
- 
1.854 
(0.059) 
* 
 
0.197 
(0.005) 
*** 
 
5.177 
(0.008) 
*** 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
- 
1.029 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.117 
(0.008) 
*** 
 
0.357 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.957 
(0.025) 
** 
- 
0.095 
(0.037) 
** 
 
0.384 
(0.025) 
** 
- 
1.231 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.143 
(0.007) 
*** 
 
0.292 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.982 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
0.102 
(0.015) 
** 
 
0.374 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
0.949 
(0.015) 
** 
- 
0.097 
(0.015) 
** 
 
0.387 
(0.015) 
** 
- 
1.146 
(0.016) 
** 
- 
0.137 
(0.013) 
** 
 
0.318 
(0.016) 
** 
- 
1.146 
(0.016) 
** 
- 
0.137 
(0.013) 
** 
 
0.318 
(0.016) 
** 
LN SALES       
0.702 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.081 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.017 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.683 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.071 
(0.000)*
** 
1,981 
(0.000) 
*** 
   
0.696 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.083 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.005 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.696 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.088 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.005 
(0.000) 
*** 
LN ASSETS 0.651 0.074 1.917 0.561 0.056 1.752       0.677 0.069 1.968       
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(0.000) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.001) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
Q-RATIO 
- 
0.249 
(0.071) 
* 
- 
0.028 
(0.066) 
* 
 
0.779 
(0.071) 
* 
- 
0.353 
(0.033) 
** 
- 
0.035 
(0.039) 
** 
 
0.702 
(0.033) 
** 
- 
0.208 
(0.296) 
 
- 
0.024 
(0.287) 
 
 
0.812 
(0.296) 
 
- 
0.318 
(0.045) 
** 
- 
0.033 
(0.038) 
** 
 
0.728 
(0.045) 
** 
- 
0.288 
(0.038) 
*** 
- 
0.029 
(0.035) 
** 
 
0.749 
(0.038) 
** 
- 
0.354 
(0.093) 
* 
- 
0.042 
(0.086) 
* 
 
0.702 
(0.093) 
* 
- 
0.354 
(0.093) 
* 
- 
0.042 
(0.086) 
* 
 
0.702 
(0.086) 
* 
SOLVENCY 
RATIO 
                     
Z-SCORE 
- 
0.080 
(0.650) 
 
 
0.009 
(0.649) 
 
1.083 
(0.650) 
 
0.204 
(0.327) 
 
 
0.020 
(0.320) 
 
 
1.227 
(0.327) 
- 
0.101 
(0.577) 
 
- 
0.012 
(0.578) 
 
 
0.904 
(0.577) 
- 
0.585 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
0.061 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.557 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
0.027 
(0.038) 
** 
- 
0.029 
(0.035) 
** 
 
0.749 
(0.038) 
** 
- 
0.131 
(0.453) 
 
- 
0.016 
(0.454) 
 
0.877 
(0.453) 
- 
0.131 
(0.453) 
 
- 
0.016 
(0.454) 
 
 
0.877 
(0.453) 
_cons 
- 
7.620 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
5.509 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
 
4.1e-03 
(0.001) 
*** 
- 
7.630 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
6.582 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.557 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
7.908 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
5.928 
(0.004) 
*** 
 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
*** 
- 
7.572 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
N. 470 373 356 507 525 356 356 
No. of Users 77 70 63 72 78 63 63 
Classified as Users 30 42 12 26 28 36 36 
Classified as Non-
Users 
47 28 51 49 50 27 27 
Sensitivity 38.96% 60.00% 19.05% 34.67% 35.90% 57.14% 57.14% 
No. of Non-Users 393 303 293 432 447 293 293 
Classified as users 53 65 12 58 47 8 61 
Classified as Non-
Users 
340 238 281 374 400 285 232 
Specificity 38.96% 78.55% 95.90% 86.57% 89.49% 97.27% 79.18% 
Correctly Specified 78.72% 75.07% 82.30£ 78.90% 81.52% 82.58% 75.28% 
Chi-Square 47.91% 54.40% 50.66% 41.16% 55.05% 47.86% 38.66% 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-Square 0.1143 0.1510 0.1524 0.0969 0.1248 0.1440 0.1163 
Log pseudo likelihood -185.65042 -152.89319 -140.8361 -191.9024 -193.0930 -142.2396 -146.8384 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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Tab. 26 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (FX). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge with FX derivatives as proxies for incentives to hedge. The dependent 
variable equals 1 if a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), 
marginal effects (ME), odds ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the 
independent variable. The marginal effect (elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent 
variable. The higher the elasticity’ value more important is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-
values are calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
EBIT INT 
PAYMENT 
0.000 
(0.675) 
0.000 
(0.675) 
1.000 
(0.675) 
            
ASSETCOV
ERX 
   
0.001 
(0.235) 
0.000 
(0.239) 
1.001 
(0.235) 
         
MKTV       
- 
4.097 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
0.271 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.017 
(0.000) 
*** 
      
PROFIT 
MARGIN 
         
- 
0.009 
(0.149) 
- 
0.001 
(0.150) 
 
0.991 
(0.149) 
   
ROA             
- 
0.036 
(0.005) 
*** 
- 
0.003 
(0.006) 
*** 
 
0.964 
(0.005) 
*** 
ST 
BORROW 
               
LT 
BORROW 
               
MKTTBRAT 
- 
80.036 
(0.029) 
** 
- 
7.154 
(0.026) 
** 
 
0.000 
(0.029) 
** 
- 
46.185 
(0.319) 
 
- 
3.472 
(0.314) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.319) 
 
- 
44.835 
(0.343) 
 
- 
2.961 
(0.339) 
 
0.000 
(0.340) 
- 
88.880 
(0.011) 
** 
- 
8.025 
(0.010) 
*** 
 
0.000 
(0.011) 
** 
- 
74.556 
(0.028) 
** 
- 
7.146 
(0.025) 
** 
 
0.000 
(0.028) 
** 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
1.067 
(0.001) 
*** 
0.095 
(0.001) 
*** 
2.908 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.124 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.093 
(0.002) 
*** 
3.442 
(0.002) 
*** 
1.660 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.110 
(0.000) 
*** 
5.260 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.914 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.082 
(0.003) 
*** 
2.495 
(0.002) 
*** 
1.137 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.109 
(0.000) 
*** 
3.118 
(0.000) 
*** 
LN SALES 
0.580 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.052 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.786 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.558 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.042 
(0.002) 
*** 
3.442 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.827 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.055 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.286 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.747 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.067 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.111 
(0.000) 
*** 
   
LN ASSETS             
0.424 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.041 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.529 
(0.000) 
*** 
Q-RATIO                
SOLVENCY - -  - -  - -  - -  - -  
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RATIO 0.775 
(0.034) 
** 
0.069 
(0.032) 
** 
0.460 
(0.034) 
** 
0.453 
(0.328) 
 
0.034 
(0.323) 
 
0.636 
(0.328) 
 
0.449 
(0.342) 
 
0.023 
(0.338) 
 
0.638 
(0.342) 
 
0.858 
(0.014) 
** 
0.077 
(0.013) 
** 
0.424 
(0.014) 
** 
0.723 
(0.033) 
** 
0.069 
(0.030) 
** 
0.485 
0.033 
** 
Z-SCORE 
0.605 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.054 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.831 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.482 
(0.004) 
*** 
0.036 
(0.002) 
*** 
1.619 
(0.004) 
*** 
0.391 
(0.015) 
** 
0.026 
(0.014) 
** 
1.478 
(0.015) 
** 
0.732 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.066 
(0.013) 
** 
2.079 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.202 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.115 
(0.000) 
*** 
3.327 
(0.000) 
*** 
_cons 
70.135 
(0.055) 
* 
 
2.9e+30 
(0.055) 
* 
37.111 
(0.424) 
 
 
1.3e+1
6 
(0.424) 
 
35.017 
(0.459) 
 
 
1.6e+1
5 
(0.459) 
 
76.821 
(0.028) 
** 
 
2.3e+3
3 
(0.028) 
** 
65.489 
(0.054) 
* 
 
2.8E+2
8 
(0.054) 
* 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 
N. 688 531 498 747 795 
No. of Users 107 60 62 118 121 
Classified as Users 52 19 28 64 55 
Classified as Non-Users 55 41 34 54 66 
Sensitivity 48.60% 31.67% 45.16% 54.24% 45.45% 
No. of Non-Users 581 471 436 629 674 
Classified as users 82 29 45 83 84 
Classified as Non-Users 499 442 391 546 590 
Specificity 85.89% 93.84% 89.68% 86.80% 87.54% 
Correctly Specified 80.09% 86.82% 84.14% 81.66% 81.13% 
Chi-Square 95.14% 41.90% 70.05% 111.53% 98.82% 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-Square 0.1600 0.1119 0.1871 0.1711 0.1457 
Log pseudo likelihood -249.7635 -166.34738 -152.1217 -270.1340 -289.6630 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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Summary Multivariate Logit Regression 
Table 17 shows the estimation results for the extent to which firms hedge their risk 
exposure with derivatives instruments as users, interest rate and foreign exchange 
hedgers. The table shows seven different model specifications that have been obtained 
from different combinations of explanatory variables. All seven models estimated the three 
different dependent variables, the hedgers, the interest rate hedgers and the foreign 
exchange hedgers, and include one at a time measures such as interest coverage ratios, 
leverage ratio, profitability ratios, debt maturity ratios, growth opportunity ratio, financial 
price risk and overseas operation ratio, firm size ratios, hedging substitutes ratios and 
likelihood of default ratio. The results show that estimates can be quite different depending 
on the dependent variable used. In model 1 when have been tested the relationship 
between hedgers and the other six hypotheses has been excluded the z-score variable 
because since univariate logit regression this variable it was insignificant. At the same time 
has to be taken in to account that as firm size and liquidity variables have been used the 
one who’s in the univariate logit regression where more significant taking in to account the 
dependent variable tested. At this point the analysis should concentrate on the estimated 
results provided by the model specification which uses as dependent variable “use”. 
Looking in the previous tables is shown that models run using “use” as dependent variable 
get a higher chi2 compared to the others. So it is believed that “use” better captures the 
decision to hedge. In model 2 is shown that the estimate asset coverage ratio is very 
insignificant (p-value 0.292), on the other hand the most significant coefficient is market 
value leverage because it has the higher coefficient (1.156) compared with the one of the 
other variables that have been used to test the relationship between hedging and financial 
distress exposure. 
This results show that market value leverage has been used as a leverage proxy and it 
measures how leveraged a firm is and its degree of leverage is often a measure of risk. 
Therefore could be stated that firms with higher leverage ratio may not be able to generate 
enough cash to satisfy their debt obligations, so they might face bankruptcy or default 
scenarios, thus are more likely to hedge. Another important aspect is that market value 
leverage is the variable with the highest significant coefficient for all the dependent 
variables (USE, IR and FX) and for IR and FX hedgers it is more significant and has an 
higher coefficient (IR: 3.037 and FX: 4.097). therefore this strengthens the fact that firms 
enter into IR and FX derivatives contracts to limit their risks and thus their debt exposure.  
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This is reinforced by the fact that long term and short term borrow, debt maturity proxies, 
are both significant and with a high coefficient, but only for USE and IR. That could be 
explained as FX hedgers are used to cover more the companies against financial risk 
exposure related to overseas operations. In fact the row testing the foreign sales suggests 
that the highest coefficients are those in the FX hedgers column, and that demonstrate a 
positive relationship between hedging and FX derivative use. Firm size is another measure 
who plays an important role because data show that larger is the company higher is the 
probability that it is going to hedge with derivative instruments. That could be related to 
economies of scale. Furthermore liquidity ratios (quick ratio and solvency ratio), which 
have been used to test the relationship between hedging substitutes and derivatives use, 
show that when companies decide to implement alternative instruments to cover 
themselves against risk exposure they do not use at the same time derivative instruments. 
After all market to book ratio tested the dependence between hedging and growth 
opportunity. This ratio has a negative coefficient and shows that the higher the growth 
opportunities of the leveraged firm the lower the corporate demand for hedging. That could 
be explained by the fact that the sample tested is composed by non-financial SMEs listed 
in the UK market. Moreover risk management at firm level is economically possible only if 
the increase in firm value is higher than the hedging costs and shareholders personally do 
not be support any costs. 
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Tab. 27 - Empirical results: summary table about the corporate demand for financial derivatives 
 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
USE. IR FX USE. IR FX USE. IR FX USE. IR FX USE. IR FX USE. IR FX USE. IR FX 
EBIT INT 
PAYMENT 
 
0.002 
(0.003) 
*** 
- 
0.000 
(0.989) 
 
0.000 
(0.675) 
                  
ASSETCOVE
RX 
   
- 
0.001 
(0.292) 
 
- 
0.012 
(0.034) 
** 
0.001 
(0.235) 
               
MKTV       
 
1.156 
(0.017) 
** 
 
3.037 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
4.097 
(0.000) 
*** 
            
PROFIT 
MARGIN 
         
 
0.008 
(0.069) 
* 
 
0.012 
(0.085) 
* 
- 
0.009 
(0.149) 
 
         
ROA             
 
0.010 
(0.057) 
* 
 
0.001 
(0.930 
 
- 
0.036 
(0.005) 
*** 
      
ST BORROW                
- 
0.996 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
1.644 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.034 
(0.948) 
 
   
LT BORROW                   
0.995 
(0.007) 
*** 
1.644 
(0.008) 
*** 
0.034 
(0.948) 
MKTTBRAT 
-73.587 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
0.327 
(0.656) 
 
- 
80.036 
(0.029) 
** 
-77.580 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
1.916 
(0.053) 
* 
- 
46.185 
(0.319) 
 
-75.952 
(0.025) 
** 
- 
2.927 
(0.011) 
** 
- 
44.835 
(0.343) 
 
-
80.844(
0.002) 
*** 
- 
1.186 
(0.123) 
 
- 
88.880 
(0.011) 
** 
-67.703 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
0.186 
(0.800) 
 
- 
74.556 
(0.028) 
** 
-78.911 
(0.019) 
** 
- 
1.854 
(0.059) 
* 
- 
33.534 
(0.467) 
 
- 78.916 
(0.019) 
** 
- 
1.854 
(0.059) 
* 
- 
33.534 
(0.467) 
 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
 
0.251 
(0.299) 
* 
- 
1.029 
(0.008) 
*** 
 
1.067 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
0.014 
(0.962) 
* 
- 
0.957 
(0.025) 
** 
 
0.124 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
0.101 
(0.737) 
 
- 
1.231 
(0.008) 
*** 
 
1.660 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.278 
(0.237) 
- 
0.982 
(0.017) 
** 
 
0.914 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
0.469 
(0.034) 
** 
- 
0.949 
(0.015) 
** 
 
1.137 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.020 
(0.948) 
- 
1.146 
(0.016) 
** 
 
1.354 
(0.001) 
*** 
0.020 
(0.948) 
- 
1.146 
(0.016) 
** 
 
1.354 
(0.001) 
*** 
LN SALES                   -   
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0.580 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.558 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.679 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.702 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.827 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.730 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.683 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.747 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.649 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.696 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.575 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.786 
(0.020) 
** 
 
0.696 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.575 
(0.002) 
*** 
LN ASSETS 
0.462 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.651 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.464 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.561 
(0.000) 
*** 
       
0.515 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.677 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.424 
(0.000) 
*** 
      
Q-RATIO  
- 
0.249 
(0.071) 
* 
  
- 
0.353 
(0.033) 
** 
  
- 
0.208 
(0.296) 
 
  
- 
0.318 
(0.045) 
** 
  
- 
0.288 
(0.038) 
*** 
  
- 
0.354 
(0.093) 
* 
  
- 
0.354 
(0.093) 
* 
 
SOLVENCY 
RATIO 
- 
0.727 
(0.008) 
*** 
 
- 
0.775 
(0.034) 
** 
- 
0.774 
(0.017) 
** 
 
- 
0.453 
(0.328) 
 
- 
0.752 
(0.026) 
** 
 
- 
0.449 
(0.342) 
 
- 
0.795 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
- 
0.858 
(0.014) 
** 
- 
0.672 
(0.007) 
*** 
 
- 
0.723 
(0.033) 
** 
- 
0.786 
(0.020) 
** 
 
- 
0.322 
(0.484) 
 
- 
0.786 
(0.020) 
** 
 
- 
0.322 
(0.484) 
 
Z-SCORE  
- 
0.080 
(0.650) 
 
 
0.605 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.204 
(0.327) 
 
 
0.482 
(0.004) 
*** 
 
- 
0.101 
(0.577) 
 
 
0.391 
(0.015) 
** 
 
- 
0.585 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.732 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
- 
0.027 
(0.038) 
** 
 
1.202 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
- 
0.131 
(0.453) 
 
 
0.549 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
- 
0.131 
(0.453) 
 
 
0.549 
(0.001) 
*** 
_cons 
 
67.568 
(0.013) 
** 
- 
7.620 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
70.135 
(0.055) 
* 
 
72.003 
(0.026) 
** 
- 
5.509 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
37.111 
(0.424) 
 
 
67.800 
(0.045) 
** 
- 
7.630 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
35.017 
(0.459) 
 
 
71.933 
(0.006) 
*** 
- 
6.582 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
76.821 
(0.028) 
** 
 
61.180 
(0.015) 
** 
- 
7.908 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
65.489 
(0.054) 
* 
 
72.063 
(0.033) 
** 
- 
5.928 
(0.004) 
*** 
 
24.094 
(0.601) 
 
71.020 
(0.035) 
** 
- 
7.572 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
24.060 
(0.602) 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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5.3: Descriptive statistics Italian non-financial listed SMEs 
The data sample consists of 528 firm-year observations. The table below 
shows the activity and the types of derivatives of hedging, the most used 
derivatives and derivative combinations for the firm-year observations in the Italian 
sample. Panel A shows that 32.95% of the sample is classified as using 
derivatives to hedge. Panel B shows that 87.93% of the derivative users disclosed 
in their annual reports that they used IR derivatives and 37.36% used FX 
derivatives. Further, Panel D and E suggest that the most used FX derivative is FX 
Forwards 75.38% and the most commonly used IR derivative is IR Swaps 97.39%. 
The most used derivative combination is FX Forwards and IR Swaps 13.22%. The 
fact that forward contracts and swaps are more commonly used than options could 
be because of the cost required to pay upfront when buying an option. Forwards 
contracts and swaps require no such premium payment upfront but are quoted 
with a bid-ask spread, which means the buyer will always get the highest price and 
the seller the lowest price. 
 
Tab. 28 - Hedging activity and types of derivatives used by Italian non-financial SMEs. 
This table presents data on the hedging activity with derivatives disclosed in the annual reports amongst the 
sample of 66 firms from the year 2005-2012. Panel data A shows the number of derivative users and non-
users. Panel B presents data on the type of derivatives used. Panel C presents the combination of derivatives 
used and distinguishes between FX derivatives users and IR derivative users. Panel D and E present data on 
the most commonly used derivatives within the groups of FX and IR derivatives. Panel F shows the most 
common combinations of FX and IR derivatives used. 
Panel A: Derivative Use N % 
Use 174 32.95% 
Do not use 354 67.05% 
Total 528 100% 
 
Panel B: Types of derivatives used (calculated as a 
percentage of 174 derivative users – Panel A) 
N % 
IR 153 87.93% 
FX 65 37.36% 
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Panel C: Combination of derivative used N % 
FX only 21 12.07% 
IR only 109 62.64% 
FX & IR only 44 25.29% 
Total 174 100.00% 
 
Panel D: Most used FX derivatives (calculated as a 
percentage of 65 derivative users – Panel B) 
N % 
FX Forwards 49 75.38% 
FX Swaps 8 12.31% 
FX Options 8 12.31% 
 
Panel E: Most used IR derivatives (calculated as a 
percentage of 153 derivative users – Panel B) 
N % 
IR Swaps 149 97.39% 
IR Options 3   1.96% 
 
Panel F: Combination of FX and IR derivative used 
(calculated as a percentage of 174 derivative users – 
Panel A) 
N % 
FX Forwards only 16 9.19% 
IR Swaps only 112 64.37% 
FX Forwards + FX Options only 2   1.15% 
FX Forwards + IR Swaps only 23 13.22% 
FX Forwards + IR Swaps + FX Swaps only 5   2.87% 
FX Options + IR Swaps only 3   1.72% 
FX Forwards + FX Swaps + FX Options + IR Swaps only 3   1.72% 
IR Swaps + IR Options only 3   1.72% 
Source: author’s elaboration of data handily collected from annual reports of UK non-financial listed SMEs. 
 
The table below examines the differences in firm characteristics between 
hedgers and non-hedgers through the mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank 
sum test. To analyse the relationship between financial distress and hedging have 
been used the following measures. The leverage proxies have two out of eight 
significant variables and the long term debt capital is higher for hedgers. This 
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shows what has been assumed by the literature that firms with higher leverage are 
more likely to hedge because are more keener to incur in financial distress 
situations. 
Have been tested seven profitability measures and three of these are 
significant variables such as ROC, ROE and profit margin. The results 
demonstrate what has been stated by Glaum (2002) that hedgers are those firms 
with higher profitability. 
Four proxies have been use to test the relationship between interest coverage 
ratio and hedging. These ratios show how easily a firm can pays interests on 
outstanding debt. Only one of these variables is significant and non hedgers have 
higher interest coverage ratios. That is consistent with what the literature says 
because there is a negative relationship between this ratio and the probability to 
hedge. 
About the debt maturity ratios both of them are significant and are consistent 
with the literature because the long term borrowing variable is significant for the 
hedgers which shows that firms with long term debt maturity are more likely to 
hedge to cover themselves against expected future fluctuations. 
To test the growth opportunities have been used the market to book ratio that 
is insignificant. 
As measures of financial price risk (IR and FX) have been used three proxies 
the foreign sales, leverage ratio and the interest coverage ratio. Foreign sales is 
not significant and the leverage ratios show that there is a positive relationship 
between hedging and financial price exposure. The interest coverage ratio 
suggests that firms with lower ratio are more likely to hedge and that agrees with 
what is stated by the literature. The foreign sales variable has been used also to 
test the relationship between hedging and overseas operations and it is not 
significant. 
All the variables measuring firm size are significantly higher for hedgers and 
that is consistent with the fact that higher firms enjoy information and transaction 
costs scale economies by engaging in risk management activities. 
Finally to test the relationship between hedging and the use of other 
instruments to hedge have been implemented five liquidity proxies and four of 
them are significant such as current ratio, quick ratio, liquidity ratio and 
shareholders liquidity ratio. Noone shows the right relationship stated by the 
literature such as more liquid is a firm less likely to hedge it is. 
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Table 29 - Mean difference test of hedgers vs non-hedgers. 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between derivatives users versus non-users, where ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variable Hedgers Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum 
test 
N Mean N Mean diff T-
stat 
Sign. H&NH Z-stat Sign 
ZSC 171 0.53 346 0.77 0.24 *** 2.95 0.00 H<NH 4.01 0.00 
LEVERAGE            
DEBTEQUITY 171 12.58 346 11.43 -1.16   -0.46 0.64 H=NH 0.85 0.40 
DEBTCAPITAL 171 3.37 346 3.15 -0.23   -0.20 0.84 H=NH -0.75 0.46 
LTDEBTCAPITAL 171 0.94 346 0.59 -0.35 * -1.68 0.09 H>NH -6.35 0.00 
LTDEBTEQUITY 171 3.10 346 2.17 -0.93   -1.54 0.23 H=NH -5.09 0.00 
LIABASSETS 171 0.48 346 0.47 -0.01   -0.50 0.62 H=NH -0.57 0.57 
GEARINGRAT 174 3.40 354 3.90 0.51 ** 0.67 0.05 H<NH -0.13 0.89 
BV 171 0.71 346 0.71 0.00   -0.10 0.92 H=NH 0.85 0.40 
MKTV 171 0.61 348 0.57 -0.04   -1.27 0.20 H=NH -1.46 0.14 
LIQUIDITY            
CRAT 171 1.79 346 2.18 0.39 * 1.88 0.06 H<NH 1.76 0.08 
QRAT 171 1.59 346 1.92 0.33 * 1.68 0.09 H<NH 2.15 0.03 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 171 1.59 346 1.92 0.33 * 1.68 0.09 H<NH 2.15 0.03 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITYRATIOX 160 9.89 271 33.98 24.09 * 1.73 0.08 H<NH 2.86 0.00 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBASED 171 0.00 346 0.00 0.00   0.45 0.65 H=NH -1.42 0.16 
PROFITABILITY            
ROC 174 -0.27 354 1.79 2.05 ** 2.39 0.02 H<NH 2.99 0.00 
ROE 174 3.31 354 -0.82 -4.13 * -1.92 0.06 H>NH -1.53 0.13 
PROFITMARGIN 171 0.14 334 -0.23 -0.37 ** -2.03 0.04 H>NH -2.80 0.01 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDERSFUNDS 171 0.33 335 0.11 -0.22   -0.56 0.58 H=NH -0.03 0.97 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 174 0.58 354 -0.20 -0.79   -0.69 0.49 H=NH 1.79 0.73 
EBITMARGIN 171 -0.20 345 -0.24 -0.05   -0.63 0.53 H=NH 2.02 0.04 
EBITDAMARGIN 171 -0.09 345 -0.13 -0.04   -0.62 0.54 H=NH 1.51 0.13 
IC            
EBITINP 171 -0.16 341 -3.84 -3.68   -0.54 0.59 H=NH 2.30 0.02 
EBITDAINP 171 2.25 341 8.73 6.47   0.95 0.34 H=NH 3.83 0.00 
INTERESTCOVERX 171 -0.16 341 -3.84 -3.68   -0.54 0.59 H=NH 2.30 0.02 
ASSETCOVERX 160 31.40 271 181.99 150.60 *** 2.87 0.00 H<NH 5.20 0.00 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITY            
MKTTBRAT 171 0.81 346 0.79 -0.01   -0.50 0.62 H=NH 1.47 0.14 
DEBT MATURITY            
STBORROW 171 0.63 346 0.80 0.18 *** 8.51 0.00 H<NH 7.79 0.00 
LTBORROW 171 0.37 346 0.20 -0.18 *** -8.51 0.00 H>NH -7.79 0.00 
FIRM SIZE            
LNMKTCAP 148 4.62 202 3.72 -0.90 *** -5.73 0.00 H>NH -4.94 0.00 
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LNTOTSALES 171 10.30 345 9.68 -0.62 *** -6.55 0.00 H>NH -6.00 0.00 
LNTOTASSETS 171 12.09 346 10.68 -1.41 *** -
10.94 
0.00 H>NH -10.19 0.00 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE            
FOREIGNSALES 59 0.25 39 0.25 0.00   0.05 0.96 H=NH 1.26 0.21 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
 
In the following table are provided the differences in means between FX 
derivative users versus non-FX derivative users and IR derivative users versus 
non-IR derivative users with and without bias. 
First of all must be done a comparison of the results from the next two tables – 
table 30 and table 31 - that gives an overview of which characteristics are 
important in case of hedging with FX derivative no bias and IR derivatives no bias. 
The data reported in table 31 show that IR hedgers have only one significant 
leverage variable, long term debt capital that is consistent with what stated by the 
literature and at the same time hedgers have higher firm size variables then non 
hedgers and that is consistent with scale economies. Long term debt borrow as 
proxy of debt maturity is a significant variable for IR users. Hedgers have higher 
long term debt that could be explain as their intention to cover themshelves 
against risk exposure. But at the same time this variable is statistically significant 
also for FX hedgers, with a positive relationship that could be explained as the 
companies likelihood to hedge to cover themselves against currency risk exposure 
due to foreign debt exposure. 
 
Tab. 30 - Mean difference test of FX hedgers vs non-FX hedgers (no bias). 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between FX derivatives users versus non-FX derivative users 
no bias, where ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variable Hedgers Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum 
test 
N Mean N Mean diff T-
stat 
Sign. H&NH Z-
stat 
Sign 
ZSC 64 0.51 346 0.77 0.25  ** 2.01 0.05 H<NH 3.20 0.00 
LEVERAGE            
DEBTEQUITY 64 12.03 346 11.43 -0.60   -
0.23 
0.81 H=NH -
0.71 
0.48 
DEBTCAPITAL 64 2.89 346 3.15 0.26   0.16 0.87 H=NH -
0.51 
0.61 
LTDEBTCAPITAL 64 0.79 346 0.59 -0.20   -
0.76 
0.45 H=NH -
3.42 
0.00 
LTDEBTEQUITY 64 2.73 346 2.17 -0.56   -
0.73 
0.46 H=NH -
2.98 
0.00 
LIABASSETS 64 0.47 346 0.47 0.00   - 0.88 H=NH - 0.72 
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0.15 0.36 
GEARINGRAT 65 2.33 354 3.90 1.57   1.47 0.14 H=NH 0.23 0.82 
BV 64 0.74 346 0.71 -0.03   -
0.99 
0.32 H=NH -
0.71 
0.48 
MKTV 64 0.58 348 0.57 -0.01   -
0.25 
0.81 H=NH -
0.47 
0.64 
LIQUIDITY            
CRAT 64 1.70 346 2.18 0.48   1.55 0.12 H=NH 0.33 0.74 
QRAT 64 1.49 346 1.92 0.43   1.46 0.15 H=NH 0.67 0.50 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 64 1.49 346 1.92 0.43   1.46 0.15 H=NH 0.67 0.50 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITYRATIOX 59 23.69 271 33.98 10.29   0.45 0.65 H=NH 1.56 0.12 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBASED 64 0.00 346 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.37 H=NH 0.29 0.77 
PROFITABILITY            
ROC 65 -3.19 354 1.79 4.98 *** 3.85 0.00 H<NH 4.73 0.00 
ROE 65 3.51 354 -0.82 -4.33   -
1.32 
0.19 H=NH -
1.27 
0.20 
PROFITMARGIN 64 -0.06 334 -0.23 -0.17   -
0.61 
0.54 H=NH -
0.61 
0.54 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDERSFUNDS 64 1.06 335 0.11 -0.95 * -
1.65 
0.10 H>NH -
0.11 
0.91 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 65 -1.13 354 -0.20 0.93   0.51 0.61 H=NH 3.17 0.00 
EBITMARGIN 64 -0.42 345 -0.24 0.17   1.48 0.14 H=NH 4.72 0.00 
EBITDAMARGIN 64 -0.29 345 -0.13 0.16   1.58 0.11 H=NH 4.83 0.00 
IC            
EBITINP 64 -3.03 341 -3.84 -0.81   -
0.07 
0.94 H=NH 3.14 0.00 
EBITDAINP 64 0.02 341 8.73 8.71   0.78 0.43 H=NH 4.28 0.00 
INTERESTCOVERX 64 -3.03 341 -3.84 -0.81   -
0.07 
0.94 H=NH 3.14 0.00 
ASSETCOVERX 59 70.37 271 181.99 111.63   1.29 0.20 H=NH 2.37 0.02 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITY            
MKTTBRAT 64 0.82 346 0.79 -0.03   -
0.84 
0.40 H=NH -
0.17 
0.87 
DEBT MATURITY            
STBORROW 64 0.65 346 0.80 0.15 *** 5.04 0.00 H<NH 3.99 0.00 
LTBORROW 64 0.35 346 0.20 -0.15 *** -
5.04 
0.00 H>NH -
3.92 
0.00 
FIRM SIZE            
LNMKTCAP 57 4.94 202 3.72 -1.22 *** -
6.07 
0.00 H>NH -
5.26 
0.00 
LNTOTSALES 64 10.08 345 9.68 -0.39 *** -
2.75 
0.01 H>NH -
2.14 
0.03 
LNTOTASSETS 64 12.10 346 10.68 -1.42 *** -
7.70 
0.00 H>NH -
7.10 
0.00 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE            
FOREIGNSALES 23 0.44 39 0.25 -0.19   -
1.46 
0.15 H=NH -
1.39 
0.16 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Tab. 31 - Mean difference test of IR hedgers vs non-IR hedgers (no bias). 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between IR derivatives users versus non-IR derivative users no 
bias, where ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variable Hedgers Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum 
test 
N mean N Mean diff T-
stat 
Sign. H&NH Z-
stat 
Sign 
ZSC 151 0.51 346 0.77 0.26 *** 3.06 0.00 H<NH 4.16 0.00 
LEVERAGE            
DEBTEQUITY 151 11.27 346 11.43 0.16   0.06 0.95 H=NH 1.47 0.14 
DEBTCAPITAL 151 3.58 346 3.15 -0.44   -0.37 0.71 H=NH -0.50 0.61 
LTDEBTCAPITAL 151 0.98 346 0.59 -0.39 * -1.79 0.07 H>NH -6.49 0.00 
LTDEBTEQUITY 151 3.19 346 2.17 -1.02   -1.61 0.11 H=NH -4.92 0.00 
LIABASSETS 151 0.48 346 0.47 -0.01   -0.36 0.72 H=NH -0.39 0.70 
GEARINGRAT 153 3.48 354 3.90 0.42   0.52 0.60 H=NH 0.05 0.96 
BV 151 0.70 346 0.71 0.01   0.57 0.57 H=NH 1.47 0.14 
MKTV 151 0.61 348 0.57 -0.05   -1.42 0.16 H=NH -1.63 0.10 
LIQUIDITY            
CRAT 151 1.82 346 2.18 0.35   1.62 0.11 H=NH 1.72 0.09 
QRAT 151 1.65 346 1.92 0.27   1.31 0.19 H=NH 1.68 0.09 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 151 1.65 346 1.92 0.27   1.31 0.19 H=NH 1.68 0.09 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITYRATIOX 141 10.95 271 33.98 23.03   1.56 0.12 H=NH 2.85 0.00 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBASED 151 0.00 346 0.00 0.00   -0.10 0.92 H=NH -1.95 0.05 
PROFITABILITY            
ROC 153 0.24 354 1.79 1.55 * 1.75 0.08 H<NH 2.47 0.01 
ROE 153 3.79 354 -0.82 -4.61 ** -2.03 0.04 H>NH -1.66 0.10 
PROFITMARGIN 151 0.20 334 -0.23 -0.43 ** -2.24 0.03 H>NH -3.89 0.00 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDERSFUNDS 151 0.38 335 0.11 -0.27   -0.64 0.52 H=NH -0.91 0.36 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 153 1.07 354 -0.20 -1.27   -1.06 0.29 H=NH 1.30 0.20 
EBITMARGIN 151 -0.18 345 -0.24 -0.06   -0.83 0.41 H=NH 1.34 0.18 
EBITDAMARGIN 151 -0.08 345 -0.13 -0.06   -0.79 0.43 H=NH 0.63 0.53 
IC            
EBITINP 151 0.32 341 -3.84 -4.16   -0.58 0.56 H=NH 1.94 0.05 
EBITDAINP 151 2.35 341 8.73 6.37   0.88 0.38 H=NH 3.58 0.00 
INTERESTCOVERX 151 0.32 341 -3.84 -4.16   -0.58 0.56 H=NH 1.94 0.05 
ASSETCOVERX 141 31.22 271 181.99 150.77 *** 2.70 0.01 H<NH 5.75 0.00 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITY            
MKTTBRAT 151 0.79 346 0.79 0.00   0.11 0.91 H=NH 2.09 0.04 
DEBT MATURITY            
STBORROW 151 0.61 346 0.80 0.20 *** 9.11 0.00 H<NH 8.18 0.00 
LTBORROW 151 0.39 346 0.20 -0.20 *** -9.11 0.00 H>NH -8.18 0.00 
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FIRM SIZE            
LNMKTCAP 131 4.67 202 3.72 -0.96 *** -5.83 0.00 H>NH -5.04 0.00 
LNTOTSALES 151 10.30 345 9.68 -0.62 *** -6.28 0.00 H>NH -5.76 0.00 
LNTOTASSETS 151 12.19 346 10.68 -1.51 *** -
11.08 
0.00 H>NH -
10.14 
0.00 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE            
FOREIGNSALES 53 0.24 39 0.25 0.01   0.14 0.89 H=NH 1.71 0.09 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
 
The next two tables show the differences in means between FX hedgers 
and IR hedgers. Those tables affirms what have been affirmed by the previous two 
tables (table 30 and 31). The main differences between FX hedgers with and 
without bias is that in table 32 the foreign sales variable is statistically significant 
and is higher for FX hedgers, that strengths what the literature stated. The table 33 
presents the mean difference test run for IR hedgers and shows that z-score is 
statistically significant and higher for hedgers meanwhile in the table 32 it was 
higher for non-hedger and that is consistent with what is stated in the literature. 
 
Tab. 32 - Mean difference test of FX hedgers vs non-FX hedgers (bias). 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between FX derivatives users versus non-FX derivative users, 
where ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variable Hedgers Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum 
test 
N mean N mean diff T-
stat 
Sign. H&NH Z-
stat 
Sign 
ZSC 64 0.51 453 0.71 0.20 * 1.69 0.09 H<NH 2.82 0.00 
LEVERAGE            
DEBTEQUITY 64 12.21 453 11.75 -0.45   -
0.13 
0.90 H=NH -
1.12 
0.26 
DEBTCAPITAL 64 2.89 453 3.27 0.38   0.24 0.81 H=NH -
0.33 
0.74 
LTDEBTCAPITAL 64 0.79 453 0.69 -0.10   -
0.34 
0.74 H=NH -
2.37 
0.02 
LTDEBTEQUITY 64 2.73 453 2.44 -0.29   -
0.34 
0.74 H=NH -
2.12 
0.03 
LIABASSETS 64 0.47 453 0.47 0.00   -
0.04 
0.96 H=NH -
0.22 
0.83 
GEARINGRAT 65 2.33 463 1.48 -0.85   1.48 0.14 H=NH 0.34 0.74 
BV 64 0.74 453 0.71 -0.04   -
1.16 
0.24 H=NH -
1.13 
0.26 
MKTV 64 0.58 455 0.58 0.00   0.03 0.97 H=NH -
0.08 
0.94 
LIQUIDITY            
CRAT 64 1.69 453 2.10 0.40   1.37 0.17 H=NH -
0.11 
0.92 
QRAT 64 1.49 453 1.86 0.37   1.31 0.19 H=NH 0.23 0.82 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 64 1.49 453 1.86 0.37   1.31 0.19 H=NH 0.23 0.82 
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SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITYRATIOX 59 23.69 372 25.25 1.56   0.08 0.94 H=NH 1.00 0.32 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBASED 64 0.00 453 0.00 0.00   1.00 0.32 H=NH 0.78 0.44 
PROFITABILITY            
ROC 65 -3.19 463 1.71 4.90 *** 4.03 0.00 H<NH 4.72 0.00 
ROE 65 3.51 463 0.12 -3.38   -
1.10 
0.27 H=NH -
1.10 
0.27 
PROFITMARGIN 64 -0.06 441 -0.11 -0.06   -
0.21 
0.83 H=NH -
1.01 
0.31 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDERSFUNDS 64 1.06 442 0.06 -1.00 * -
1.79 
0.07 H>NH -
0.03 
0.98 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 65 -1.13 463 0.22 1.35   0.83 0.41 H=NH 3.33 0.00 
EBITMARGIN 64 -0.42 452 -0.20 0.22 ** 2.03 0.04 H<NH 1.42 0.16 
EBITDAMARGIN 64 -0.29 452 -0.09 0.20 ** 2.15 0.03 H<NH 5.17 0.00 
IC            
EBITINP 64 -3.03 448 -2.55 0.48   0.05 0.96 H=NH 3.32 0.00 
EBITDAINP 64 0.02 448 7.50 7.48   0.77 0.44 H=NH 4.55 0.00 
INTERESTCOVERX 64 -3.03 448 -2.55 0.48   0.05 0.96 H=NH 3.32 0.00 
ASSETCOVERX 59 70.37 372 134.92 64.56   0.87 0.39 H=NH 1.42 0.16 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITY            
MKTTBRAT 64 0.82 453 0.79 -0.03   -
0.90 
0.37 H=NH -
0.60 
0.55 
DEBT MATURITY            
STBORROW 64 0.65 453 0.76 0.11 *** 3.39 0.00 H<NH 2.70 0.01 
LTBORROW 64 0.35 453 0.24 -0.11 *** -
3.39 
0.00 H>NH -
2.70 
0.01 
FIRM SIZE            
LNMKTCAP 57 4.94 293 3.94 -1.01 *** -
4.69 
0.00 H>NH -
4.64 
0.00 
LNTOTSALES 64 10.08 452 9.86 -0.21   -
1.52 
0.13 H=NH -
0.74 
0.46 
LNTOTASSETS 64 12.10 453 11.01 -1.09 *** -
5.44 
0.00 H>NH -
5.59 
0.00 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE            
FOREIGNSALES 23 0.44 75 0.19 -0.25 *** -
2.59 
0.01 H>NH -
2.55 
0.01 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
 
Tab. 33- Mean difference test of IR hedgers vs non-IR hedgers (bias). 
This table presents the results from the Mean difference test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The tests are 
performed on a rage of independent variables between IR derivatives users versus non-IR derivative users, 
where ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10%respectively. 
Variable Hedgers Non-
Hedgers 
T-Stat Wilcoxon rank sum 
test 
N mean N Mean diff T-
stat 
Sign. H&NH Z-
stat 
Sign 
ZSC 151 0.51 366 0.76 0.26 *** 3.05 0.00 H>NH 4.08 0.00 
LEVERAGE            
DEBTEQUITY 151 11.27 366 12.03 0.76   0.29 0.77 H=NH 1.74 0.08 
DEBTCAPITAL 151 3.58 366 3.07 -0.51   -0.44 0.66 H=NH -
0.40 
0.69 
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LTDEBTCAPITAL 151 0.98 366 0.59 -0.39 * -1.82 0.07 H<NH -
6.44 
0.00 
LTDEBTEQUITY 151 3.19 366 2.18 -1.01   -1.61 0.11 H=NH -
4.73 
0.00 
LIABASSETS 151 0.48 366 0.47 -0.01   -0.30 0.77 H=NH -
4.73 
0.00 
GEARINGRAT 153 3.48 375 3.84 0.36   0.45 0.65 H=NH 0.13 0.89 
BV 151 0.70 366 0.72 0.02   0.87 0.39 H=NH 1.74 0.81 
MKTV 171 0.61 348 0.57 -0.04   -1.27 0.20 H=NH 1.74 0.08 
LIQUIDITY            
CRAT 151 1.82 366 2.14 0.32   1.50 0.14 H=NH 1.65 0.10 
QRAT 151 1.65 366 1.88 0.23   1.15 0.25 H=NH 1.44 0.15 
LIQUIDITYRATIOX 151 1.65 366 1.88 0.23   1.15 0.25 H=NH 1.44 0.15 
SHAREHOLDERSLIQUIDITYRATIOX 141 10.95 290 31.88 20.94   1.46 0.14 H=NH 2.76 0.01 
SOLVENCYRATIOASSETBASED 151 0.00 366 0.00 0.00   -0.35 0.72 H=NH -
2.19 
0.03 
PROFITABILITY            
ROC 153 0.24 375 1.46 1.22   1.37 0.17 H=NH 2.09 0.04 
ROE 153 3.79 375 -0.78 -4.57 ** -2.05 0.04 H>NH -
1.67 
0.09 
PROFITMARGIN 151 0.20 354 -0.24 -0.43 ** -2.33 0.02 H>NH -
4.26 
0.00 
RETURNONSHAREHOLDERSFUNDS 151 0.38 355 0.11 -0.27   -0.67 0.50 H=NH -
1.37 
0.17 
RETURNONTOTALASSETS 153 1.07 375 -0.36 -1.42   -1.21 0.23 H=NH 0.96 0.34 
EBITMARGIN 151 -0.18 365 -0.25 -0.07   -0.09 0.36 H=NH 1.06 0.29 
EBITDAMARGIN 151 -0.08 365 -0.14 -0.06   -0.87 0.39 H=NH 0.28 0.78 
IC            
EBITINP 151 0.32 361 -3.84 -4.16   -0.59 0.55 H=NH 1.63 0.10 
EBITDAINP 151 2.35 361 8.33 5.98   0.85 0.40 H=NH 3.25 0.00 
INTERESTCOVERX 151 0.32 361 -3.84 -4.16   -0.59 0.55 H=NH 1.63 0.10 
ASSETCOVERX 141 31.22 290 172.21 140.99 *** 2.61 0.01 H<NH 5.86 0.00 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITY            
MKTTBRAT 151 0.79 366 0.80 0.01   0.38 0.70 H=NH 2.36 0.02 
DEBT MATURITY            
STBORROW 151 0.61 366 0.80 0.20 *** 9.06 0.00 H<NH 8.16 0.00 
LTBORROW 151 0.39 366 0.20 -0.20 *** -9.06 0.00 H>NH -
8.16 
0.00 
FIRM SIZE            
LNMKTCAP 131 4.67 219 3.76 -0.92 *** -5.70 0.00 H>NH -
4.96 
0.00 
LNTOTSALES 151 10.30 365 9.72 -0.58 *** -5.94 0.00 H>NH -
5.43 
0.00 
LNTOTASSETS 151 12.19 366 10.72 -1.47 *** -
11.03 
0.00 H>NH -
9.97 
0.00 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE            
FOREIGNSALES 53 0.24 45 0.26 0.02   0.27 0.79 H=NH 2.01 0.04 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Summary Mean difference test and Wilcoxon rank sum test 
What can be concluded is that the most important factor that determine if an 
Italian non-financial listed SME goes hedging is its size. Because in all the mean 
difference tests is the most significant measure. Furthermore the debt maturity is 
another element that could influence the likelihood of a SME to enters into a 
derivative contract. The debt maturity proxies shows that firms facing long term 
borrowing are more likely to use derivatives as hedging instruments. 
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5.3.1: Univariate logit regression: Italian non-financial listed SMEs 
In the next table are presented the results from the univariate logit tests run 
with all the independent variables. By doing this is given an estimated idea of the 
effects of every individual explanatory variable in the decision of hedging, so can 
be choosen with more confidence the most significant proxies to run multivariate 
logit regression and construct the best model to explain the determinants of 
hedging. The same test have been run to check the effect of every variable on 
Hedgers, FX Hedgers and IR Hedgers with and without bias. 
The leverage measure for hedgers is long term debt capital ratio because it is 
significant and it has a positive coefficient. This variable is also the leverage 
measure for IR derivative users because significant and with a positive coefficient. 
About the FX derivative users, gearing ratio represents the leverage measure 
because it is the only significant proxy but has to be taken into account that it has 
a negative coefficient. In the previous section where have been discussed the 
mean defference test, the table 29 showed that Hedgers and IR hedgers no bias 
had this variable as significant variable and it was right with the literature. 
Liquidity variables are the same for Hedgers and FX hedgers such as: current 
ratio, quick ratio and liquidity ratio. Current ratio is one with the higest chi-square 
and all of these variables have a negative coefficient as literature states. However 
IR derivative users have not significant liquidity ratios. The mean difference test 
showed that only Hedgers had significant liquidity variables. 
Profitability variables for Users are mainly three: ROC, ROE and Profit Margin, 
but the latter two are significant and have a positive coefficient. Also IR Hedgers 
have ROE and Profit Margin as significant variables with a positive relationship 
with the probability to hedge. At the same time for FX Hedgers have four 
significant profitability variable: ROC, EBITDA Margin, EBIT Margin and Return on 
Shareholders Funds. But the first three variables have a negative coefficient. 
Hedgers and IR Hedgers haven’t Interest Coverage significant variables. At 
the same time EBITDA Interest Payments is the FX Users significant variable and 
has a negative coefficient as expected from the literature. 
About the firm growth in anyone of the groups the market to book ratio is 
significant but for the users and the FX derivative users it has a positive coefficient 
as the literature states. 
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Debt maturity variables for all the dependent variables are the long term 
borrow and short borrow are the most significant variable with a positive and 
negative coefficients. 
The natural log of total assets and the natural log of total sales are the 
variables that can be used to capture the effect of the firm size, because they are 
statistically significant with a positive coefficient. 
As a overseas operation variable has been used the foreign sales. This 
variable is statistically significant with a positive coefficient only for FX derivative 
users. 
To measure the risk of default have been used the variable z-score because it 
is the only variable available in this category. Z-score is statistically significant in 
all groups with a negative coefficient. 
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Tab. 34 - Univariate Logit of hedgers. 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms use 
derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust standard 
errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
  Variables N Coeff   
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
  zsc 517 -0.324 *** 0.108 -3.00 0.00 8.99 
LEVERAGE debtequity 517 0.002   0.004 0.44 0.66 0.19 
 debtcapital 517 0.002   0.008 0.20 0.84 0.04 
 ltdebtcapital 517 0.065 * 0.039 1.66 0.10 2.76 
 ltdebtequity 517 0.021   0.136 1.52 0.13 2.32 
 liabassets 517 0.198   0.374 0.53 0.60 0.28 
 gearingrat 528 -0.008   0.013 -0.64 0.52 0.41 
 bv 517 0.040   0.373 0.11 0.92 0.01 
 mktv 519 0.367   0.259 1.41 0.16 2.00 
LIQUIDITY  crat 517 -0.093 ** 0.046 -2.04 0.04 4.17 
 qrat 517 -0.086 * 0.047 -1.83 0.07 3.35 
 liquidityratiox 517 -0.086 * 0.047 -1.83 0.07 3.35 
 
shareholdersliq
uidityratiox 
431 -0.002   0.003 -0.84 0.40 0.70 
 
solvencyratioa
ssetbased 
517 -18.600   35.891 -0.52 0.60 0.27 
PROFITABILITY roc 528 -0.024 ** 0.010 -2.42 0.02 5.84 
 roe 528 0.008 ** 0.004 2.16 0.03 4.68 
 profitmargin 505 0.108 ** 0.054 2.00 0.05 3.98 
 
returnonshareh
oldersfunds 
506 0.013   0.023 0.57 0.57 0.32 
 
returnontotalas
sets 
528 0.005   0.006 0.86 0.39 0.73 
 ebitmargin 516 0.077   0.098 0.79 0.43 0.62 
 ebitdamargin 516 0.086   0.111 0.77 0.44 0.60 
IC ebitinp 512 0.001   0.001 0.83 0.41 0.68 
 ebitdainp 512 -0.001   0.001 -1.22 0.22 1.48 
 interestcoverx 512 0.001   0.001 0.83 0.41 0.68 
 assetcoverx 431 -0.002   0.001 -1.12 0.26 1.27 
GROWTH OP mkttbrat 517 0.209   0.363 0.58 0.57 0.33 
DEBT 
MATURITY 
stborrow 517 -3.183 *** 0.428 -7.44 0.00 55.40 
 ltborrow 517 3.183 *** 0.428 7.44 0.00 55.40 
FIRM SIZE lnmktcap 350 0.431 *** 0.083 5.22 0.00 27.29 
 lntotsales 516 0.653 *** 0.103 6.33 0.00 40.03 
 lntotassets 517 0.773 *** 0.098 7.91 0.00 62.54 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 98 -0.025   0.450 -0.06 0.96 0.00 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Tab. 35 - Univariate Logit of IR (bias). 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms hedge 
with IR derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust 
standard errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
  Variables N Coeff   
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
  zsc 517 -0.348 *** -0.110 -3.16 0.00 9.96 
LEVERAGE debtequity 517 -0.001   0.004 -0.27 0.79 0.07 
 debtcapital 517 0.003   0.008 0.43 0.67 0.19 
 ltdebtcapital 517 0.070 * 0.039 1.81 0.07 3.28 
 ltdebtequity 517 0.022   0.014 1.60 0.11 2.56 
 liabassets 517 0.123   0.384 0.32 0.75 0.10 
 gearingrat 528 -0.006   0.013 -0.43 0.67 0.19 
 bv 517 -0.350   0.380 -0.92 0.36 0.85 
 mktv 519 0.437 * 0.263 1.66 0.10 2.75 
LIQUIDITY  crat 517 -0.076   0.047 -1.62 0.11 2.62 
 qrat 517 -0.059   0.046 -1.27 0.20 1.62 
 liquidityratiox 517 -0.059   0.046 -1.27 0.20 1.62 
 
shareholdersliq
uidityratiox 
431 -0.002   0.002 -0.82 0.41 0.68 
 
solvencyratioa
ssetbased 
517 14.632   36.432 0.40 0.69 0.16 
PROFITABILITY roc 528 -0.014   0.010 -1.47 0.14 2.16 
 roe 528 0.009 ** 0.004 2.33 0.02 5.44 
 profitmargin 505 0.131 ** 0.060 2.16 0.03 4.66 
 
returnonshareh
oldersfunds 
506 0.016   0.025 0.66 0.51 0.43 
 
returnontotalas
sets 
528 0.010   0.006 1.56 0.12 2.43 
 ebitmargin 516 0.120   0.101 1.18 0.24 1.40 
 ebitdamargin 516 0.130   0.118 1.10 0.27 1.21 
IC ebitinp 512 0.001   0.001 0.99 0.32 0.98 
 ebitdainp 512 -0.001   0.001 -1.20 0.23 1.44 
 interestcoverx 512 0.001   0.001 0.99 0.32 0.98 
 assetcoverx 431 -0.002   0.002 -0.99 0.32 0.98 
GROWTH OP mkttbrat 517 -0.161   0.367 -0.44 0.66 0.19 
DEBT 
MATURITY 
stborrow 517 -3.435 *** 0.440 -7.81 0.00 60.96 
 ltborrow 517 3.435 *** 0.440 7.81 0.00 60.96 
FIRM SIZE lnmktcap 350 0.431 *** 0.083 5.17 0.00 26.71 
 lntotsales 516 0.618 *** 0.104 5.94 0.00 35.31 
 lntotassets 517 0.789 *** 0.098 8.01 0.00 64.23 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 98 -0.132   0.548 -0.24 0.81 0.06 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Table 36 - Univariate Logit of FX (bias). 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms hedge 
with FX derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust 
standard errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
  Variables N Coeff   
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
  zsc 517 -0.265 * 0.151 -1.75 0.08 3.07 
LEVERAGE debtequity 517 0.001   0.005 0.13 0.90 0.02 
 debtcapital 517 -0.003   0.014 -0.20 0.84 0.04 
 ltdebtcapital 517 0.019   0.055 0.34 0.74 0.11 
 ltdebtequity 517 0.006   0.015 0.44 0.66 0.19 
 liabassets 517 0.025   0.483 0.05 0.96 0.00 
 gearingrat 528 -0.075 * 0.039 -1.91 0.06 3.63 
 bv 517 0.702   0.590 1.19 0.23 1.42 
 mktv 519 -0.014   0.286 -0.05 0.96 0.00 
LIQUIDITY  crat 517 -0.114 ** 0.056 -2.03 0.04 4.11 
 qrat 517 -0.116 ** 0.059 -1.96 0.05 3.85 
 liquidityratiox 517 -0.116 ** 0.059 -1.96 0.05 3.85 
 
shareholdersliq
uidityratiox 
431 0.000   0.002 -0.07 0.94 0.00 
 
solvencyratioa
ssetbased 
517 -65.880   58.810 -1.12 0.26 1.25 
PROFITABILITY roc 528 -0.055 *** 0.014 -3.81 0.00 14.54 
 roe 528 0.007   0.005 1.38 0.17 1.91 
 profitmargin 505 0.015   0.076 0.20 0.84 0.04 
 
returnonshareh
oldersfunds 
506 0.073 ** 0.034 2.17 0.03 4.73 
 
returnontotalas
sets 
528 -0.009   0.008 -1.07 0.28 1.15 
 ebitmargin 516 -0.261 *** 0.101 -2.58 0.01 6.68 
 ebitdamargin 516 -0.307 *** 0.113 -2.71 0.01 7.37 
IC ebitinp 512 0.000   0.001 -0.12 0.91 0.01 
 ebitdainp 512 -0.001 * 0.001 -1.67 0.09 2.80 
 interestcoverx 512 0.000   0.001 -0.12 0.91 0.01 
 assetcoverx 431 0.000   0.000 -0.96 0.34 0.93 
GROWTH OP mkttbrat 517 0.602   0.588 1.02 0.31 1.05 
DEBT 
MATURITY 
stborrow 517 -1.709 *** 0.563 -3.04 0.00 9.22 
 ltborrow 517 1.709 *** 0.563 3.04 0.00 9.22 
FIRM SIZE lnmktcap 350 0.419 *** 0.100 4.19 0.00 17.53 
 lntotsales 516 0.205 * 0.113 1.81 0.07 3.28 
 lntotassets 517 0.425 *** 0.080 5.34 0.00 28.48 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 98 1.882 * 1.039 1.81 0.07 3.28 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
 
In the table below have been summarized in order by significance, all the 
significant independent variables for each dependent binary variable. To build up 
the multivariate regression for each proxy have been taken into account the 
independent variables that the dependent variables have in common and at the 
same time whose who have the high number of observations.27 
 
 
 
                                                             
27
 The data sample consists of 528 firm-year observations. 
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Tab. 37 - Summary independent variables for multivariate model. 
HEDGERS No. Obs. IR No. Obs. FX No. Obs. 
Z-Score 517 Z-Score 517 Z-Score 517 
Leverage 
LT Debt Capital 517 LT Debt Capital 517 Gearing ratio 528 
  Mktv 519   
      
      
Liquidity 
Cratio 517   Cratio 517 
Qratio 517   Qratio 517 
Liquidity ratio 517   Liquidity ratio 517 
      
Profitability 
ROC 528 ROE 528 ROC 528 
ROE 528 Profit Margin 505 EBITDA Margin 516 
Profit margin 505   EBIT Margin 516 
    Return on 
Shareholders’Funds  
506 
      
Interest Coverage 
    EBTDA Int. 
Payiments 
512 
      
Growth Opportunities 
      
      
Debt Maturity 
Short Term Borrow 517 Short Term Borrow 517 Short Term Borrow 517 
Long Term Borrow 517 Long Term Borrow 517 Long Term Borrow 517 
Firm Size 
Ln Total Sales 516 Ln Total Assets 517 Ln Total Assets 517 
Ln Total Assets 517 Ln Total Sales 516 Ln Total Sales 516 
Ln Market 
Capitalization 
350 Ln Market 
Capitalization 
350 Ln Market 
Capitalization 
350 
Foreign Exposure 
    Foreign Sales 98 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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5.3.2: Multivariate logit regression: Italian non-financial listed SMEs 
To run the Multivariate logit regression have been used the following 
independent variables: 
 
Table 38 - Summary independent variables and relative literature. 
 
Independent Variables Literature 
Z-SCORE Altman (1968) 
Leverage  
LT Debt Capital  Stulz (1996) 
Leland (1998) 
Gearing ratio  
Liquidity  
CRatio Geczy et al. (1999) 
Bartrtam et al. (2009) 
Liquidity Ratio 
Profitability  
ROC Glaum (2002) 
Bartram et al. (2009) 
ROE 
Interest Coverage  
EBITDA Interest Payments Froot et al. (1993) 
Growth Opportunities  
Market To Book Ratio Myers (1977) 
Bressembinder (1991) 
Froot et al. (1993) 
Debt Maturity  
Long Term Borrow Stulz (1996) 
Leland (1998) 
Short Term Borrow 
Firm Size  
Ln Total Sales Graham and Rodgers (2002) 
Judge (2006) 
Campello et al. (2011) Ln Total Assets 
Foreign Exposure  
Foreign Sales Smith and Stulz (1985) 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
The Univariate test explained the relationship between hedging and different 
firms characteristics. The problem is that previous tests did not take into account 
the interaction between different independent variables. For this motivation have 
been run a logit regression between the probability of hedging and several 
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explanatory variables. The results in model 1-7 suggest that firm size is the most 
significant variable to determine the probability for a firm to hedge. The variable 
shows that there is a positive relationship between firm size and the probability to 
hedge, therefore can be expected that bigger firms are more likely to hedge. 
Foreign sales has been used as a proxy to measure the foreign exposure, but 
in all the seven models it is statistically insignificant. Indeed, also in the mean 
difference test and in the univariate logit regression this variable had not a 
significant coefficient. 
The variables that have been used as measures of leverage and debt maturity 
are long term debt capital, gearing ratio, short and long term borrow. They show 
that exist a positive relationship between them and the probability to hedge, that it 
is consistent with what Stulz (1996) and Leland (1998) demonstrated on how 
companies that hedge are able to reduce their likelihood of bankruptcy and 
therefore are able to increase their level of debt. The results suggest that long 
term borrow and leverage measures have a very high elasticity and odds values. 
What said right now have been predicted also in the mean difference test where all 
of these variables were significant and hedgers had an higher mean than the non-
hedgers. 
As liquidity ratio proxy has been used the current ratio but is not statistically 
significant in all the seven models. Infact looking back to the previous test, in 
particular to the mean difference tests, is shown that it is significant but non-
hedgers presents an higher mean respect the hedgers, which suggests that more 
liquid is a firm more likely it uses hedging substitutes than derivatives instruments. 
The Interest Coverage ratio used is the EBITDA Interest Payments. It is 
significant and has a negative coefficient as the theory of Froot et al. (1993) states. 
With their research showed that hedging reduces cash flow volatility leading to 
better rates for financing, therefore those companies with higher rates of volatilities 
are more likely to use derivatives in order to reduce the financial risk and get an 
easier and better conditions access for funding. 
Profitability proxies employed to measure the relationship with the probability 
of hedging are return on capital (ROC) and return on equity (ROE) and both of 
them are not significant. 
What argued above suggests that the decision of using derivatives as hedging 
instruments is closely related to factors determining the firm size and the financial 
distress situation measured by debt maturity proxies and leverage proxies. 
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The table 40 shows the relationship between the probability that a firm hedgs 
with IR derivatives and proxies for incentives to hedge. The natural log of total 
assets is the most significant variable, at the same time debt maturity (DM) 
variables are important factors in determining whether to hedge with IR 
derivatives. Long term debt borrow is the most important financial distress 
measure when comparing the marginal effect across models, which gives strong 
support to the notion that firm’s with more long term debt exposure are more likely 
to hedge. According to Bessembinder (1991) and Myers (1977), the significantly 
positive effects of leverage on the likelihood of hedging is consistent with the 
notion that asymmetric information can lead to underinvestment when leverage is 
high, resulting in increased agency costs which creates incentives for firms to 
hedge. 
Table 41 suggests that FX exposure is an important factor in determining 
whether firms hedge FX risks. This supports the argument that firms with more 
volatile income resulting from changes in the exchange rate are more likely to 
hedge with FX derivatives, which is supported by the findings in the multivariate 
logit regression, where three out of seven models show a positive and statistical 
relationship between hedging and foreign sales. As demonstrated for hedgers and 
IR hedgers, also for FX hedgers the firm size proxy used suggests the existence of 
a positive relationship between firm size and the probability that a firm hedges and 
that supports scale economies hypothesis. The liquidity measure used has been 
the current ratio and in six out of seven model have a significant and negative 
coefficient as the literature states. This shows that Italian non-financial listed SMEs 
are less likely to hedge against foreign currency exposure by derivative 
instruments when the company uses alternative instruments. 
With the multivariate analysis have been tried to identify a model with all the 
most significant variables. Hence, have been started creating the model with the 
most significant variables and then based on trial and error method adding other 
variables have been tried to find those that are meaningful to create the model 
with the largest number of explanatory variables which reflects the best possible 
decision of hedging. At the end have been obtained a model composed of two 
independent variables statistically significant: long term debt capital and atural log 
of total assets – Model 1. 
As might be expected when this model has been applied to specific cases 
as the probability of using foreign exchange derivatives or interest rate derivatives 
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have been found that some variables are no longer significant. For FX Hedgers 
the long term debt capital is not statistically significant whilst for Hedgers and IR 
Hedgers all these variables are significant. 
Looking into the summary statistics of each table is possible to demonstrate 
why model 5 has been choose as the best model. Taking into account the 
summary table related to the probability of hedging (Use) model 1 correctly 
predicted the 77.97% of the derivatives users and the 73.68% of the no derivatives 
users. Thus the 23.71 % of the sample are misclassified cases. But the same 
model at the same time when predicts the probability of hedging by IR its correctly 
predicted the 81.13% would use derivatives and the 79.55% would not use those 
instruments. So the 19.59% of the sample are misclassified cases. For the 
probability of hedging instruments by FX the 98.96% of the sample are 
misclassified cases so the 4.35% would use derivatives and 95.95% would not use 
derivatives. IR Hedgers are those with the higher chi square (46.86%) meanwhile 
the FX Hedgers have the lower chi square (13.47%), that could be explained by 
the fact that the 87.93% of the Italian non-financial listed SMEs used IR 
derivatives. 
Is interesting focusing on the numbers of users and non-users displayed in 
table 40 and 41. The table 28 shows the probability of hedging by IR derivative 
and the data show that over 53 observation as users 43 are classified as users IR 
derivatives and at the same time there are 10 misclassified non derivatives users. 
At the same time is interesting to see that data about the FX hedgers in table 41 
states that ove 23 observation as users only 1 is classified as user FX instruments 
and the others 22 obseravtions are classified as non-users. In all the seven model 
the sensitivity is very higher for IR derivative users compared with the Hedgers 
and FX hedgers tables. But at the same time the specificity is higher in table 16 
(FX hedgers). Therefore the misclassification presented by FX Hedgers is not 
clearly clarified by the data present in the IR table. So could be assumed that 
could be that the Italian sample from presents misclassification about the use of 
foreign exchange derivatives as hedging instruments. 
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Tab. 39 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (Use). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge as proxies for incentives to hedge (Panel A). The dependent variable equals 1 if 
a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), marginal effects (ME), odds 
ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the independent variable. The marginal effect 
(elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent variable. The higher the elasticity’ value more important 
is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-values are calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) standard 
errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
LT DEBT 
CAPITAL 
2.354 
(0.010) 
*** 
0.282 
(0.000) 
*** 
10.528 
(0.010) 
*** 
                  
GEARING 
RATIO 
   
0.622 
(0.010) 
*** 
0.110 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.862 
(0.010) 
*** 
               
ROC       
- 
0.030 
(0.342) 
- 
0.007 
(0.343) 
 
0.970 
(0.342) 
            
ROE          
- 
0.006 
(0.696) 
- 
0.001 
(0.697) 
 
0.994 
(0.696) 
         
EBITDA INT 
PAY 
            
- 
0.571 
(0.025) 
** 
- 
0.014 
(0.033) 
** 
 
0.945 
(0.025) 
** 
      
ST 
BORROW 
               
- 
3.610 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.808 
(0.006) 
*** 
 
0.027 
(0.008) 
*** 
   
LT 
BORROW 
                  
3.610 
(0.008) 
*** 
0.808 
(0.006) 
*** 
36.970 
(0.008) 
*** 
MKTTBRAT 
- 
3.017 
(0.244) 
- 
0.362 
(0.303) 
 
0.049 
(0.244) 
- 
2.503 
(0.330) 
- 
0.446 
(0.344) 
 
0.082 
(0.330) 
- 
2.439 
(0.304) 
- 
0.566 
(0.303) 
 
0.087 
(0.304) 
- 
2.283 
(0.343) 
- 
0.530 
(0.342) 
 
0.102 
(0.343) 
- 
0.291 
(0.610) 
- 
0.309 
(0.610) 
 
0.275 
(0.610) 
- 
1.421 
(0.564) 
- 
0.318 
(0.566) 
 
0.241 
(0.564) 
- 
1.421 
(0.564) 
- 
0.318 
(0.566) 
 
0.241 
(0.564) 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
0.143 
(0.837) 
0.017 
(0.838) 
1.153 
(0.837) 
0.067 
(0.919) 
0.012 
(0.919) 
1.069 
(0.919) 
0.054 
(0.922) 
0.012 
(0.922) 
1.056 
(0.922) 
0.002 
(0.997) 
0.005 
(0.997) 
1.002 
(0.997) 
- 
0.010 
(0.855) 
 
- 
0.025 
(0.855) 
 
 
0.902 
(0.855) 
 
 
0.224 
(0.736) 
 
 
0.050 
(0.736) 
 
 
1.251 
(0.736) 
 
0.224 
(0.736) 
0.050 
(0.736) 
1.251 
(0.736) 
LN ASSETS 
1.105 
(0.020) 
** 
0.132 
(0.115) 
 
3.018 
(0.020) 
*** 
1.703 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.303 
(0.000) 
*** 
5.489 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.724 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.400 
(0.000) 
*** 
5.604 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.612 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.374 
(0.000) 
*** 
5.014 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.344 
(0.003) 
*** 
0.321 
(0.003) 
*** 
3.833 
(0.003) 
*** 
0.946 
(0.061) 
* 
0.212 
(0.062) 
* 
2.574 
(0.061) 
* 
0.946 
(0.061) 
* 
0.212 
(0.062) 
* 
2.574 
(0.061) 
* 
CRATIO 
0.243 
(0.170) 
0.029 
(0.205) 
1.275 
(0.170) 
0.329 
(0.100) 
 
0.059 
(0.078) 
1.390 
(0.100) 
0.132 
(0.461) 
0.031 
(0.459) 
1.141 
(0.461) 
0.128 
(0.463) 
0.030 
(0.461) 
1.136 
(0.463) 
0.306 
(0.228) 
0.073 
(0.221) 
1.358 
(0.228) 
- 
0.014 
(0.945) 
- 
0.003 
(0.946) 
 
0.986 
(0.945) 
- 
0.014 
(0.945) 
- 
0.003 
(0.946) 
0.986 
(0.945) 
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*      
Z-SCORE 
0.149 
(0.660) 
0.018 
(0.679) 
1.161 
(0.660) 
0.270 
(0.428) 
0.048 
(0.435) 
1.310 
(0.428) 
0.538 
(0.133) 
0.125 
(0.133) 
1.713 
(0.133) 
0.450 
(0.230) 
0.104 
(0.229) 
1.568 
(0.230) 
 
0.754 
(0.051) 
* 
 
0.180 
(0.057) 
* 
 
2.125 
(0.051) 
* 
0.318 
(0.343) 
0.071 
(0.345) 
1.374 
(0.343) 
0.318 
(0.343) 
0.071 
(0.345) 
1.374 
(0.343) 
_cons 
- 
10.657 
(0.065) 
* 
 
 
0.000 
(0.065) 
* 
- 
18.655 
(0.003) 
*** 
 
7.93-09 
(0.003) 
*** 
- 
17.401 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
16.200 
(0.003) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.003) 
*** 
- 
14..147 
(0.006) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.006) 
*** 
- 
6.580 
(0.296) 
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.296) 
 
- 
10.190 
(0.079) 
* 
 
 
0.000 
(0.079) 
* 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
N. 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
No. of Users 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Classified as Users 46 51 45 46 50 46 46 
Classified as Non-Users 13 8 14 13 9 913 13 
Sensitivity 77.97% 86.44% 76.27% 77.97% 84.75% 77.97% 77.97% 
No. of Non-Users 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Classified as users 10 14 18 19 16 12 12 
Classified as Non-Users 28 24 20 19 22 26 26 
Specificity 73.68% 63.16% 52.63% 50.00% 57.89% 68.42% 68.42% 
Correctly Specified 76.29% 77.32% 67.01% 67.01% 74.23% 74.23% 74.23% 
Chi-Square 33.62% 32.32% 22.48% 21.71% 31.19% 29.78% 29.78% 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-Square 0.2589 0.2488 0.1731 0.1671 0.2401 0.2293 0.2293 
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
-48.131512 -48.783157 -53.703583 -54.089008 -49.351322 -50.054822 -50.054822 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Tab. 40 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (IR). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge with IR derivatives as proxies for incentives to hedge. The dependent variable 
equals 1 if a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), marginal effects 
(ME), odds ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the independent variable. The marginal 
effect (elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent variable. The higher the elasticity’ value more 
important is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-values are calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
LT DEBT 
CAPITAL 
2.694 
(0.005) 
*** 
0.348 
(0.000) 
*** 
14.792 
(0.005) 
*** 
                  
GEARING 
RATIO 
   
0.479 
(0.054) 
* 
0.104 
(0.020) 
** 
1.614 
(0.054) 
* 
               
ROC       
- 
0.022 
(0.506) 
- 
0.005 
(0.506) 
 
0.977 
(0.506) 
            
ROE          
0.006 
(0.687) 
0.001 
(0.687) 
1.006 
(0.687) 
         
EBITDA INT 
PAY 
            
- 
0.035 
(0.122) 
- 
0.008 
(0.127) 
 
0.964 
(0.122) 
      
ST 
BORROW 
               
- 
4.287 
(0.003) 
*** 
- 
1.029 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
0.013 
(0.003) 
*** 
   
LT 
BORROW 
                  
4.287 
(0.003) 
*** 
1.029 
(0.002) 
*** 
72.762 
(0.003) 
*** 
MKTTBRAT 
- 
1.679 
(0.503) 
- 
0.217 
(0.533) 
 
0.186 
(0.503) 
- 
1.546 
(0.533) 
- 
0.337 
(0.539) 
 
0.212 
(0.533) 
- 
1.594 
(0.490) 
- 
0.392 
(0.491) 
 
0.202 
(0.490) 
- 
1.854 
(0.437) 
- 
0.456 
(0.437) 
 
0.156 
(0.437) 
- 
0.815 
(0.736) 
- 
0.202 
(0.736) 
 
0.442 
(0.736) 
- 
0.419 
(0.867) 
- 
0.100 
(0.868) 
 
0.657 
(0.867) 
- 
0.419 
(0.867) 
- 
0.100 
(0.868) 
 
0.657 
(0.867) 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
- 
0.092 
(0.879) 
- 
0.011 
(0.879) 
 
0.912 
(0.879) 
- 
0.127 
(0.822) 
- 
0.027 
(0.822) 
 
0.880 
(0.822) 
- 
0.128 
(0.805) 
- 
0.031 
(0.805) 
 
0.879 
(0.805) 
- 
0.153 
(0.771) 
- 
0.037 
(0.771) 
 
0.857 
(0.771) 
- 
0.235 
(0.653) 
- 
0.058 
(0.654) 
 
0.790 
(0.653) 
 
0.019 
(0.974) 
 
0.004 
(0.974) 
 
1.019 
(0.974) 
 
0.019 
(0.974) 
 
0.004 
(0.974) 
 
1.019 
(0.974) 
LN ASSETS 
1.738 
(0.001) 
*** 
0.224 
(0.056) 
** 
5.689 
(0.001) 
*** 
2.218 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.484 
(0.000) 
*** 
9.197 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.269 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.558 
(0.000) 
*** 
9.674 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.097 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.516 
(0.000) 
*** 
8.148 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.981 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.491 
(0.000) 
*** 
7.251 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.499 
(0.006) 
*** 
0.360 
(0.006) 
*** 
4.477 
(0.006) 
*** 
1.499 
(0.006) 
*** 
0.360 
(0.006) 
*** 
4.477 
(0.006) 
*** 
CRATIO 
0.294 
(0.134) 
0.038 
(0.171) 
1.343 
(0.134) 
0.347 
(0.107) 
 
0.075 
(0.086) 
* 
1.416 
(0.107) 
0.173 
(0.378) 
0.042 
(0.376) 
1.189 
(0.378) 
0.179 
(0.347) 
0.044 
(0.345) 
1.196 
(0.347) 
0.262 
(0.272) 
0.065 
(0.269) 
1.300 
(0.272) 
- 
0.030 
(0.899) 
 
- 
0.007 
(0.899) 
 
0.969 
(0.899) 
- 
0.030 
(0.899) 
 
- 
0.007 
(0.899) 
 
0.969 
(0.899) 
Z-SCORE 
 
0.337 
 
0.043 
 
1.401 
 
0.398 
 
0.086 
 
1.488 
 
0.654 
 
0.161 
 
1.924 
0.418 
(0.292) 
0.102 
(0.292) 
1.519 
(0.292) 
 
0.749 
 
0.185 
 
2.115 
0.529 
(0.135) 
0.127 
(0.138) 
1.697 
(0.135) 
0.529 
(0.135) 
0.127 
(0.138) 
1.697 
(0.135) 
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(0.354) 
 
(0.416) 
 
(0.354) 
 
(0.262) 
 
(0.273) 
 
(0.262) 
 
(0.096) 
* 
(0.096) 
* 
(0.096) 
* 
(0.056) 
* 
(0.058) 
* 
(0.056) 
* 
_cons 
- 
19.561 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
 
3.2e-09 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
25.479 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
8.6e-12 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
24.723 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
1.8e-11 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
22.444 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
1.8e-10 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
22.097 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
2.5e-10 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
13.586 
(0.038) 
** 
 
 
1.3e-06 
(0.038) 
** 
- 
17.874 
(0.004) 
*** 
 
 
1.7e-08 
(0.004) 
*** 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
N. 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
No. of Users 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Classified as Users 43 44 43 43 45 43 43 
Classified as Non-Users 10 9 10 10 8 10 10 
Sensitivity 81.13% 83.82% 81.13% 81.13% 84.91% 81.13% 81.13% 
No. of Non-Users 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Classified as users 9 8 13 12 13 11 11 
Classified as Non-Users 35 36 31 32 31 33 33 
Specificity 79.55% 81.82% 70.45% 72.73% 70.45% 75.00% 75% 
Correctly Specified 80.41% 82.47% 76.29% 77.32% 78.35% 78.35% 78.35% 
Chi-Square 46.87% 40.06% 33.82% 33.54% 37.78% 43.82% 43.82% 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-Square 0.3507 0.2998 0.2531 0.2510 0.2827 0.3279 0.3279 
Log pseudo likelihood -43.381332 -46.787286 -49.907269 -50.048889 -47.927789 -44.904983 -44.904983 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Tab. 41 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (FX). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge with FX exposure as proxies for incentives to hedge. The dependent variable 
equals 1 if a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), marginal effects 
(ME), odds ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the independent variable. The marginal 
effect (elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent variable. The higher the elasticity’ value more 
important is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-values are calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
LT DEBT 
CAPITAL 
- 
0.074 
(0.556) 
- 
0.011 
(0.553) 
 
0.928 
(0.556) 
                  
GEARING 
RATIO 
   
 
0.981 
(0.698) 
- 
0.002 
(0.696) 
 
0.981 
(0.698) 
               
ROC       
- 
0.079 
(0.054) 
* 
- 
0.011 
(0.048) 
** 
 
0.924 
(0.054) 
* 
            
ROE          
- 
0.026 
(0.194) 
- 
0.003 
(0.171) 
 
0.974 
(0.194) 
         
EBITDA INT 
PAY 
            
- 
0.076 
(0.038) 
** 
- 
0.009 
(0.007) 
*** 
 
0.926 
(0.038) 
** 
      
ST 
BORROW 
               
- 
3.884 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.555 
(0.009) 
*** 
 
0,020 
(0.008) 
*** 
   
LT 
BORROW 
                  
3.884 
(0.008) 
*** 
0.555 
(0.009) 
*** 
48.644 
(0.008) 
*** 
MKTTBRAT 
1.115 
(0.733) 
0.170 
(0.732) 
3.051 
(0.733) 
2.315 
(0.794) 
0.128 
(0.793) 
2.315 
(0.794) 
0.897 
(0.778) 
0.129 
(0.778) 
2.454 
(0.778) 
2.090 
(0.555) 
0.301 
(0.548) 
8.089 
(0.555) 
0.944 
(0.772) 
0.113 
(0.774) 
2.571 
(0.772) 
0.293 
(0.932) 
0.041 
(0.932) 
1.341 
(0.932) 
0.293 
(0.932) 
0.041 
(0.932) 
1.341 
(0.932) 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
1.734 
(0.127) 
0.264 
(0.137) 
5.666 
(0.127) 
6.085 
(0.112) 
0.277 
(0.123) 
6.085 
(0.112) 
 
1.915 
(0.083) 
* 
 
0.275 
(0.090) 
* 
 
6.791 
(0.083) 
* 
1.871 
(0.102) 
0.270 
(0.110) 
6.499 
(0.102) 
1.941 
(0.114) 
0.234 
(0.151) 
6.971 
(0.114) 
 
2.595 
(0.034) 
** 
 
0.371 
(0.044) 
** 
 
13.406 
(0.034) 
*** 
 
2.595 
(0.034) 
*** 
 
0.371 
(0.044) 
** 
 
13.406 
(0.034) 
** 
LN ASSETS 
 
0.740 
(0.114) 
 
 
0.113 
(0.107) 
 
 
2.097 
(0.114) 
 
 
2.018 
(0.131) 
 
 
0.107 
(0.125) 
 
 
2.018 
(0.131) 
 
 
1.152 
(0.037) 
** 
 
0.165 
(0.031) 
** 
 
3.164 
(0.037) 
** 
 
0.995 
(0.064) 
* 
 
0.143 
(0.051) 
* 
 
2.706 
(0.064) 
* 
 
0.832 
(0.106) 
 
 
0.100 
(0.086) 
* 
 
2.298 
(0.106) 
 
- 
0.213 
(0.702) 
 
- 
0.030 
(0.701) 
 
0.808 
(0.702) 
- 
0.213 
(0.702) 
- 
0.030 
(0.701) 
 
0.808 
(0.702) 
CRATIO 
- 
0.690 
- 
0.105 
 
0.501 
 
0.503 
- 
0.105 
 
0.503 
- 
0.692 
- 
0.099 
 
0.500 
- 
0.781 
- 
0.112 
 
0.457 
- 
0.586 
- 
0.070 
 
0.556 
- 
0.878 
- 
0.125 
 
0.415 
- 
0.878 
- 
0.125 
 
0.415 
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(0.085) 
* 
(0.035) 
** 
(0.085) 
* 
(0.088) 
* 
(0.037) 
** 
(0.088) 
* 
(0.084) 
* 
(0.035) 
** 
(0.084) 
* 
(0.080) 
* 
(0.023) 
** 
(0.080) 
* 
(0.111) 
 
(0.072) 
* 
(0.111 
) 
(0.039) 
** 
(0.009) 
*** 
(0.039) 
** 
(0.039) 
** 
(0.009) 
*** 
(0.039) 
** 
Z-SCORE 
0.702 
(0.127) 
0.107 
(0.101) 
2.018 
(0.127) 
2.023 
(0.127) 
0.108 
(0.101) 
2.023 
(0.127) 
1.230 
(0.023) 
** 
0.176 
(0.011) 
** 
3.422 
(0.023) 
** 
1.269 
(0.056) 
* 
0.183 
(0.027) 
** 
3.558 
(0.056) 
* 
1.638 
(0.017) 
** 
0.197 
(0.003) 
*** 
5.149 
(0.017) 
** 
0.674 
(0.146) 
 
0.096 
(0.129) 
 
1.962 
(0.146) 
 
0.674 
(0.146) 
 
0.096 
(0.129) 
 
1.962 
(0.146) 
 
_cons 
- 
10.271 
(0.074) 
* 
 
 
0.000 
(0.074) 
* 
 
0.000 
(0.087) 
* 
 
 
0.000 
(0.087) 
* 
- 
15.246 
(0.022) 
** 
 
 
2.4e-07 
(0.022) 
** 
- 
14.311 
(0.041) 
** 
 
 
6.1e-07 
(0.041) 
** 
- 
11.772 
(0.056) 
* 
 
 
7.7e-06 
(0.056) 
* 
 
3.807 
(0.586) 
 
 
 
45.015 
(0.586) 
 
- 
0.077 
(0.990) 
 
 
0.925 
(0.990) 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
N. 97 97 97 97 97 07 97 
No. of Users 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Classified as Users 1 2 4 1 3 6 6 
Classified as Non-Users 22 21 19 22 20 17 17 
Sensitivity 4.35% 8.70% 17.39% 4.35% 13.04% 26.09% 26.09% 
No. of Non-Users 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Classified as users 3 3 4 3 4 5 5 
Classified as Non-Users 71 71 70 71 70 69 69 
Specificity 95.95% 95.95% 94.59% 95.95% 94.59% 93.24% 93.24% 
Correctly Specified 74.23% 75.26% 76.29% 74.23% 75.26% 77.32% 77.32% 
Chi-Square 13.47% 13.47% 17.30% 14.97% 20.25% 20.99% 20.99% 
Probability 0.0362 0.0395 0.0083 0.0205 0.0020 0.0018 0.0018 
Pseudo R-Square 0.1268 0.1245 0.1628 0.1408 0.1953 0.1975 0.1975 
Log pseudo likelihood -46.394885 -46.51417 -44.482041 -45.647001 -42.754443 -42.634016 -42.634016 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Summary Multivariate Logit Regression 
Table 42 shows the estimation results for the extent to which firms hedge their 
risk exposure with derivatives instruments as users (USE), interest rate (IR) and 
foreign exchange (FX) hedgers. It shows the seven different models specifications 
that have been obtained from different combinations of explanatory variables. All 
seven models estimated the three different dependent variables, the hedgers, the 
interest rate hedgers and the foreign exchange hedgers, and include one at a time 
measures such as interest coverage ratios, leverage ratio, profitability ratios, debt 
maturity ratios, growth opportunity ratio, financial price risk ratio and overseas 
operation ratio, firm size ratios, hedging substitutes ratios and likelihood of default 
ratio. 
Previous tables showed that when the seven model have been run testing the 
IR hegers they get an higher chi-squarecomparted to the others. So it is belived 
that IR hedgers better capture the decision to hedge. Data suggest that estimates 
can be quite similar for Hedgers and IR hedgers because they have mainly the 
same significant variables. That could be explained because hedgers, as 
dependent variable, includes all those firms that used all types of derivatives and 
those who do not, further has to be taken into account that the Italian sample is 
characterized by the fact that 87.93% of the derivative users disclosed in their 
annual reports that they used IR derivatives. Meanwhile all the three dependent 
variables have in common the fact the most important proxy of financial distress is 
debt maturity as long term debt borrow, that has the highest coefficient. 
Furthermore it suggest that the Italian non-fianancial listed SMEs are more likely to 
use derivatives instruments on long term basis. That could be explained by high 
costs that they have to support entering into a derivative contract. 
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Tab. 42 - Empirical results: summary table about the corporate demand for financial derivatives 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
USE IR FX USE IR FX USE IR FX USE IR FX USE IR FX USE IR FX USE IR FX 
LT DEBT 
CAPITAL 
 
2.354 
(0.010) 
*** 
 
2.694 
(0.005) 
*** 
- 
0.074 
(0.556) 
 
                  
GEARING 
RATIO 
   
0.622 
(0.010) 
*** 
0.479 
(0.054) 
* 
0..981 
(0.698) 
 
               
ROC       
- 
0.030 
(0.342) 
 
- 
0.022 
(0.506) 
 
- 
0.079 
(0.054) 
* 
            
ROE          
- 
0.006 
(0.696) 
 
0.006 
(0.687) 
- 
0.026 
(0.194) 
         
EBITDA INT 
PAY 
            
- 
0.571 
(0.025) 
** 
- 
0.035 
(0.122) 
 
- 
0.076 
(0.038) 
** 
      
ST 
BORROW 
               
- 
3.610 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
4.287 
(0.003) 
*** 
- 
3.884 
(0.008) 
*** 
   
LT 
BORROW 
                  
3.610 
(0.008) 
*** 
4.287 
(0.003) 
*** 
3.884 
(0.008) 
*** 
MKTTBRAT 
- 
3.017 
(0.244) 
- 
1.679 
(0.503) 
 
1.115 
(0.733) 
- 
2.503 
(0.330) 
- 
1.546 
(0.533) 
 
2.315 
(0.794) 
- 
2.439 
(0.304) 
- 
1.594 
(0.490) 
 
0.897 
(0.778) 
- 
2.283 
(0.343) 
- 
1.854 
(0.437) 
 
2.090 
(0.555) 
- 
0.291 
(0.610) 
- 
0.815 
(0.736) 
 
0.944 
(0.772) 
- 
1.421 
(0.564) 
- 
0.419 
(0.867) 
 
0.293 
(0.932) 
- 
1.421 
(0.564) 
- 
0.419 
(0.867) 
 
0.293 
(0.932) 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
 
0.143 
(0.837) 
 
- 
0.092 
(0.879) 
 
 
1.734 
(0.127) 
 
 
0.067 
(0.919) 
 
- 
0.127 
(0.822) 
 
 
6.085 
(0.112) 
 
 
0.054 
(0.922) 
 
- 
0.128 
(0.805) 
 
 
1.915 
(0.083) 
* 
 
0.002 
(0.997) 
 
- 
0.153 
(0.771) 
 
 
1.871 
(0.102) 
 
- 
0.010 
(0.855) 
 
- 
0.235 
(0.653) 
 
 
1.941 
(0.114) 
 
 
0.224 
(0.736) 
 
 
0.019 
(0.974) 
 
 
2.595 
(0.034) 
** 
0.224 
(0.736) 
0.019 
(0.974) 
 
2.595 
(0.034) 
*** 
LN ASSETS 
 
1.105 
(0.020) 
** 
 
1.738 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
0.740 
(0.114) 
 
 
1.703 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
2.218 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
2.018 
(0.131) 
 
 
1.724 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
2.269 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
1.152 
(0.037) 
** 
 
1.612 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
2.097 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.995 
(0.064) 
* 
 
1.344 
(0.003) 
*** 
 
1.981 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.832 
(0.106) 
 
 
0.946 
(0.061) 
* 
 
1.499 
(0.006) 
*** 
- 
0.213 
(0.702) 
 
 
0.946 
(0.061) 
* 
 
1.499 
(0.006) 
*** 
- 
0.213 
(0.702) 
 
CRATIO 
0.243 
(0.170) 
0.294 
(0.134) 
- 
0.690 
(0.085) 
* 
0.329 
(0.100) 
0.347 
(0.107) 
 
0.503 
(0.088) 
* 
0.132 
(0.461) 
0.173 
(0.378) 
- 
0.692 
(0.084) 
* 
0.128 
(0.463) 
0.179 
(0.347) 
- 
0.781 
(0.080) 
* 
0.306 
(0.228) 
0.262 
(0.272) 
- 
0.586 
(0.111) 
 
- 
0.014 
(0.945) 
 
- 
0.030 
(0.899) 
 
- 
0.878 
(0.039) 
** 
- 
0.014 
(0.945) 
 
- 
0.030 
(0.899) 
 
- 
0.878 
(0.039) 
** 
Z-SCORE 
0.149 
(0.660) 
 
0.337 
(0.354) 
 
0.702 
(0.127) 
0.270 
(0.428) 
 
0.398 
(0.262) 
 
2.023 
(0.127) 
0.538 
(0.133) 
 
0.654 
(0.096) 
* 
 
1.230 
(0.023) 
** 
0.450 
(0.230) 
0.418 
(0.292) 
 
1.269 
(0.056) 
* 
 
0.754 
(0.051) 
* 
 
0.749 
(0.056) 
* 
 
1.638 
(0.017) 
** 
0.318 
(0.343) 
0.529 
(0.135) 
 
0.674 
(0.146) 
 
0.318 
(0.343) 
0.529 
(0.135) 
 
0.674 
(0.146) 
 
_cons 
- 
10.657 
- 
19.561 
- 
10.271 
- 
18.655 
- 
25.479 
 
0.000 
- 
17.401 
- 
24.723 
- 
15.246 
- 
16.200 
- 
22.444 
- 
14.311 
- 
14..147 
- 
22.097 
- 
11.772 
- 
6.580 
- 
13.586 
 
3.807 
- 
10.190 
- 
17.874 
- 
0.077 
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(0.065) 
* 
(0.002) 
*** 
(0.074) 
* 
(0.003) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.087) 
* 
(0.002) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.022) 
** 
(0.003) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.041) 
** 
(0.006) 
*** 
(0.000) 
*** 
(0.056) 
* 
(0.296) 
 
(0.038) 
** 
(0.586) 
 
(0.079) 
* 
(0.004) 
*** 
(0.990) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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5.4: United Kingdom vs Italian non-financial listed SMEs 
This analysis attempted to track the utilization of derivatives instruments by UK and 
Italian non-financial listed Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) during the time period 
2005-2012. The UK sample is composed by 1328 firm-year observations meanwhile the 
Italian has 528 firm-year observations. 
In figure 1 is shown that the use of derivatives was most common among medium 
firms – almost 90 percent, followed by small and micro companies. Indeed, was expected 
this positive relationship between size and derivative usage because the derivative 
markets show significant economies of scale. Those results are consistent with the 
findings of Bodnar et al. (1995) and Berkman et al. (1997). But has to be taken into 
account that Warmer’s in 1977 with his research demonstrate that between direct costs of 
bankruptcy and firm size there is a negative relationship. 
By industry sector28, the use of derivatives by Italian SMEs was most common among 
manufacturing companies (36.21%), followed by professional, scientific and technical 
activities (17.24%) and industrial and commercial firms (13.22%). About the UK sample it 
is characterized by 22.57% of manufacturing companies that used derivatives instruments, 
the 21.18% of the hedger were information and commercial firms meanwhile the 19.10% 
were professional, scientific and technical activities. Therefore as could be expected in 
both samples manufacturing firms indicated a higher usage of derivatives, and this could 
be explained by the fact that manufacturing companies are more exposed to foreign 
exchange risks. UK small and medium enterprises are on average more exposed to 
foreign exchange risk than Italian, because in the European Union they trade with their 
national currency that is sterling and not Euro. 
Another important fact that has to be taken into account matching the UK and Italian 
samples is what have been reported in the tables referring to the hedging activities and 
types of derivatives used by the UK and Italian non-financial listed SMEs. Indeed, data 
show that the 87.93% of the Italian derivative users disclosed in their annual reports that 
they used interest rate derivatives and the most common type has been interest rate swap 
(IRS). Meanwhile, the 55.21% of United Kingdom firms disclosed in their annual reports 
that they hedged by IR derivatives and 51.74% hedged by FX derivatives. Therefore there 
is a substantial difference in hedging type between the Italian and the UK small and 
                                                             
28
 See Annex E: Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities SIC 2007 
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medium enterprises, furthermore the univariate and the multivariate results strengthened 
that assumptions. 
The summary multivariate logit regression tables shows that firm size is statistically 
significant with a positive relationship in both of the samples, thus larger Italian and UK 
small and medium enterprises are more likely to hedge. But, in almost all UK models the 
foreign sales and the liquidity measures are statistical significant variables, the first with a 
positive coefficient and the second with a negative one. Those explanatory variables in the 
Italian sample are never significant, except in few exceptional models. Also the market to 
book ratio is statistically significant only in the UK sample but with a negative coefficient. 
About the financial distress measures, the results suggest that the two best proxies in both 
samples are leverage and debt maturity. But the Italian multivariate logit regression used 
as leverage variables the long term debt and the gearing ratio which have a statistical 
positive coefficients for two dependent variables (Hedgers and IR Hedgers), meanwhile 
the UK model used the market value leverage who had a positive and statistical significant 
coefficient when the dependent variables were Hedgers and IR Hedgers and a statistical 
high negative coefficient when FX Hedgers are tested. The other explanatory proxies such 
as interest coverage ratios and profitability ratios in both samples had very low coefficient. 
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Fig.1 - Derivative usage by SMEs in United Kingdom and Italy 
Micro, Small and Medium indicates the percentage of firms that disclosed in their annual reports that used derivatives according to firm size, where a turnover value equal or less than 
€ 2 million (£ 2 million) was considered micro, more than € 2 million (£ 2 million) but equal or less than € 10million (£ 9million) was considered small and more than € 10 (£ 9 million) 
equal or less than € 50 (£ 43 million) million was considered medium. 
     
Source: author’s elaboration –Annual Reports data, STATA.. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research employs two unique datasets to examine why and how United 
Kingdom and Italian non-financial listed Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
used financial derivative instruments such as currency derivatives, interest rate 
derivatives and commodity derivatives, during the time period 2005-2012. 
From the European Definition of SMEs using Bureaux Van Dijk databases – 
FAME (UK) AIDA (Italy) – have built up the two samples and collected all the 
necessary variables to perform the calculation needed for this research. 
Meanwhile, hedging data have been handily collected from the annual reports 
published on the websites of each firm, and for the Italian sample have been 
handily collected data about the overseas operations. 
The univariate and multivariate logit tests help to understand which are the 
main factors that could lead an UK and an Italian non-financial listed small and 
medium enterprise to hedge with derivatives. The firm size proxies that have been 
used are statistically significant in all of the models in both samples, and it could 
be explained as: the high costs related to the use of derivatives are unaffordable 
for small businesses and they play a key role in decisions to adopt a risk 
management strategy that includes the use of these instruments. The findings are 
in line with the results obtained by Froot et al. (1993), Nance et al. (1993) and 
Judge (2006b). 
The UK sample shows that foreign sale is a significant variable in almost all 
the models as foreign risk and overseas operation measure. Furthermore, it has a 
higher level of significance being 1% in all those models having FX hedgers as 
dependent variable. This is consistent with Berkman et Bradbourgy (1996) stated 
in their research. Meanwhile, in the Italian sample foreign sale variable is not 
significant in almost all of the models, that could be explained because only the 
37% of the firms in the sample disclosed in their annual reports the use of FX 
derivatives, furthermore Italian companies trade in the European market with their 
national currency that is Euro. 
The interest rate exposure is relevant in both samples but it is higher in the 
Italian. The proxies used to test this phenomenon are leverage and debt maturity. 
For the Italian sample the debt maturity and long term debt over capital are the 
best variables that explain the relationship between financial distress and the use 
of interest rate derivatives by Italian SMEs. Instead, market value leverage is the 
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best variable with debt maturity in the UK sample that best explain this 
relationship. The meaningfulness of these variables can be justified by the fact that 
SMEs have an high long term debt exposure therefore are more likely to face 
interest risks exposure. And an higher interest exposure lead to higher borrow 
costs, which in turn affect the company leverage and higher is its leverage 
exposure higher is its probability to incur into a financial distress situation. 
Therefore, bigger SMEs are more likely to hedge against this type of risk. Here is 
confirmed what stated by Smith and Stulz (1985) about the financial distress, with 
what Campello, Lin Ma and Zou (2011), Bartram et al. (2009) and Graham and 
Roger (2002) argued about leverage ratio. 
The Froot, Scharfestein and Stein (1993) theory about the growth opportunities 
and the likelihood to hedge has been tested using the market to book ratio. This 
variable in the Italian sample was not significant in all the model, meanwhile in the 
UK sample it was statistically significant with a negative coefficient instead of 
positive. 
Some analogy can be found comparing the results with those obtained in 
previous studies about European countries. Particularly, the firm size is a key 
variable because the benefits derived from economies of scale are a huge 
incentive for the adoption of derivatives by SMEs. 
In contrast to the analysis carried out in the United States, in the Italian sample 
the market to book ratio is not significant in all the models, meanwhile in the UK 
sample it is statistically significant with a negative coefficient. Further, compared to 
other European research in the Italian sample the exchange rate proxies and the 
substitute of hedging variables used have no significant coefficients in all of the 
models tested. 
While in both samples, the variables used to measure interest rate such as 
leverage and debt maturity are statistically significant with a high coefficient. 
The most discriminating variable in the decision to use derivatives in the UK 
and Italian samples is the firm size, because is the only factor that in all the 
models is statistically significant with the higher marginal effect: larger is the firms  
higher is the probability that it is going to hedge by derivative instruments. 
The unique aspect of this research is that it investigates this important issue of 
Italian and United Kingdom non-financial listed Small and Medium Enterprises. 
However it should be noted that a further research is required in this area, 
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especially estimating and managing interest rate and foreign exchange exposure 
and their determinants of UK and Italian firms. 
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Annex A: Univariate logit regression results - UK sample 
Tab. 43 - Univariate Logit of IR (no bias) 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms hedge 
with IR derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust 
standard errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables N Coeff  
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
 Zsc 797 -0.222 *** 0.060 -3.68 0.00 13.52 
 Divyield 394 -0.037   0.045 -0.82 0.41 0.67 
LEVERAGE 
debtequity 627 0.001 * 0.001 1.84 0.07 3.40 
debtcapital 627 -0.032   0.110 -0.29 0.77 0.08 
ltdebtcapital 702 0.589 ** 0.288 2.05 0.04 4.19 
ltdebtequity 702 0.402 *** 0.114 3.52 0.00 12.41 
liabassets 988 0.139   0.274 0.51 0.61 0.26 
gearingrat 1020 0.003 *** 0.001 3.90 0.00 15.19 
Bv 627 0.532 ** 0.232 2.29 0.02 5.25 
Mktv 503 3.301 *** 0.465 7.10 0.00 50.37 
LIQUIDITY 
Crat 1197 -0.067   0.070 -0.96 0.34 0.92 
Qrat 721 -0.243 ** 0.120 -2.03 0.04 4.13 
liquidityratiox 1197 -0.344 *** 0.116 -2.97 0.00 8.80 
shareholdersliqui
dityratiox 
997 -0.019   0.013 -1.49 0.14 2.23 
solvencyratioass
etbased 
11877 -0.001   0.003 -0.52 0.60 0.28 
PROFITABILITY 
Roc 1189 0.001   0.001 1.22 0.22 1.49 
Roe 1145 0.119 * 0.064 1.86 0.06 3.47 
profitmargin 1107 0.012 *** 0.005 2.52 0.01 6.34 
returnonsharehol
dersfunds 
1131 0.002   0.001 1.17 0.24 1.37 
returnontotalass
ets 
1196 0.007 *** 0.003 2.70 0.01 7.28 
ebitmargin 1168 0.012 *** 0.005 2.60 0.01 6.77 
ebitdamargin 1166 0.012 *** 0.004 3.19 0.00 10.19 
grossmargin 1011 -0.002   0.004 -0.41 0.68 0.17 
IC 
Ebitinp 944 0.000   0.000 1.50 0.14 2.24 
ebitdainp 944 0.000   0.000 -0.41 0.68 0.17 
interestcoverx 925 -0.002   0.002 -1.21 0.23 1.46 
assetcoverx 690 -0.011 ** 0.005 -2.27 0.02 5.15 
berryratio 1008 0.115   0.120 0.96 0.34 0.92 
GROWTH OP. capexpsales 293 3.916   2.153 1.35 0.18 1.83 
mkttbrat 934 0.270   0.266 1.02 0.31 1.03 
DEBT MATURITY stborrow 627 -2.226 *** 0.418 -5.33 0.00 28.40 
ltborrow 627 2.226 *** 0.418 5.33 0.00 28.40 
FIRM SIZE 
lnmktcap 934 0.316 *** 0.067 4.74 0.00 22.46 
lntotsales 1130 0.557 *** 0.081 6.88 0.00 47.40 
lntotassets 1146 0.695 *** 0.070 9.94 0.00 98.71 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 1130 -0.583 ** 0.271 -2.15 0.03 4.62 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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Tab. 44 - Univariate Logit of FX (no bias). 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms hedge 
with FX derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust 
standard errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables N Coeff  
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
 Zsc 797 0.586 *** 0.098 5.93 0.00 35.15 
 Divyield 394 0.052   0.052 -0.99 0.32 0.98 
LEVERAGE 
debtequity 627 0.000   0.001 -0.40 0.69 0.16 
debtcapital 627 -0.085   0.065 -1.32 0.19 1.75 
ltdebtcapital 702 -0.805 *** 0.271 -2.97 0.00 8.83 
ltdebtequity 702 -0.183   0.158 -1.16 0.25 1.33 
liabassets 988 -2.542 *** 0.462 -5.50 0.00 30.24 
gearingrat 1020 -0.012 *** 0.004 -3.49 0.00 12.15 
Bv 627 -2.067 *** 0.656 -3.15 0.00 9.91 
Mktv 503 -2.677 *** 0.614 -4.36 0.00 19.03 
LIQUIDITY 
Crat 1197 0.105 *** 0.029 3.59 0.00 12.89 
Qrat 721 0.247 *** 0.067 3.67 0.00 13.48 
liquidityratiox 1197 0.141 *** 0.040 3.49 0.00 12.17 
shareholdersliqui
dityratiox 
997 0.001   0.001 1.33 0.18 1.76 
solvencyratioass
etbased 
1187 0.024 *** 0.004 5.77 0.00 33.28 
PROFITABILITY 
Roc 1189 0.004 *** 0.001 3.45 0.00 11.92 
Roe 1145 0.137   0.093 1.48 0.14 2.19 
profitmargin 1107 0.014 *** 0.003 3.86 0.00 14.93 
returnonsharehol
dersfunds 
1131 0.008 *** 0.002 3.81 0.00 14.50 
returnontotalass
ets 
1196 0.025 *** 0.006 4.21 0.00 17.73 
ebitmargin 1168 0.005 *** 0.002 3.15 0.00 9.92 
ebitdamargin 1166 0.004 *** 0.001 2.75 0.01 7.55 
grossmargin 1011 -0.003   0.004 -0.88 0.38 0.77 
IC 
Ebitinp 944 0.002 *** 0.000 4.03 0.00 16.28 
ebitdainp 944 0.001 *** 0.000 3.90 0.00 15.17 
interestcoverx 925 0.004 *** 0.001 4.13 0.00 17.07 
assetcoverx 690 0.001   0.001 1.49 0.14 2.23 
berryratio 1008 0.111 * 0.061 1.82 0.07 3.32 
GROWTH OP. capexpsales 293 0.888   0.832 1.07 0.29 1.14 
mkttbrat 934 -2.314 *** 0.442 -5.24 0.00 27.42 
DEBT MATURITY stborrow 627 0.359   0.437 0.82 0.41 0.67 
ltborrow 627 -0.359   0.437 -0.82 0.41 0.67 
FIRM SIZE 
lnmktcap 934 0.231 *** 0.065 3.57 0.00 12.75 
lntotsales 1130 0.884 *** 0.107 8.25 0.00 68.14 
lntotassets 1146 0.237 *** 0.053 4.50 0.00 20.24 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 1130 1.514 *** 0.242 6.27 0.00 39.28 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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Annex B: Multivariate logit results – UK sample 
Tab. 45 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (IR no bias). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge with IR derivatives as proxies for incentives to hedge. The dependent 
variable equals 1 if a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), 
marginal effects (ME), odds ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the 
independent variable. The marginal effect (elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent 
variable. The higher the elasticity’ value more important is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-
values are calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
EBIT INT 
PAYMENT 
- 
0.000 
(0.977) 
 
- 
0.000 
(0.977) 
 
 
0.999 
(0.977) 
 
                  
ASSETCOV
ERX 
   
- 
0.010 
(0.048) 
** 
- 
0.231 
(0.049) 
** 
 
0.989 
(0.048) 
** 
               
MKTV       
2.475 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.335 
(0.002) 
*** 
11.883 
(0.002) 
*** 
            
PROFIT 
MARGIN 
         
0.009 
(0.152) 
0.001 
(0.152) 
1.009 
(0.152) 
         
ROA             
- 
0.008 
(0.649) 
- 
0.000 
(0.650) 
 
0.991 
(0.649) 
      
ST 
BORROW 
               
- 
1.595 
(0.011) 
** 
- 
0.216 
(0.008) 
*** 
 
0.202 
(0.011) 
** 
   
LT 
BORROW 
                  
1.595 
(0.011) 
** 
0.216 
(0.008) 
*** 
4.932 
(0.011) 
** 
MKTTBRAT 
- 
0.531 
(0.482) 
 
- 
0.071 
(0.480) 
 
 
0.587 
(0.482) 
 
- 
1.875 
(0.059) 
* 
- 
0.102 
(0.067) 
* 
 
0.153 
(0.059) 
* 
- 
2.796 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
0.379 
(0.011) 
** 
 
0.061 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
1.484 
(0.056) 
* 
- 
0.179 
(0.051) 
* 
 
0.226 
(0.056) 
* 
- 
0.427 
(0.572) 
 
- 
0.051 
(0.571) 
 
 
0.652 
(0.572) 
 
- 
1.976 
(0.051) 
* 
- 
0.268 
(0.044) 
** 
 
0.138 
(0.051) 
* 
- 
1.976 
(0.051) 
* 
- 
0.268 
(0.044) 
** 
 
0.138 
(0.051) 
* 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
- 
0.904 
(0.026) 
** 
- 
0.120 
(0.024) 
** 
 
0.204 
(0.026) 
** 
 
0.829 
(0.061) 
* 
 
0.071 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.436 
(0.061) 
* 
- 
1.070 
(0.026) 
** 
- 
0.145 
(0.024) 
** 
 
0.342 
(0.026) 
** 
- 
1.023 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
0.123 
(0.015) 
** 
 
0.359 
(0.017) 
** 
- 
0.822 
(0.041) 
** 
- 
0.099 
(0.040) 
** 
 
0.439 
(0.041) 
** 
- 
0.941 
(0.060) 
* 
- 
0.128 
(0.056) 
* 
 
0.389 
(0.060) 
* 
- 
0.941 
(0.060) 
* 
- 
0.128 
(0.056) 
* 
 
0.389 
(0.060) 
* 
LN SALES                      
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0.768 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.104 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.157 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.849 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.102 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.337 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.783 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.106 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.188 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.783 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.106 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.188 
(0.000) 
*** 
LN ASSETS 
 
0.660 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.088 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
1.935 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.577 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
0.040 
(0.042) 
** 
 
1.781 
(0.000) 
*** 
      
 
0.733 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.089 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
2.082 
(0.000) 
*** 
      
Q-RATIO 
- 
0.253 
(0.066) 
* 
- 
0.033 
(0.062) 
* 
 
0.776 
(0.066) 
* 
- 
0.328 
(0.043) 
** 
- 
0.040 
(0.042) 
** 
 
0.719 
(0.043) 
** 
- 
0.153 
(0.440) 
 
- 
0.020 
(0.434) 
 
0.858 
(0.440) 
- 
0.319 
(0.044) 
* 
- 
0.038 
(0.037) 
** 
 
0.726 
(0.044) 
** 
- 
0.302 
(0.031) 
** 
- 
0.036 
(0.028) 
** 
 
0.739 
(0.031) 
** 
- 
0.277 
(0.181) 
 
- 
0.037 
(0.173) 
 
0.757 
(0.181) 
- 
0.277 
(0.181) 
 
- 
0.037 
(0.173) 
 
0.757 
(0.181) 
SOLVENCY 
RATIO 
                     
Z-SCORE 
0.204 
(0.281) 
0.027 
(0.275) 
1.226 
(0.281) 
0.274 
(0.204) 
0.033 
(0.194) 
1.35 
(0.204) 
- 
0.070 
(0.709) 
 
- 
0.009 
(0.710) 
 
0.932 
(0.709) 
- 
0.476 
(0.004) 
*** 
- 
0.057 
(0.003) 
*** 
 
0.621 
(0.004) 
*** 
 
0.210 
(0.464) 
 
0.025 
(0.465) 
1.233 
(0.464) 
- 
0.047 
(0.798) 
 
- 
0.006 
(0.799) 
 
 
0.953 
(0.798) 
 
- 
0.047 
(0.798) 
 
- 
0.006 
(0.799) 
 
0.953 
(0.798) 
_cons 
- 
7.577 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
5.749 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
 
0.003 
(0.001) 
*** 
- 
8.113 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
7.971 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
8.432 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
6.818 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
*** 
- 
8.414 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
N. 398 330 310 430 444 310 310 
No. of Users 77 70 65 75 78 63 63 
Classified as Users 35 47 40 30 32 40 40 
Classified as Non-
Users 
42 23 23 45 46 23 23 
Sensitivity 45.45% 67.14% 63.49% 40.00% 41.03% 63.49% 63.49% 
No. of Non-Users 321 260 247 355 366 247 247 
Classified as users 61 68 56 57 55 63 63 
Classified as Non-
Users 
260 192 191 298 311 184 184 
Specificity 81.00% 73.85% 77.33% 83.94% 84.97% 74.49% 74.49% 
Correctly Specified 74.12% 72.42% 74.52% 76.28% 77.25% 72.26% 72.26% 
Chi-Square 44.53% 49.49% 41.40% 42.67% 51.32% 38.62% 38.62% 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-Square 0.1139 0.1451 0.1323 0.1072 0.1244 0.1234 0.1234 
Log pseudo likelihood -173.23633 -145.78173 -135.80085 -177.6772 -180.69657 -137.19141 -137.19141 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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Tab. 46 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (FX no bias). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge with FX derivatives as proxies for incentives to hedge. The dependent 
variable equals 1 if a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), 
marginal effects (ME), odds ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the 
independent variable. The marginal effect (elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent 
variable. The higher the elasticity’ value more important is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-
values are calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
EBIT INT 
PAYMENT 
- 
0.000 
(0.783) 
- 
0.000 
(0.782) 
 
0,999 
(0.783) 
            
ASSETCOV
ERX 
   
0.001 
(0.149) 
0.000 
(0.151) 
1.001 
(0.149) 
         
MKTV       
- 
4.261 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
0.402 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.014 
(0.000) 
*** 
      
PROFIT 
MARGIN 
         
- 
0.022 
(0.008) 
*** 
- 
0.002 
(0.007) 
*** 
 
0.977 
(0.008) 
*** 
   
ROA             
- 
0.072 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
0.009 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.930 
(0.000) 
*** 
ST 
BORROW 
               
LT 
BORROW 
               
MKTTBRAT 
- 
1.937 
(0.020) 
** 
- 
0.254 
(0.016) 
** 
 
0.144 
(0.020) 
** 
- 
0.362 
(0.698) 
 
- 
0.039 
(0.697) 
 
 
0.695 
(0.698) 
 
0.002 
(0.998) 
0.000 
(0.998) 
1.002 
(0.998) 
- 
3.666 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
0.386 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
0.025 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
2.642 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
0.331 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
0.071 
(0.002) 
*** 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
0.558 
(0.134) 
0.073 
(0.138) 
1.747 
(0.134) 
0.702 
(0.121) 
0.077 
(0.125) 
2.019 
(0.121) 
 
0.967 
(0.059) 
* 
 
0.091 
(0.064) 
* 
 
2.630 
(0.059) 
* 
 
0.414 
(0.267) 
 
 
0.043 
(0.270) 
 
 
1.512 
(0.267) 
 
 
0.601 
(0.094) 
* 
 
0.075 
(0.095) 
* 
 
1.823 
(0.094) 
* 
LN SALES       
0.954 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.090 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.597 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.117 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.117 
(0.000) 
*** 
3.055 
(0.000) 
*** 
   
LN ASSETS 
0.301 
(0.024) 
0.039 
(0.018) 
1.352 
(0.024) 
0.296 
(0.073) 
0.032 
(0.060) 
1.345 
(0.073) 
      
0.732 
(0.000) 
0.091 
(0.000) 
2.080 
(0.000) 
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** ** ** * * * *** *** *** 
Q-RATIO 
- 
0.054 
(0.655) 
- 
0.007 
(0.655) 
 
0.947 
(0.655) 
- 
0.030 
(0.856) 
- 
0.003 
(0.856) 
 
0.969 
(0.856) 
 
0.036 
(0.872) 
 
0.003 
(0.872) 
 
1.037 
(0.872) 
- 
0.147 
(0.325) 
- 
0.015 
(0.319) 
 
0.862 
(0.325) 
- 
0.167 
(0.162) 
- 
0.020 
(0.159) 
 
0.845 
(0.162) 
SOLVENCY 
RATIO 
               
Z-SCORE 
0.893 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.117 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.442 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.773 
(0.001) 
*** 
0.085 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.166 
(0.001) 
*** 
0.491 
(0.014) 
** 
0.046 
(0.011) 
** 
1.635 
(0.014) 
** 
1.009 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.106 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.743 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.795 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.225 
(0.000) 
*** 
6.023 
(0.000) 
*** 
_cons 
- 
4.914 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
 
0.007 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
5.825 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
10.739 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
12.336 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
4.4e-06 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
9.899 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 
N. 401 308 298 441 455 
No. of Users 80 48 51 86 89 
Classified as Users 43 20 28 57 54 
Classified as Non-Users 37 28 23 29 35 
Sensitivity 53.75% 41.67% 54.90% 66.28% 60.67% 
No. of Non-Users 321 260 247 355 366 
Classified as users 72 27 39 69 66 
Classified as Non-Users 249 233 208 286 300 
Specificity 77.57% 89.62% 84.21% 80.56% 81.97% 
Correctly Specified 72.82% 82.14% 79.19% 77.78% 77.80% 
Chi-Square 45.80% 23.13% 55.37% 92.37% 71.92% 
Probability 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-Square 0.1143 0.0868 0.2030 0.2122 0.1599 
Log pseudo likelihood -177.48354 -121.71149 -108.70473 -171.41046 -188.92298 
Source: author’s elaboration – FAME database. 
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Annex C: Univariate logit regression results – Italian sample 
Tab. 47 - Univariate Logit of IR (no bias). 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms hedge 
with IR derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust 
standard errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
  Variables N Coeff   
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
  zsc 497 -0.352   0.117 -3.15 0.00 9.91 
LEVERAGE debtequity 497 0.000   0.004 -0.06 0.10 0.00 
 debtcapital 497 0.003   0.008 0.36 0.72 0.13 
 ltdebtcapital 497 0.070   0.039 1.77 0.08 3.14 
 ltdebtequity 497 0.022   0.014 1.59 0.11 2.53 
 liabassets 497 0.151   0.384 0.39 0.70 0.15 
 gearingrat 507 -0.006   0.013 -0.49 0.62 0.24 
 bv 497 -0.231   0.380 -0.61 0.54 0.37 
 mktv 499 0.422   0.264 1.60 0.11 2.56 
LIQUIDITY  crat 497 -0.082 * 0.047 -1.75 0.08 3.07 
 qrat 497 -0.068   0.047 -1.45 0.15 2.11 
 liquidityratiox 497 -0.068   0.047 -1.45 0.15 2.11 
 
shareholdersliq
uidityratiox 
412 -0.002   0.002 -0.08 0.41 0.69 
 
solvencyratioa
ssetbased 
497 4.324   36.346 0.12 0.91 0.01 
PROFITABILITY roc 507 -0.019 * 0.010 -1.84 0.07 3.40 
 roe 507 0.009   0.004 2.31 0.21 5.36 
 profitmargin 485 0.124 ** 0.059 2.11 0.04 4.46 
 
returnonshareh
oldersfunds 
486 0.015   0.024 0.63 0.53 0.40 
 
returnontotalas
sets 
507 0.009   0.006 1.36 0.17 1.85 
 ebitmargin 496 0.108   0.100 1.08 0.28 1.17 
 ebitdamargin 496 0.117   0.116 1.01 0.31 1.02 
IC ebitinp 492 0.001   0.001 0.94 0.35 0.88 
 ebitdainp 492 -0.001   0.001 -1.21 0.23 1.46 
 interestcoverx 492 0.001   0.001 0.94 0.35 0.88 
 assetcoverx 412 -0.002   0.002 -1.03 0.30 1.06 
GROWTH OP mkttbrat 497 -0.047   0.367 -0.13 0.90 0.02 
DEBT 
MATURITY 
stborrow 497 -3.511 *** 0.453 -7.75 0.00 60.13 
 ltborrow 497 3.511 *** 0.453 7.75 0.00 60.13 
FIRM SIZE lnmktcap 333 0.450 *** 0.086 5.21 0.00 27.10 
 lntotsales 496 0.664 *** 0.107 6.19 0.00 38.32 
 lntotassets 497 0.791 *** 0.100 7.94 0.00 62.98 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 92 -0.071   0.484 -0.15 0.88 0.02 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Table 48 - Univariate Logit of FX (no bias). 
This table presents the results from univariate logit regression using a binary variable equal to 1 if firms hedge 
with FX derivatives and 0 if otherwise. The table presents the number of observations, coefficients, robust 
standard errors, z-statistics, p-values and Wald chi-square statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
  Variables N Coeff   
Robust 
std.errors 
Z-stat 
p-
value 
chi2 
  zsc 410 -0.303 ** 0.143 -2.12 0.03 4.50 
LEVERAGE debtequity 410 0.001   0.006 0.23 0.82 0.05 
 debtcapital 410 -0.002   0.015 -0.14 0.89 0.02 
 ltdebtcapital 410 0.044   0.056 0.80 0.42 0.64 
 ltdebtequity 410 0.015   0.018 0.85 0.40 0.07 
 liabassets 410 0.083   0.475 0.18 0.86 0.03 
 gearingrat 419 -0.075 * 0.040 -1.88 0.06 3.54 
 bv 410 0.583   0.555 1.05 0.29 1.10 
 mktv 412 0.100   0.279 9.36 0.72 0.13 
LIQUIDITY  crat 410 -0.135 ** 0.062 -2.18 0.03 4.76 
 qrat 410 -0.135 ** 0.064 -2.09 0.04 4.36 
 liquidityratiox 410 -0.135 ** 0.064 -2.09 0.04 4.36 
 
shareholdersliq
uidityratiox 
330 0.000   0.001 -0.37 0.71 0.14 
 
solvencyratioa
ssetbased 
410 -56.320   52.277 -1.08 0.28 1.16 
PROFITABILITY roc 419 -0.052 *** 0.014 -3.67 0.00 13.48 
 roe 419 0.008 * 0.005 1.67 0.10 2.78 
 profitmargin 398 0.042   0.072 0.58 0.56 0.34 
 
returnonshareh
oldersfunds 
399 0.063 ** 0.031 2.03 0.04 4.11 
 
returnontotalas
sets 
419 -0.005   0.007 -0.68 0.49 0.47 
 ebitmargin 409 -0.194 * 0.101 -1.92 0.06 3.68 
 ebitdamargin 409 -0.233 ** 0.114 -2.04 0.04 4.16 
IC ebitinp 405 0.000   0.001 0.16 0.87 0.03 
 ebitdainp 405 -0.001   0.001 -1.55 0.12 2.39 
 interestcoverx 405 0.000   0.001 0.16 0.87 0.03 
 assetcoverx 330 -0.001   0.000 -1.22 0.22 1.48 
GROWTH OP mkttbrat 410 0.527   0.525 1.00 0.32 1.01 
DEBT 
MATURITY 
stborrow 410 -2.549 *** 0.574 -4.44 0.00 19.70 
 ltborrow 410 2.549 *** 0.574 4.44 0.00 19.70 
FIRM SIZE lnmktcap 259 0.667 *** 0.138 4.84 0.00 23.38 
 lntotsales 409 0.389 *** 0.124 3.14 0.00 9.89 
 lntotassets 410 0.728 *** 0.121 6.02 0.00 36.25 
FOREIGN 
EXPOSURE 
foreignsales 62 0.954   0.652 1.46 0.14 2.14 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Annex D: Multivariate logit results - Italian sample 
Tab. 49 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (IR no bias). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge with IR derivatives as proxies for incentives to hedge. The dependent variable 
equals 1 if a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), marginal effects 
(ME), odds ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the independent variable. The marginal 
effect (elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent variable. The higher the elasticity’ value more 
important is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-values are calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
LT DEBT 
CAPITAL 
2.554 
(0.007) 
*** 
0.285 
(0.000) 
*** 
12.862 
(0.007) 
*** 
                  
GEARING 
RATIO 
   
0.537 
(0.033) 
** 
0.103 
(0.004) 
*** 
1.711 
(0.033) 
** 
               
ROC       
- 
o.024 
(0.468) 
- 
0.005 
(0.468) 
 
0.975 
(0.468) 
            
ROE          
0.002 
(0.873) 
0.000 
(0.873) 
1.002 
(0.873) 
         
EBITDA INT 
PAY 
            
- 
0.043 
(0.078) 
* 
- 
0.010 
(0.088) 
* 
 
0.957 
(0.078) 
* 
      
ST 
BORROW 
               
- 
4.074 
(0.004) 
*** 
- 
0.931 
(0.003) 
*** 
 
0.017 
(0.004) 
*** 
   
LT 
BORROW 
                  
4.074 
(0.004) 
*** 
0.931 
(0.003) 
*** 
58.793 
(0.004) 
*** 
MKTTBRAT 
- 
2.124 
(0.405) 
- 
0.237 
(0.456) 
 
0.119 
(0.405) 
- 
1.913 
(0.447) 
- 
0.369 
(0.459) 
 
0.147 
(0.447) 
- 
1.931 
(0.411) 
- 
0.459 
(0.411) 
 
0.144 
(0.411) 
- 
2.076 
(0.390) 
- 
0.494 
(0.390) 
 
0.125 
(0.390) 
- 
1.073 
(0.664) 
- 
0.260 
(0.664) 
 
0.341 
(0.664) 
- 
0.713 
(0.776) 
- 
0.163 
(0.777) 
 
0.490 
(0.776) 
- 
0.713 
(0.776) 
 
- 
0.163 
(0.777) 
 
 
0.490 
(0.776) 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
- 
0.022 
(0.972) 
- 
0.002 
(0.972) 
 
0.978 
(0.972) 
- 
0.048 
(0.936) 
- 
0.009 
(0.936) 
 
0.952 
(0.936) 
- 
0.068 
(0.899) 
- 
0.016 
(0.899) 
 
0.934 
(0.899) 
- 
0.104 
(0.847) 
- 
0.024 
(0.847) 
 
0.901 
(0.847) 
- 
0.184 
(0.733) 
- 
0.044 
(0.733) 
 
0.831 
(0.733) 
 
0.074 
(0.904) 
 
0.016 
(0.904) 
 
1.077 
(0.904) 
 
0.074 
(0.904) 
 
0.016 
(0.904) 
 
1.077 
(0.904) 
LN ASSETS 
1.605 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.179 
(0.087) 
* 
4.981 
(0.002) 
*** 
2.049 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.395 
(0.000) 
*** 
7.761 
(0.000) 
*** 
2.141 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.509 
(0.000) 
*** 
8.514 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.998 
(0.000) 
*** 
0.475 
(0.000) 
*** 
7.378 
(0.000) 
*** 
1.754 
(0.001) 
*** 
0.425 
(0.001) 
*** 
5.782 
(0.001) 
*** 
1.396 
(0.011) 
** 
0.319 
(0.011) 
** 
4.041 
(0.011) 
** 
1.396 
(0.011) 
** 
0.319 
(0.011) 
** 
4.041 
(0.011) 
** 
 134 
 
CRATIO 
 
0.304 
(0.124) 
 
 
0.034 
(0.177) 
 
 
1.356 
(0.124) 
 
 
0.373 
(0.085) 
* 
 
0.072 
(0.062) 
* 
 
1.453 
(0.085) 
* 
 
0.193 
(0.333) 
 
0.045 
(0.329) 
 
1.213 
(0.333) 
 
0.194 
(0.316) 
 
0.046 
(0.255) 
 
1.214 
(0.316) 
 
0.315 
(0.219) 
 
0.076 
(0.213) 
 
1.371 
(0.219) 
0.014 
(0.954) 
0.003 
(0.954) 
1.014 
(0.954) 
0.014 
(0.954) 
0.003 
(0.954) 
1.014 
(0.954) 
Z-SCORE 
0.309 
(0.389) 
0.034 
(0.454) 
1.362 
(0.389) 
0.331 
(0.351) 
0.064 
(0.366) 
1.392 
(0.351) 
 
0.630 
(0.098) 
* 
 
0.150 
(0.099) 
* 
 
1.878 
(0.098) 
* 
0.449 
(0.255) 
0.106 
(0.255) 
1.567 
(0.255) 
 
0.750 
(0.052) 
* 
 
0.181 
(0.057) 
* 
 
2.118 
(0.052) 
* 
 
0.484 
(0.167) 
 
0.110 
(0.172) 
1.623 
(0.167) 
0.484 
(0.167) 
0.110 
(0.172) 
1.623 
(0.167) 
_cons 
- 
17.555 
(0.007) 
*** 
 
 
2.3e-08 
(0.007) 
*** 
- 
23.261 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
7.9e-11 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
22.915 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
1.1e-10 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
21.075 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
 
7.0e-10 
(0.000) 
*** 
- 
19.238 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
 
4.4e-09 
(0.001) 
*** 
- 
12.297 
(0.065) 
* 
 
 
4.5e-06 
(0.065) 
* 
- 
16.371 
(0.010) 
*** 
 
 
7.7e-08 
(0.010) 
*** 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
N. 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
No. of Users 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Classified as Users 43 44 43 43 46 43 43 
Classified as Non-Users 10 9 10 10 7 10 10 
Sensitivity 81.13% 83.02% 81.13% 81.13% 86.79% 81.13% 81.13% 
No. of Non-Users 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Classified as users 8 9 13 13 14 10 10 
Classified as Non-Users 30 29 25 25 24 28 28 
Specificity 78.95% 76.32% 65.79% 65.79% 63.16% 73.68% 73.68% 
Correctly Specified 80.22% 80.22% 74.73% 74.73% 76.92% 78.02% 78.02% 
Chi-Square 41.14% 36.17% 28.92% 28.41% 34.20% 38.04% 38.04% 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-Square 0.3327 0.2925 0.2339 0.2298 0.2765 0.3076 0.3076 
Log pseudo likelihood -41.264965 -43.749998 -47.373148 -47.627049 -44.735995 -42.816868 -42.816868 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Tab. 50 - Logit Regression on the probability of hedging (FX no bias). 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the probability that a firm hedge with FX exposure as proxies for incentives to hedge. The dependent variable 
equals 1 if a firm provides qualitative information of any derivative use in the annual report, an 0 if otherwise. The model presents log of odds coefficients (Coef.), marginal effects 
(ME), odds ratios and the respective p-values in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients give the change in the logit function given a change in the independent variable. The marginal 
effect (elasticities) measures the actual change (percentage change) in the probability of hedging for 1% increase in the independent variable. The higher the elasticity’ value more 
important is the variable in the model. The odds ratio gives the likelihood of Y = 1 when X is increased by one unit. The p-values are calculated using the robust (heteroscedastic) 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Indep. 
Variables 
MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds Coeff. ME Odds 
LT DEBT 
CAPITAL 
3.311 
(0.001) 
*** 
0.773 
(0.002) 
*** 
27.427 
(0.001) 
*** 
                  
GEARING 
RATIO 
   
1.553 
(0.001) 
*** 
0.326 
(0.001) 
*** 
4.726 
(0.001) 
*** 
               
ROC       
- 
0.068 
(0.123) 
- 
0.015 
(0.111) 
 
0.933 
(0.123) 
            
ROE          
- 
0.030 
(0.244) 
- 
0.006 
(0.234) 
 
0.970 
(0.244) 
         
EBITDA INT 
PAY 
            
- 
0.075 
(0.045) 
** 
- 
0.014 
(0.005) 
*** 
 
0.927 
(0.045) 
** 
      
ST 
BORROW 
               
- 
5.271 
(0.003) 
*** 
- 
1.200 
(0.004) 
*** 
 
0.005 
(0.003) 
*** 
   
LT 
BORROW 
                  
5.271 
(0.003) 
*** 
1.200 
(0.004) 
*** 
194.706 
(0.003) 
*** 
MKTTBRAT 
- 
1.214 
(0.824) 
- 
0.283 
(0.825) 
 
0.296 
(0.824) 
- 
1.929 
(0.742) 
- 
0.406 
(0.741) 
 
0.145 
(0.742) 
 
1.288 
(0.770) 
 
0.288 
(0.769) 
 
3.628 
(0.770) 
 
1.361 
(0.771) 
 
0.307 
(0.770) 
 
3.903 
(0.771) 
- 
0.645 
(0.891) 
- 
0.121 
(0.891) 
 
0.524 
(0.891) 
 
1.559 
(0.772) 
 
0.355 
(0.771) 
 
4.755 
(0.772) 
 
1.559 
(0.772) 
 
0.355 
(0.771) 
 
4.755 
(0.772) 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
1.825 
(0.260) 
0.426 
(0.268) 
6.203 
(0.260) 
2.916 
(0.113) 
0.613 
(0.113) 
 
18.477 
(0.006) 
*** 
0.989 
(0.307) 
0.221 
(0.310) 
2.689 
(0.307) 
1.107 
(0.381) 
0.249 
(0.385) 
3.025 
(0.381) 
1.157 
(0.417) 
0.217 
(0.428) 
3.180 
(0.417) 
2.151 
(0.177) 
0.489 
(0.188) 
8.596 
(0.177) 
2.151 
(0.177) 
0.489 
(0.188) 
8.596 
(0.177) 
LN ASSETS 
0.034 
(0.959) 
0.008 
(0.959) 
1.035 
(0.959) 
 
2.069 
(0.006) 
*** 
 
0.435 
(0.004) 
*** 
 
7.919 
(0.006) 
*** 
 
1.305 
(0.019) 
** 
 
0.292 
(0.016) 
** 
 
3.688 
(0.019) 
** 
 
1.349 
(0.030) 
** 
 
0.304 
(0.024) 
** 
 
3.855 
(0.030) 
** 
 
1.078 
(0.055) 
* 
 
0.202 
(0.048) 
** 
 
2.940 
(0.055) 
* 
 
0.055 
(0.925) 
 
0.012 
(0.965) 
 
1.057 
(0.925) 
 
0.055 
(0.925) 
 
0.012 
(0.925) 
 
1.057 
(0.925) 
CRATIO 
- 
0.421 
- 
0.098 
 
0.655 
 
0.614 
 
0.129 
 
1.849 
- 
0.537 
- 
0.120 
 
0.584 
- 
0.618 
- 
0.139 
 
0.538 
- 
0.069 
- 
0.013 
 
0.932 
- 
1.032 
- 
0.235 
 
0.355 
- 
1.032 
- 
0.235 
 
0.355 
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(0.466) 
 
(0.461) 
 
(0.466) 
 
(0.204) 
 
(0.195) 
 
(0.204) 
 
(0.308) 
 
(0.296) 
 
(0.308) 
 
(0.265) 
 
(0.251) 
 
(0.265) 
 
(0.903) 
 
(0.903) 
 
(0.903) 
 
(0.089) 
* 
(0.080) 
* 
(0.089) 
* 
(0.089) 
* 
(0.080) 
* 
(0.089) 
* 
Z-SCORE 
0.258 
(0.677) 
0.060 
(0.676) 
1.295 
(0.677) 
0.848 
(0.183) 
0.178 
(0.172) 
2.336 
(0.183) 
0.934 
(0.098) 
* 
0.209 
(0.087) 
* 
2.545 
(0.098) 
* 
1.236 
(0.134) 
 
0.279 
(0.121) 
 
3.444 
(0.134) 
 
1.379 
(0.074) 
* 
0.258 
(0.039) 
** 
3.972 
(0.074) 
* 
0.593 
(0.279) 
 
0.135 
(0.281) 
 
1.810 
(0.279) 
 
0.593 
(0.279) 
 
0.135 
(0.281) 
 
1.810 
(0.279) 
 
_cons 
- 
1.162 
(0.876) 
 
 
0.312 
(0.876) 
- 
28.647 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
 
3.6e-13 
(0.002) 
*** 
- 
16.407 
(0.023) 
** 
 
 
7.4e-08 
(0.023) 
** 
- 
17.018 
(0.038) 
** 
 
 
4.0e-08 
(0.038) 
** 
- 
12.874 
(0.058) 
* 
 
 
2.5e-06 
(0.058) 
* 
1.866 
(0.796) 
 
6.468 
(0.796) 
- 
3.404 
(0.600) 
 
 
0.033 
(0.600) 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
Summary Statistic for Logit Regression. 
Statistics MOD.1 MOD.2 MOD.3 MOD.4 MOD.5 MOD.6 MOD.7 
N. 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
No. of Users 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Classified as Users 13 14 11 10 11 10 10 
Classified as Non-Users 10 9 12 13 12 13 13 
Sensitivity 56.52% 60.87% 47.83% 43.38% 47.83% 43.38% 43.38% 
No. of Non-Users 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Classified as users 4 5 6 6 8 6 6 
Classified as Non-Users 34 33 32 32 30 32 32 
Specificity 89.47% 86.84% 84.21% 84.21% 78.95% 84.21% 84.21% 
Correctly Specified 77.05% 77.05% 70.49% 68.85% 67.21% 68.85% 68.85% 
Chi-Square 23.93% 26.48% 11.53% 10.37% 16.78% 20.01% 20.01% 
Probability 0.0005 0.0002 0.0734 0.1101 0.0101 0.0028 0.0028 
Pseudo R-Square 0.2960 0.3276 0.1426 0.1282 0.2076 0.2475 0.2475 
Log pseudo likelihood -28.454006 -27.179225 -34.654963 -35.236036 -32.029625 -30.413871 -30.41387 
Source: author’s elaboration – AIDA database and Annual Reports for foreign sales measure. 
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Annex E: Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities SIC 2007 
Tab.51 – SIC 2007. 
Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (SIC) is used to classify business establishments and 
other standard units by the type of economic activity in which they are engaged. The new version of these 
codes (SIC 2007) was adopted by the UK as from 1st January 2008. 
SIC 2007 Description 
SECTION 
A 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
01110 Growing of cereals (except rice), leguminous crops and oil seeds 
01120 Growing of rice 
01130 Growing of vegetables and melons, roots and tubers 
01140 Growing of sugar cane 
01150 Growing of tobacco 
01160 Growing of fibre crops 
01190 Growing of other non-perennial crops 
01210 Growing of grapes 
01220 Growing of tropical and subtropical fruits 
01230 Growing of citrus fruits 
01240 Growing of pome fruits and stone fruits 
01250 Growing of other tree and bush fruits and nuts 
01260 Growing of oleaginous fruits 
01270 Growing of beverage crops 
01280 Growing of spices, aromatic, drug and pharmaceutical crops 
01290 Growing of other perennial crops 
01300 Plant propagation 
01410 Raising of dairy cattle 
01420 Raising of other cattle and buffaloes 
01430 Raising of horses and other equines 
01440 Raising of camels and camelids 
01450 Raising of sheep and goats 
01460 Raising of swine/pigs 
01470 Raising of poultry 
01490 Raising of other animals 
01500 Mixed farming 
01610 Support activities for crop production 
01621 Farm animal boarding and care 
01629 Support activities for animal production (other than farm animal boarding and care) n.e.c. 
01630 Post-harvest crop activities 
01640 Seed processing for propagation 
01700 Hunting, trapping and related service activities 
02100 Silviculture and other forestry activities 
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02200 Logging 
02300 Gathering of wild growing non-wood products 
02400 Support services to forestry 
03110 Marine fishing 
03120 Freshwater fishing 
03210 Marine aquaculture 
03220 Freshwater aquaculture 
SECTION 
B 
Mining and Quarrying 
05101 Deep coal mines 
05102 Open cast coal working 
05200 Mining of lignite 
06100 Extraction of crude petroleum 
06200 Extraction of natural gas 
07100 Mining of iron ores 
07210 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
07290 Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores 
08110 Quarrying of ornamental and building stone, limestone, gypsum, chalk and slate 
08120 Operation of gravel and sand pits; mining of clays and kaolin 
08910 Mining of chemical and fertilizer minerals 
08920 Extraction of peat 
08930 Extraction of salt 
08990 Other mining and quarrying n.e.c. 
09100 Support activities for petroleum and natural gas mining 
09900 Support activities for other mining and quarrying 
SECTION 
C 
Manufacturing 
10110 Processing and preserving of meat 
10120 Processing and preserving of poultry meat 
10130 Production of meat and poultry meat products 
10200 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs 
10310 Processing and preserving of potatoes 
10320 Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice 
10390 Other processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 
10410 Manufacture of oils and fats 
10420 Manufacture of margarine and similar edible fats 
10511 Liquid milk and cream production 
10512 Butter and cheese production 
10519 Manufacture of other milk products 
10520 Manufacture of ice cream 
10611 Grain milling 
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10612 Manufacture of breakfast cereals and cereals-based food 
10620 Manufacture of starches and starch products 
10710 Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes 
10720 Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved pastry goods and cakes 
10730 Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products 
10810 Manufacture of sugar 
10821 Manufacture of cocoa and chocolate confectionery 
10822 Manufacture of sugar confectionery 
10831 Tea processing 
10832 Production of coffee and coffee substitutes 
10840 Manufacture of condiments and seasonings 
10850 Manufacture of prepared meals and dishes 
10860 Manufacture of homogenized food preparations and dietetic food 
10890 Manufacture of other food products n.e.c. 
10910 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals 
10920 Manufacture of prepared pet foods 
11010 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 
11020 Manufacture of wine from grape 
11030 Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines 
11040 Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages 
11050 Manufacture of beer 
11060 Manufacture of malt 
11070 Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters and other bottled waters 
12000 Manufacture of tobacco products 
13100 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres 
13200 Weaving of textiles 
13300 Finishing of textiles 
13910 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics 
13921 Manufacture of soft furnishings 
13922 manufacture of canvas goods, sacks, etc. 
13923 manufacture of household textiles 
13931 Manufacture of woven or tufted carpets and rugs 
13939 Manufacture of other carpets and rugs 
13940 Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and netting 
13950 Manufacture of non-wovens and articles made from non-wovens, except apparel 
13960 Manufacture of other technical and industrial textiles 
13990 Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c. 
14110 Manufacture of leather clothes 
14120 Manufacture of workwear 
14131 Manufacture of other men's outerwear 
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14132 Manufacture of other women's outerwear 
14141 Manufacture of men's underwear 
14142 Manufacture of women's underwear 
14190 Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories n.e.c. 
14200 Manufacture of articles of fur 
14310 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery 
14390 Manufacture of other knitted and crocheted apparel 
15110 Tanning and dressing of leather; dressing and dyeing of fur 
15120 Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness 
15200 Manufacture of footwear 
16100 Sawmilling and planing of wood 
16210 Manufacture of veneer sheets and wood-based panels 
16220 Manufacture of assembled parquet floors 
16230 Manufacture of other builders' carpentry and joinery 
16240 Manufacture of wooden containers 
16290 Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting 
materials 
17110 Manufacture of pulp 
17120 Manufacture of paper and paperboard 
17211 Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard, sacks and bags 
17219 Manufacture of other paper and paperboard containers 
17220 Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of toilet requisites 
17230 Manufacture of paper stationery 
17240 Manufacture of wallpaper 
17290 Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard n.e.c. 
18110 Printing of newspapers 
18121 Manufacture of printed labels 
18129 Printing n.e.c. 
18130 Pre-press and pre-media services 
18140 Binding and related services 
18201 Reproduction of sound recording 
18202 Reproduction of video recording 
18203 Reproduction of computer media 
19100 Manufacture of coke oven products 
19201 Mineral oil refining 
19209 Other treatment of petroleum products (excluding petrochemicals manufacture) 
20110 Manufacture of industrial gases 
20120 Manufacture of dyes and pigments 
20130 Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals 
20140 Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals 
20150 Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 
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20160 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms 
20170 Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms 
20200 Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical products 
20301 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, mastics and sealants 
20302 Manufacture of printing ink 
20411 Manufacture of soap and detergents 
20412 Manufacture of cleaning and polishing preparations 
20420 Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations 
20510 Manufacture of explosives 
20520 Manufacture of glues 
20530 Manufacture of essential oils 
20590 Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 
20600 Manufacture of man-made fibres 
21100 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 
21200 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 
22110 Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes; retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyres 
22190 Manufacture of other rubber products 
22210 Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles 
22220 Manufacture of plastic packing goods 
22230 Manufacture of builders ware of plastic 
22290 Manufacture of other plastic products 
23110 Manufacture of flat glass 
23120 Shaping and processing of flat glass 
23130 Manufacture of hollow glass 
23140 Manufacture of glass fibres 
23190 Manufacture and processing of other glass, including technical glassware 
23200 Manufacture of refractory products 
23310 Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags 
23320 Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay 
23410 Manufacture of ceramic household and ornamental articles 
23420 Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures 
23430 Manufacture of ceramic insulators and insulating fittings 
23440 Manufacture of other technical ceramic products 
23490 Manufacture of other ceramic products n.e.c. 
23510 Manufacture of cement 
23520 Manufacture of lime and plaster 
23610 Manufacture of concrete products for construction purposes 
23620 Manufacture of plaster products for construction purposes 
23630 Manufacture of ready-mixed concrete 
23640 Manufacture of mortars 
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23650 Manufacture of fibre cement 
23690 Manufacture of other articles of concrete, plaster and cement 
23700 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 
23910 Production of abrasive products 
23990 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 
24100 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 
24200 Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related fittings, of steel 
24310 Cold drawing of bars 
24320 Cold rolling of narrow strip 
24330 Cold forming or folding 
24340 Cold drawing of wire 
24410 Precious metals production 
24420 Aluminium production 
24430 Lead, zinc and tin production 
24440 Copper production 
24450 Other non-ferrous metal production 
24460 Processing of nuclear fuel 
24510 Casting of iron 
24520 Casting of steel 
24530 Casting of light metals 
24540 Casting of other non-ferrous metals 
25110 Manufacture of metal structures and parts of structures 
25120 Manufacture of doors and windows of metal 
25210 Manufacture of central heating radiators and boilers 
25290 Manufacture of other tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal 
25300 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers 
25400 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 
25500 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy 
25610 Treatment and coating of metals 
25620 Machining 
25710 Manufacture of cutlery 
25720 Manufacture of locks and hinges 
25730 Manufacture of tools 
25910 Manufacture of steel drums and similar containers 
25920 Manufacture of light metal packaging 
25930 Manufacture of wire products, chain and springs 
25940 Manufacture of fasteners and screw machine products 
25990 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c. 
26110 Manufacture of electronic components 
26120 Manufacture of loaded electronic boards 
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26200 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 
26301 Manufacture of telegraph and telephone apparatus and equipment 
26309 Manufacture of communication equipment other than telegraph, and telephone apparatus and 
equipment 
26400 Manufacture of consumer electronics 
26511 Manufacture of electronic measuring, testing etc. equipment, not for industrial process control 
26512 Manufacture of electronic industrial process control equipment 
26513 Manufacture of non-electronic measuring, testing etc. equipment, not for industrial process 
control 
26514 Manufacture of non-electronic industrial process control equipment 
26520 Manufacture of watches and clocks 
26600 Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic equipment 
26701 Manufacture of optical precision instruments 
26702 Manufacture of photographic and cinematographic equipment 
26800 Manufacture of magnetic and optical media 
27110 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 
27120 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 
27200 Manufacture of batteries and accumulators 
27310 Manufacture of fibre optic cables 
27320 Manufacture of other electronic and electric wires and cables 
27330 Manufacture of wiring devices 
27400 Manufacture of electric lighting equipment 
27510 Manufacture of electric domestic appliances 
27520 Manufacture of non-electric domestic appliances 
27900 Manufacture of other electrical equipment 
28110 Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines 
28120 Manufacture of fluid power equipment 
28131 Manufacture of pumps 
28132 Manufacture of compressors 
28140 Manufacture of taps and valves 
28150 Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements 
28210 Manufacture of ovens, furnaces and furnace burners 
28220 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment 
28230 Manufacture of office machinery and equipment (except computers and peripheral equipment) 
28240 Manufacture of power-driven hand tools 
28250 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment 
28290 Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery n.e.c. 
28301 Manufacture of agricultural tractors 
28302 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery other than tractors 
28410 Manufacture of metal forming machinery 
28490 Manufacture of other machine tools 
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28910 Manufacture of machinery for metallurgy 
28921 Manufacture of machinery for mining 
28922 Manufacture of earthmoving equipment 
28923 Manufacture of equipment for concrete crushing and screening and roadworks 
28930 Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing 
28940 Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production 
28950 Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard production 
28960 Manufacture of plastics and rubber machinery 
28990 Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery n.e.c. 
29100 Manufacture of motor vehicles 
29201 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles (except caravans) 
29202 Manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers 
29203 Manufacture of caravans 
29310 Manufacture of electrical and electronic equipment for motor vehicles and their engines 
29320 Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
30110 Building of ships and floating structures 
30120 Building of pleasure and sporting boats 
30200 Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock 
30300 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery 
30400 Manufacture of military fighting vehicles 
30910 Manufacture of motorcycles 
30920 Manufacture of bicycles and invalid carriages 
30990 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 
31010 Manufacture of office and shop furniture 
31020 Manufacture of kitchen furniture 
31030 Manufacture of mattresses 
31090 Manufacture of other furniture 
32110 Striking of coins 
32120 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 
32130 Manufacture of imitation jewellery and related articles 
32200 Manufacture of musical instruments 
32300 Manufacture of sports goods 
32401 Manufacture of professional and arcade games and toys 
32409 Manufacture of other games and toys, n.e.c. 
32500 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies 
32910 Manufacture of brooms and brushes 
32990 Other manufacturing n.e.c. 
33110 Repair of fabricated metal products 
33120 Repair of machinery 
33130 Repair of electronic and optical equipment 
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33140 Repair of electrical equipment 
33150 Repair and maintenance of ships and boats 
33160 Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft 
33170 Repair and maintenance of other transport equipment n.e.c. 
33190 Repair of other equipment 
33200 Installation of industrial machinery and equipment 
SECTION 
D 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
35110 Production of electricity 
35120 Transmission of electricity 
35130 Distribution of electricity 
35140 Trade of electricity 
35210 Manufacture of gas 
35220 Distribution of gaseous fuels through mains 
35230 Trade of gas through mains 
35300 Steam and air conditioning supply 
SECTION 
E 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
36000 Water collection, treatment and supply 
37000 Sewerage 
38110 Collection of non-hazardous waste 
38120 Collection of hazardous waste 
38210 Treatment and disposal of non-hazardous waste 
38220 Treatment and disposal of hazardous waste 
38310 Dismantling of wrecks 
38320 Recovery of sorted materials 
39000 Remediation activities and other waste management services 
SECTION 
F 
Construction 
41100 Development of building projects 
41201 Construction of commercial buildings 
41202 Construction of domestic buildings 
42110 Construction of roads and motorways 
42120 Construction of railways and underground railways 
42130 Construction of bridges and tunnels 
42210 Construction of utility projects for fluids 
42220 Construction of utility projects for electricity and telecommunications 
42910 Construction of water projects 
42990 Construction of other civil engineering projects n.e.c. 
43110 Demolition 
43120 Site preparation 
 146 
 
43130 Test drilling and boring 
43210 Electrical installation 
43220 Plumbing, heat and air-conditioning installation 
43290 Other construction installation 
43310 Plastering 
43320 Joinery installation 
43330 Floor and wall covering 
43341 Painting 
43342 Glazing 
43390 Other building completion and finishing 
43910 Roofing activities 
43991 Scaffold erection 
43999 Other specialised construction activities n.e.c. 
SECTION 
G 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
45111 Sale of new cars and light motor vehicles 
45112 Sale of used cars and light motor vehicles 
45190 Sale of other motor vehicles 
45200 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
45310 Wholesale trade of motor vehicle parts and accessories 
45320 Retail trade of motor vehicle parts and accessories 
45400 Sale, maintenance and repair of motorcycles and related parts and accessories 
46110 Agents selling agricultural raw materials, livestock, textile raw materials and semi-finished 
goods 
46120 Agents involved in the sale of fuels, ores, metals and industrial chemicals 
46130 Agents involved in the sale of timber and building materials 
46140 Agents involved in the sale of machinery, industrial equipment, ships and aircraft 
46150 Agents involved in the sale of furniture, household goods, hardware and ironmongery 
46160 Agents involved in the sale of textiles, clothing, fur, footwear and leather goods 
46170 Agents involved in the sale of food, beverages and tobacco 
46180 Agents specialised in the sale of other particular products 
46190 Agents involved in the sale of a variety of goods 
46210 Wholesale of grain, unmanufactured tobacco, seeds and animal feeds 
46220 Wholesale of flowers and plants 
46230 Wholesale of live animals 
46240 Wholesale of hides, skins and leather 
46310 Wholesale of fruit and vegetables 
46320 Wholesale of meat and meat products 
46330 Wholesale of dairy products, eggs and edible oils and fats 
46341 Wholesale of fruit and vegetable juices, mineral water and soft drinks 
46342 Wholesale of wine, beer, spirits and other alcoholic beverages 
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46350 Wholesale of tobacco products 
46360 Wholesale of sugar and chocolate and sugar confectionery 
46370 Wholesale of coffee, tea, cocoa and spices 
46380 Wholesale of other food, including fish, crustaceans and molluscs 
46390 Non-specialised wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco 
46410 Wholesale of textiles 
46420 Wholesale of clothing and footwear 
46431 Wholesale of audio tapes, records, CDs and video tapes and the equipment on which these 
are played 
46439 Wholesale of radio, television goods & electrical household appliances (other than records, 
tapes, CD's & video tapes and the equipment used for playing them) 
46440 Wholesale of china and glassware and cleaning materials 
46450 Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics 
46460 Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods 
46470 Wholesale of furniture, carpets and lighting equipment 
46480 Wholesale of watches and jewellery 
46491 Wholesale of musical instruments 
46499 Wholesale of household goods (other than musical instruments) n.e.c 
46510 Wholesale of computers, computer peripheral equipment and software 
46520 Wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts 
46610 Wholesale of agricultural machinery, equipment and supplies 
46620 Wholesale of machine tools 
46630 Wholesale of mining, construction and civil engineering machinery 
46640 Wholesale of machinery for the textile industry and of sewing and knitting machines 
46650 Wholesale of office furniture 
46660 Wholesale of other office machinery and equipment 
46690 Wholesale of other machinery and equipment 
46711 Wholesale of petroleum and petroleum products 
46719 Wholesale of other fuels and related products 
46720 Wholesale of metals and metal ores 
46730 Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary equipment 
46740 Wholesale of hardware, plumbing and heating equipment and supplies 
46750 Wholesale of chemical products 
46760 Wholesale of other intermediate products 
46770 Wholesale of waste and scrap 
46900 Non-specialised wholesale trade 
47110 Retail sale in non-specialised stores with food, beverages or tobacco predominating 
47190 Other retail sale in non-specialised stores 
47210 Retail sale of fruit and vegetables in specialised stores 
47220 Retail sale of meat and meat products in specialised stores 
47230 Retail sale of fish, crustaceans and molluscs in specialised stores 
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47240 Retail sale of bread, cakes, flour confectionery and sugar confectionery in specialised stores 
47250 Retail sale of beverages in specialised stores 
47260 Retail sale of tobacco products in specialised stores 
47290 Other retail sale of food in specialised stores 
47300 Retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised stores 
47410 Retail sale of computers, peripheral units and software in specialised stores 
47421 Retail sale of mobile telephones 
47429 Retail sale of telecommunications equipment other than mobile telephones 
47430 Retail sale of audio and video equipment in specialised stores 
47510 Retail sale of textiles in specialised stores 
47520 Retail sale of hardware, paints and glass in specialised stores 
47530 Retail sale of carpets, rugs, wall and floor coverings in specialised stores 
47540 Retail sale of electrical household appliances in specialised stores 
47591 Retail sale of musical instruments and scores 
47599 Retail of furniture, lighting, and similar (not musical instruments or scores) in specialised store 
47610 Retail sale of books in specialised stores 
47620 Retail sale of newspapers and stationery in specialised stores 
47630 Retail sale of music and video recordings in specialised stores 
47640 Retail sale of sports goods, fishing gear, camping goods, boats and bicycles 
47650 Retail sale of games and toys in specialised stores 
47710 Retail sale of clothing in specialised stores 
47721 Retail sale of footwear in specialised stores 
47722 Retail sale of leather goods in specialised stores 
47730 Dispensing chemist in specialised stores 
47741 Retail sale of hearing aids 
47749 Retail sale of medical and orthopaedic goods in specialised stores (not incl. hearing aids) 
n.e.c. 
47750 Retail sale of cosmetic and toilet articles in specialised stores 
47760 Retail sale of flowers, plants, seeds, fertilizers, pet animals and pet food in specialised stores 
47770 Retail sale of watches and jewellery in specialised stores 
47781 Retail sale in commercial art galleries 
47782 Retail sale by opticians 
47789 Other retail sale of new goods in specialised stores (not commercial art galleries and 
opticians) 
47791 Retail sale of antiques including antique books in stores 
47799 Retail sale of other second-hand goods in stores (not incl. antiques) 
47810 Retail sale via stalls and markets of food, beverages and tobacco products 
47820 Retail sale via stalls and markets of textiles, clothing and footwear 
47890 Retail sale via stalls and markets of other goods 
47910 Retail sale via mail order houses or via Internet 
47990 Other retail sale not in stores, stalls or markets 
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SECTION 
H 
Transportation and storage 
49100 Passenger rail transport, interurban 
49200 Freight rail transport 
49311 Urban and suburban passenger railway transportation by underground, metro and similar 
systems 
49319 Other urban, suburban or metropolitan passenger land transport (not underground, metro or 
similar) 
49320 Taxi operation 
49390 Other passenger land transport 
49410 Freight transport by road 
49420 Removal services 
49500 Transport via pipeline 
50100 Sea and coastal passenger water transport 
50200 Sea and coastal freight water transport 
50300 Inland passenger water transport 
50400 Inland freight water transport 
51101 Scheduled passenger air transport 
51102 Non-scheduled passenger air transport 
51210 Freight air transport 
51220 Space transport 
52101 Operation of warehousing and storage facilities for water transport activities 
52102 Operation of warehousing and storage facilities for air transport activities 
52103 Operation of warehousing and storage facilities for land transport activities 
52211 Operation of rail freight terminals 
52212 Operation of rail passenger facilities at railway stations 
52213 Operation of bus and coach passenger facilities at bus and coach stations 
52219 Other service activities incidental to land transportation, n.e.c. 
52220 Service activities incidental to water transportation 
52230 Service activities incidental to air transportation 
52241 Cargo handling for water transport activities 
52242 Cargo handling for air transport activities 
52243 Cargo handling for land transport activities 
52290 Other transportation support activities 
53100 Postal activities under universal service obligation 
53201 Licensed carriers 
53202 Unlicensed carriers 
SECTION I Accommodation and food service activities 
55100 Hotels and similar accommodation 
55201 Holiday centres and villages 
55202 Youth hostels 
 150 
 
55209 Other holiday and other collective accommodation 
55300 Recreational vehicle parks, trailer parks and camping grounds 
55900 Other accommodation 
56101 Licenced restaurants 
56102 Unlicenced restaurants and cafes 
56103 Take-away food shops and mobile food stands 
56210 Event catering activities 
56290 Other food services 
56301 Licenced clubs 
56302 Public houses and bars 
SECTION 
J 
Information and communication 
58110 Book publishing 
58120 Publishing of directories and mailing lists 
58130 Publishing of newspapers 
58141 Publishing of learned journals 
58142 Publishing of consumer and business journals and periodicals 
58190 Other publishing activities 
58210 Publishing of computer games 
58290 Other software publishing 
59111 Motion picture production activities 
59112 Video production activities 
59113 Television programme production activities 
59120 Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities 
59131 Motion picture distribution activities 
59132 Video distribution activities 
59133 Television programme distribution activities 
59140 Motion picture projection activities 
59200 Sound recording and music publishing activities 
60100 Radio broadcasting 
60200 Television programming and broadcasting activities 
61100 Wired telecommunications activities 
61200 Wireless telecommunications activities 
61300 Satellite telecommunications activities 
61900 Other telecommunications activities 
62011 Ready-made interactive leisure and entertainment software development 
62012 Business and domestic software development 
62020 Information technology consultancy activities 
62030 Computer facilities management activities 
62090 Other information technology service activities 
63110 Data processing, hosting and related activities 
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63120 Web portals 
63910 News agency activities 
63990 Other information service activities n.e.c. 
SECTION 
K 
Financial and insurance activities 
64110 Central banking 
64191 Banks 
64192 Building societies 
64201 Activities of agricultural holding companies 
64202 Activities of production holding companies 
64203 Activities of construction holding companies 
64204 Activities of distribution holding companies 
64205 Activities of financial services holding companies 
64209 Activities of other holding companies n.e.c. 
64301 Activities of investment trusts 
64302 Activities of unit trusts 
64303 Activities of venture and development capital companies 
64304 Activities of open-ended investment companies 
64305 Activities of property unit trusts 
64306 Activities of real estate investment trusts 
64910 Financial leasing 
64921 Credit granting by non-deposit taking finance houses and other specialist consumer credit 
grantors 
64922 Activities of mortgage finance companies 
64929 Other credit granting n.e.c. 
64991 Security dealing on own account 
64992 Factoring 
64999 Financial intermediation not elsewhere classified 
65110 Life insurance 
65120 Non-life insurance 
65201 Life reinsurance 
65202 Non-life reinsurance 
65300 Pension funding 
66110 Administration of financial markets 
66120 Security and commodity contracts dealing activities 
66190 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation n.e.c. 
66210 Risk and damage evaluation 
66220 Activities of insurance agents and brokers 
66290 Other activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding 
66300 Fund management activities 
SECTION Real estate activities 
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L 
68100 Buying and selling of own real estate 
68201 Renting and operating of Housing Association real estate 
68202 Letting and operating of conference and exhibition centres 
68209 Other letting and operating of own or leased real estate 
68310 Real estate agencies 
68320 Management of real estate on a fee or contract basis 
SECTION 
M 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 
69101 Barristers at law 
69102 Solicitors 
69109 Activities of patent and copyright agents; other legal activities n.e.c. 
69201 Accounting and auditing activities 
69202 Bookkeeping activities 
69203 Tax consultancy 
70100 Activities of head offices 
70210 Public relations and communications activities 
70221 Financial management 
70229 Management consultancy activities other than financial management 
71111 Architectural activities 
71112 Urban planning and landscape architectural activities 
71121 Engineering design activities for industrial process and production 
71122 Engineering related scientific and technical consulting activities 
71129 Other engineering activities 
71200 Technical testing and analysis 
72110 Research and experimental development on biotechnology 
72190 Other research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering 
72200 Research and experimental development on social sciences and humanities 
73110 Advertising agencies 
73120 Media representation services 
73200 Market research and public opinion polling 
74100 specialised design activities 
74201 Portrait photographic activities 
74202 Other specialist photography 
74203 Film processing 
74209 Photographic activities not elsewhere classified 
74300 Translation and interpretation activities 
74901 Environmental consulting activities 
74902 Quantity surveying activities 
74909 Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c. 
74990 Non-trading companynon trading 
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75000 Veterinary activities 
SECTION 
N 
Administrative and support service activities 
77110 Renting and leasing of cars and light motor vehicles 
77120 Renting and leasing of trucks and other heavy vehicles 
77210 Renting and leasing of recreational and sports goods 
77220 Renting of video tapes and disks 
77291 Renting and leasing of media entertainment equipment 
77299 Renting and leasing of other personal and household goods 
77310 Renting and leasing of agricultural machinery and equipment 
77320 Renting and leasing of construction and civil engineering machinery and equipment 
77330 Renting and leasing of office machinery and equipment (including computers) 
77341 Renting and leasing of passenger water transport equipment 
77342 Renting and leasing of freight water transport equipment 
77351 Renting and leasing of air passenger transport equipment 
77352 Renting and leasing of freight air transport equipment 
77390 Renting and leasing of other machinery, equipment and tangible goods n.e.c. 
77400 Leasing of intellectual property and similar products, except copyright works 
78101 Motion picture, television and other theatrical casting activities 
78109 Other activities of employment placement agencies 
78200 Temporary employment agency activities 
78300 Human resources provision and management of human resources functions 
79110 Travel agency activities 
79120 Tour operator activities 
79901 Activities of tourist guides 
79909 Other reservation service activities n.e.c. 
80100 Private security activities 
80200 Security systems service activities 
80300 Investigation activities 
81100 Combined facilities support activities 
81210 General cleaning of buildings 
81221 Window cleaning services 
81222 Specialised cleaning services 
81223 Furnace and chimney cleaning services 
81229 Other building and industrial cleaning activities 
81291 Disinfecting and exterminating services 
81299 Other cleaning services 
81300 Landscape service activities 
82110 Combined office administrative service activities 
82190 Photocopying, document preparation and other specialised office support activities 
82200 Activities of call centres 
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82301 Activities of exhibition and fair organisers 
82302 Activities of conference organisers 
82911 Activities of collection agencies 
82912 Activities of credit bureaus 
82920 Packaging activities 
82990 Other business support service activities n.e.c. 
SECTION 
O 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
84110 General public administration activities 
84120 Regulation of health care, education, cultural and other social services, not incl. social security 
84130 Regulation of and contribution to more efficient operation of businesses 
84210 Foreign affairs 
84220 Defence activities 
84230 Justice and judicial activities 
84240 Public order and safety activities 
84250 Fire service activities 
84300 Compulsory social security activities 
SECTION 
P 
Education 
85100 Pre-primary education 
85200 Primary education 
85310 General secondary education 
85320 Technical and vocational secondary education 
85410 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
85421 First-degree level higher education 
85422 Post-graduate level higher education 
85510 Sports and recreation education 
85520 Cultural education 
85530 Driving school activities 
85590 Other education n.e.c. 
85600 Educational support services 
SECTION 
Q 
Human health and social work activities 
86101 Hospital activities 
86102 Medical nursing home activities 
86210 General medical practice activities 
86220 Specialists medical practice activities 
86230 Dental practice activities 
86900 Other human health activities 
87100 Residential nursing care facilities 
87200 Residential care activities for learning difficulties, mental health and substance abuse 
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87300 Residential care activities for the elderly and disabled 
87900 Other residential care activities n.e.c. 
88100 Social work activities without accommodation for the elderly and disabled 
88910 Child day-care activities 
88990 Other social work activities without accommodation n.e.c. 
SECTION 
R 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 
90010 Performing arts 
90020 Support activities to performing arts 
90030 Artistic creation 
90040 Operation of arts facilities 
91011 Library activities 
91012 Archives activities 
91020 Museums activities 
91030 Operation of historical sites and buildings and similar visitor attractions 
91040 Botanical and zoological gardens and nature reserves activities 
92000 Gambling and betting activities 
93110 Operation of sports facilities 
93120 Activities of sport clubs 
93130 Fitness facilities 
93191 Activities of racehorse owners 
93199 Other sports activities 
93210 Activities of amusement parks and theme parks 
93290 Other amusement and recreation activities n.e.c. 
SECTION 
S 
Other service activities 
94110 Activities of business and employers membership organisations 
94120 Activities of professional membership organisations 
94200 Activities of trade unions 
94910 Activities of religious organisations 
94920 Activities of political organisations 
94990 Activities of other membership organisations n.e.c. 
95110 Repair of computers and peripheral equipment 
95120 Repair of communication equipment 
95210 Repair of consumer electronics 
95220 Repair of household appliances and home and garden equipment 
95230 Repair of footwear and leather goods 
95240 Repair of furniture and home furnishings 
95250 Repair of watches, clocks and jewellery 
95290 Repair of personal and household goods n.e.c. 
96010 Washing and (dry-)cleaning of textile and fur products 
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96020 Hairdressing and other beauty treatment 
96030 Funeral and related activities 
96040 Physical well-being activities 
96090 Other service activities n.e.c. 
SECTION 
T 
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing 
activities of households for own use 
97000 Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel 
98000 Residents property management 
98100 Undifferentiated goods-producing activities of private households for own use 
98200 Undifferentiated service-producing activities of private households for own use 
SECTION 
U 
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 
99000 Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 
99999 Dormant Company 
Source: ompany House 
 
